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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BODELL CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, 
a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MARK H. ROBBINS; CHEROKEE & 
WALKER INVESTMENT COMPANY, 
L.L.C., a Utah limited liability company; 
CHEROKEE AND WALKER, L.L.C., a 
Utah limited liability company; BANK 
ONE, UTAH, National Association, a Utah 
corporation; and DOES 1 through 50, 
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MOTION TO EXCLUDE EXPERT 
TESTIMONY OF MERRILL WEIGHT 
Case No. 030917018 
Judge John Paul Kennedy 
Pursuant to Rules 26(e) and 37(f), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and Rule 702, Utah 
Rules of Evidence, defendant Mark Robbins ("Robbins") hereby moves the court for an order 
excluding the expert testimony of Merrill Weight ("Weight"). 
The basis for this motion is that plaintiff Bodell Construction Company ("Bodell") has 
repeatedly stated in its initial disclosures and discovery responses that it seeks only the principal 
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amount it loaned to MSF Properties plus interest at the legal rate. These disclosures and 
responses have never been supplemented as required by Rule 26(e). Weight's opinions as to 
damages include additional theories that were not disclosed to the defendants until plaintiff 
served Weight's expert report after the fact discovery deadline. Mr. Weight's damages 
calculation should also be excluded because they find no basis under Utah law and the factual 
assumptions these calculations are based on are contradicted by the evidence already obtained in 
discovery. 
This motion is supported by a memorandum filed herewith 
Dated: June 28, 2007 DURHAM JONES & PINEGAR, P.C. 
D&vidW.Wts 
Erik A. Olson\ 
Jason R. Hull 
Attorneys for Mark Robbins 
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Richard D. Burbidge 
Stephen B. Mitchell 
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL 
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John A. Beckstead 
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
SLC 75053 

David \\ Tufts (8736) 
Erik A. Olson (8479) 
Jason R Hull (11202) 
DURH \M JONLS & PlM (.AK, \'.L 
111 East Broadway, Suite 900 
P.O. Box 4050 
Salt Lake City, Utah 8411 U-4» i -i i 
Telephone: (801)415-3000 
Facsimile: (801)415-3500 
Attorneys loi I Mi'iuk ul kl nl II Uobbm 
IN Ml) 1IIIK1), ! ! l ) l ( I VI, J)ISTRICT COURT 
s si i i M i < in r 11 s n i i in n n n 
BODELL CONSTRUCTION COMPANY 
a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MARK H. ROBBINS; CHEROKEE & 
WALKER INVESTMENT COMPANY, 
L.L.C., a Utah limited liability company; 
CHEROKEE AND WALKER, L.L.C., a 
Utah limited liability company; BANK 
ONE, UTAH, National Association, a Utal 
corporation; and DOES 1 through 50, 
Defendants. 
1IEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF (1) 
MOTION TO EXCLUDE EXPERT 
I ESTIMON\ OE MERRILL WEIGHT 
AND (2) MOTION TO REOPEN FACT 
DISCOVERY AND EXTEND EXPERT 
DE \DLINES 
Case No. 030917018 
Judge John Paul Kennedy 
Defendani Mai I Robbms heieby submits this memorandum in support of his motion to 
exclude the expert testimony of Merrill Weight or in the alternative to reopen fact discovery and 
extend expeit deadlines 
»* h i 
INTRODUCTION 
i iiiou.jiiuii laii uisco\ CP. - that is now closed, Bodell. Consti ii.cl.ioi 1 Goi i lpany ( "Bodcll' ) 
repeatedly stated that the damages it seeks are the principal amount it loaned to MSF Properties 
or Marc Jensen (collectively "Jenson") minus the amounts repaid • JC:;M»II puis unci-, -i .i : 
legal rate. Despite these repeated representations and Bodeli's failure to amend its disclosures 
and discovery responses as requirea oy lvLiR---MO. i u::; Km- - m *- =. d rroceuurcs, IM^K-M now 
attempts, through its expert Merrill Weight, to claim damages based on three new theories: die 
so-called "benelit ol me bargain Rule, Mourned Benefit of the Bargain i . .uui me 
"Reasonable Rate of Return" theory. Weight also provides a calculation for other consequential 
damages. Because Bodell has failed to disclose these new damages theories prior to the end of 
fact discovery, Weight should be t*\rluded from testifying thereon. 
Moreover, Weight's new theories should ne exciuueu as improper, i ne Beneiu wi ; 
Bargain" Rule and "Modified Benefit of the Bargain" Rule proposed by Weight do not match 
any theory recognized by Utah courts. Moreover, these types of calculations have been rejected 
by other jurisdictions. The "Reasonable Rate of Return" theory is not proper because Bodell 
cannot show the causal link between the facts of this case and the reiurn Y\ cigni ^ claiming. 
Finally, Weight's consequential damages analysis should be excluded for failing to show a 
causal nexus. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Bodell s Initial Disclosures ana HIM O\ ar\ ((espouses on Damages 
1. On January 27, 2004, Bodell served its initial disclosures on the defendants in this 
action. A. copy of Bod-; ;ll's initial disclosures are attached hei eto as Ex.1 i \ I liese i.ni.1 ial 
SLC 73104 
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disclosures expressly state: "Bodell's damages constitute the funds advanced, together with 
interest at the le<:;d r:ik\ !^ • ] '• " - \ | - 0 \ A . 
Since January 27, 2004, Bodell has not amended these disclosures to include other 
damages il .,. :^;e ^ « ;;! I K», I . ; 
»n September 22, 2004, Bodell served responses to the first discovery requests of 
h • • / ^e relevant pen tit )i is of these discovery i equesl s are attached hereto as 
Exh. B. Included m these responses is the following: 
I1N 1 E K K U I J A1UK\ NU. 1-. Describe in detail all of the damages that 
you allege you have suffered because of Robbins, giving a detailed calculation of 
how you arrive at such damages and identifying all witnesses, documents or other 
evidence that supports your claim for damages. 
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 22: Bodell objects to 
interrogatory upon the ground that it is overbroad and burdensome to the extent 
that it calls for the identification of "all witnesses, documents or other evidence 
that supports your claim for such damages." Subject to said objection and without 
waiving the same, Bodell responds as follows" See Bodell's response to CW's 
[Cherokee & Walker's] Interrogatory No. -1. !> akll has been damaged in the 
principal sum of $4 million representing the amount that Bodell was 
fraudulently induced to loan to MSF to in turn loan those fmids to Robbins. 
Bodell also contends that it is entitled to recover interest at the legal rate. 
Bodell also contends that it is entitled to recover punitive damages. I he 
documents supporting this calculation of damages have already been produced 
REQUEST [FOR PRODUCTION! NO. 10: All non-privileged doom lents 
that discuss, memorialize, constitute, demonstrate, or pertain to any damages that 
you claim to have suffered. 
RESPONSE 1 O REQUES1 NO. 10: All n o n - , - n . K ^ . a,, • 
the scope of this request have already been produced. 
See Exh. B (emphasis added). 
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4 Since Sep tember 22 , 2004 , Bodel l has not supp lemen ted its r e s p o n s e to Robbings 
Intei roga to ry I Jo. 22 or Reqi lest foi Pi odi ictioi i T lo. 10. S ee C XH n t Dockel 
5 On May 24, 2004, Bodell served responses to defendant Bank One's first 
discovery requests. Relevant pen tions of those responses are attached hereto as Exh. C. Inch idc d 
in these responses is the following: 
R E Q U E S T IFOR ADMISSION! NO. 7. Admit that ii Bwdcli pic\ai ls on all 
claims, the only amounts Bodell is entitled to recover from Bank One are the 
principal amount outstanding on the $4 million Bodell Eoan, interest on that 
amount at the rate provided in I hah Code vjvj \* • ] ••••* I ; ' 4, and costs of 
court. 
R E S P O N S E : Bodell admits that at this time he is not seeking punitive damages 
against Bank One. However, discovery is in its infancy and Bank one had not 
been forthcoming with all of the information requested. Accordingly, Bodell 
reserves the right to amend the complaint and seek punitive damages should 
subsequent discovery so justify. 
See Exh, C. 
6 On August 5, 2004, Bodell served a supplemental response to Bank One's 
Request: for Ac Ii n iss ion No. 7 listed ii i paragraph 5 above. A copy of this supplemental response 
is attached hereto as Exh. D. The supplemental response is as follows: 
SUPi' i .EiMEN I ' A L K I I S J ' U N M L : Admit. Discovery is in its infancy and Bank 
One has not been forthcoming with all of the information requested. Accordingly. 
Bodell reserves the right to amend its Complaint: to seek punitive damages should 
subsequent discovery justify such relief. 
7. Since August 5, 2004, Bodell has not supplemented its response to Bank One's 
i-!iu-"-a !•••! •<-• . See Court Docket. 
8. On April 9, 2004, Bodell served responses to defendant Cherokee & Walker's 
f • -; -•! "{"discovery. R elevant portioi is of these i espouses are attached hereto as Exl i. E. 
Included in these responses was the following: 
S'LC 73104 
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INTERROGATORY NO. 7: State specifically the amount of money 
Bodell contends it is entitled to receive from Cherokee & Walker in this action 
and explain in detail how that amount has been calculated. 
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 7: Bodell contends it is entitled 
to recover from Cherokee & Walker the principal sum of $4 million representing 
the amount that Bodell was fraudulently induced to loan to Robbins and by which 
amount Bodell contends Cherokee & Walker was unjustly enriched. Bodell 
contends it is also entitled to recover interest at the legal rate. 
See Exh. E. 
9. Since April 9, 2004, Bodell has not supplemented its response to Cherokee & 
Walker's Interrogatory No. 7. See Court Docket. 
Merrill Weight's Report on Damages 
10. Despite Bodell's repeated disclosure that the damages it seeks are "the principal 
sum of $4 million" plus "interest at the legal rate," Weight's report includes several new theories 
for calculation of damages including the "Benefit of the Bargain Rule," the "Modified Benefit of 
the Bargain Rule", the "Comparable Rate of Return" theory, and consequential damages. See 
Expert Report of Merrill Weight ("Weight Report") at 6-9. A copy of Weight Report is attached 
hereto as Exhibit F. The first three of these theories appear to be alternative calculations. Weight 
Report at 5-6. 
11. Weight's "Benefit of the Bargain Rule" analysis is based on the "contractual rate 
of interest" between Jenson and Bodell of "one percent (1.0%) per week, accruing on the 
outstanding balance weekly, in advance, at the beginning of each Wednesday, until it was 
repaid." Weight Report at 6. Based on this analysis, Weight calculates the total amount of 
damages after "[ajpplying interest at the contractual rate . . . and accounting for contractual loan 
fees and default fees, and after making adjustments for monies received in from Jenson" plus 
v 
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"reasonable attorneys fees and costs incurred by Bodell Construction" as "$18,843,290.39 (plus 
attorney fees and costs through trial)." Weight Report at 6-7. 
12. Weight's "Modified Benefit of the Bargain Rule" involves "applying the terms 
and conditions of the August 2000 loan agreement [between Jenson and Bodell] only through 
October 3, 2000, the date specified in the contract for payment of all outstanding principal and 
interest. . . [and] subsitut[ing] the statutory rate of interest (10%) for the contractual rate of 
interest (one percent per week)." Weight Report at 8. Weight then adds attorneys' fees and 
costs and interest payments as consequential damages to calculate a total damages figure of 
$5,890,768.12. Id 
13. In both Weight's "Benefit of the Bargain Rule" and "Modified Benefit of the 
Bargain Rule" calculation, Weight includes $127,281.18 in "consequential damages" 
representing "the amount of interest Bodell Construction was required to pay on money it was 
forced to borrow against its line of credit as a result of not receiving the payments promised in 
connection with the August 2000 Jenson loan." Weight Report at 7. 
14. At no point prior to the end of fact discovery did Bodell provide Robbins with any 
documentation or other information relating to "the amount of interest Bodell Construction was 
required to pay on money it was forced to borrow against its line of credit" as a result of Jenson 
not paying Bodell back the money it loaned him. 
15. Weight's "Comparable Rate of Return" analysis involves Weight estimating what 
Bodell "could have achieved . . . had it invested elsewhere the four million dollars it was instead 
induced to loan to Jenson." Weight Report at 9. Weight then "assume[s] a rate of 18 percent as 
a comparable rate of return available through other investments." Id. With this assumption of 18 
vi 
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percent return, Weight calculates Bodell's damages at $7,510,352.96. Id. The 18% rate of 
return assumption is based on loans made by MJB LTD. and James H. Bodell, not on loans that 
were either presented to Bodell or were entered into by Bodell. Weight Report at 8. 
16. At no point in time prior to the end of fact discovery did Bodell provide Robbins 
with information relating to Bodell's "comparable rate of return available through other 
investments." Bodell has never provided information about potential loans it was presented with 
or loans it has made in the past, other than the loans it made to Jenson. 
vn 
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ARGUMENT 
L BODELL SHOULD BE LIMITED TO THE DAMAGES THEORY IT 
DISCLOSED IN ITS INITIAL DISCLOSURES AND DISCOVERY RESPONSES. 
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure require a party to supplement its initial disclosures 
and discovery responses. See Utah R. Civ. P.26(e). "If a party fails to disclose a witness, 
document or other material as required by Rule 26(a) of Rules 26(e)(1), or to amend a prior 
response to discovery as required by Rule 26(e)(2), that party shall not be permitted to use the 
witness, document or other material." Utah R. Civ. P. 37(f) (emphasis added); see also Am. 
Interstate Mortg. Corp. v. Edwards, 2002 UT App 16, K 14, 41 P.3d 1142 (refusing to allow 
evidence relating to the total amount owed by the defendant where plaintiff had failed to 
supplement its response to defendant's request for production). Rule 37(f)'s "preclusionary 
sanction is 'automatic' absent a determination of either '[good cause]' or 'harmlessness.'" 
Design Strategies, Inc. v. Davis, 367 F. Supp. 630, 634 (S.D.N.Y. 2005);1 Utah R. Civ. P. 37(f). 
Both Bodell's initial disclosures and discovery responses indicate that Bodell is only 
seeking the $4 million in funds loaned to Jenson plus interest at the legal rate. See SOF fl 1, 3, 
5, 6, 8. These statements have never been supplemented to state a basis for other measures of 
damages, and Bodell has never provided any evidentiary support for such damages. See SOF fflf 
2, 4, 7, 9. Prior to Weight's report, Robbins did not know that Bodell was seeking damages 
based on Weight's new damages theories. Bodell's failure to supplement is not harmless and 
Bodell can show no good cause for its failure. 
A. Bodell's Failure To Disclose its New Damages Theories is Not Harmless. 
'"Interpretations of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are persuasive where the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure are 
'substantially similar' to the federal rules." Tucker v. State FarmMut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2002 UT 54, % 7 n. 2, 53 P.3d 
947 (citations omitted). 
" "SOF" refers to the Statement of Facts above. 
Bodelfs failure to disclose its new damages theory prior to the end of discovery and after 
making numerous representations that its damages theory was limited to the principal loaned 
plus interest at the legal rate is not harmless. "The burden to prove . . . harmlessness rests with 
the dilatory party.'" Design Strategies, 367 F. Supp. at 635 (citations omitted). 
Robbins "would thus be harmed if the Court were to permit [plaintiff] to pursue a [new] 
theory of damages, in that Defendants would be required to either postpone a trial for which they 
are otherwise prepared and which has already been significantly delayed, or proceed without 
having had the opportunity to conduct adequate discovery on this issue. Therefore, the Court 
[should] fmd[] that permitting [plaintiff] to advance a [new] theory of damages in this case 
would not be harmless." Design Strategies, 367 F. Supp. at 635 (excluding evidence of lost 
profits where plaintiff failed to disclose lost profits damages theory and failed to provide 
sufficient discovery of its allegedly lost profits). See also Thibeault v. Square D Company, 960 
F.2d 239, 246 (1st Cir. 1992) ("We think it is beyond dispute that an eleventh-hour change in a 
party's theory of the case can be equally harmful, perhaps more harmful, from the standpoint of 
his adversary.") (citations omitted). As in Design Strategies, Bodell never disclosed in its initial 
disclosures or responses to discovery requests, the damages theories that Weight appears to put 
forth—the Benefit of the Bargain Rule, Modified Benefit of the Bargain, Comparable Rate of 
Return and consequential damages. Likewise, Bodell has never supplemented its initial 
disclosures or discovery responses. Now that fact discovery is closed, Bodell should not be 
allowed to advance new theories that were not considered in fact discovery. Allowing Weight to 
testify as to these items is not "harmless" under Rule 37(f) and should be disallowed. 
B. Bodell has No Good Cause for Failing to Disclose its New Damages Theories. 
2 
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Bodell does not have "good cause" for failing to disclose its new damages theories: it 
cannot identify any reason for waiting until after the close of fact discovery and years have 
passed since it served its initial disclosures and discovery responses to identify its new damages 
theories. See Thibeault, 960 F.2d at 247 (excluding evidence where years had passed since the 
interrogatories were originally responded, fact discovery was complete and the plaintiff failed to 
supplement its discovery responses and noting that the plaintiff "has identified no other unusual 
circumstance that handicapped his ability to prepare his case in a timely fashion . . . it is simply 
inexcusable for a party, already late in responding, not to supplement his interrogatory answers, 
as required by Rule 26(e), as soon as practicable."). 
During the pendency of this action, the facts providing the alleged basis for Weight's 
opinion were in the control of Bodell. Bodell knew or should have loiown the "rates of return" it 
now claims and any interest that it claims it was forced to pay as a result of Jenson not repaying 
the loan. See Weight Report at 8-9. Bodell was also in the exclusive possession of documents 
evidencing what it claims to be the "Benefit of the Bargain Rule" damages as well as documents 
and other evidence showing its alleged "consequential damages." Bodell can identify "no other 
unusual circumstance that handicapped its ability to prepare its case in a timely fashion;" 
therefore, "it is simply inexcusable for" Bodell to now come forward with additional damages 
theories. Weight should be excluded. 
II. WEIGHT'S "BENEFIT OF THE BARGAIN" AND "MODIFIED BENEFIT OF 
THE BARGAIN" THEORIES SHOULD BE EXCLUDED BECAUSE THEY ARE 
IMPROPER THEORIES UNDER UTAH LAW. 
Weight improperly puts forth two new theories of damages that he labels the "Benefit of 
the Bargain" and "Modified Benefit of the Bargain." Weight's benefit of the bargain theory is 
3 
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nothing more than calculating the terms of the contract—including 52% interest—entered into 
between Bodell and Jenson and claiming that figure as damages against the defendants who are 
not parties to that contract. Weight Report at 6-7. Weight's modified benefit of the bargain 
takes all of the terms of the contract between Jenson and Bodell and substitutes the statutory rate 
of contractual interest (10%) for the period of time after Jenson was supposed to make payment. 
Weight Report at 8. Neither of these theories have been adopted by Utah law. 
In fraud cases involving the exchange of real estate or other tangible property, Utah 
courts allow a plaintiff to recover the "difference between the actual value of what is received 
and the value thereof if it had been as represented." Dilworth v. Lauritzen, 18 Utah.2d 386, 389 
(1967). Thus, "in an action for fraud and deceit the measure of damages is the difference 
between the actual value of what the party received and the value thereof if it had been as 
represented; this is the benefit of the bargain rule." Lamb v. Bangart, 525 P.2d 602, 609 (Utah 
1974). See also Brown v. Richards, 840 P.2d 143, 151 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) ("[B]enefit of the 
bargain damages are, in effect, a refund to the purchaser of the oveipayment in order to bring the 
effective purchase in line with the actual value received. Both parties thereby received the full 
benefit of the bargain."); Pace v. Parrish, 247 P.2d 273 (Utah 1952) (awarding the value of 
reservoir rights as damages for fraud where seller misrepresented that the reservoir rights were 
being sold with the property when the seller did not actually own the reservoir). 
No Utah court has ever expanded the Benefit of the Bargain Rule beyond transactions 
involving the transfer of real property or some other tangible asset. In fact, other jurisdictions 
have rejected the application of this theory in the loan context. In McLean v. Charles Ellis 
Realty, Inc., the plaintiff was induced by a third party to loan $100,000 to a borrower based on 
4 
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misrepresentations as to the borrower's experience, what was to occur with the money, and the 
certitude of the money being repaid. 76 P.3d 661, 663-64 (Ore. Ct. App. 2003). The lender 
received a $150,000 note payable within a year plus 20% interest for any additional time. Id. at 
664. The loan was not timely repaid and the lender brought suit against the third party for fraud. 
Id. at 665. The lender's expert provided the following "benefit of the bargain" calculation: 
Starting with the face amount of the note of $150,000, [lender's expert] added all 
expenditures incurred by the [lender] to recover their investment, plus interest of 
20 percent, less proceeds on the sale of [the collateral], for net damages of 
$303,945. 
Id. at 426. The court found that this was an improper measure of damages for fraud in 
inducing a loan explaining that the "benefit-of-the-bargain method [is not] particularly apt 
where, as here, no property changed hands and a value comparison is not available." Id. at 667. 
Weight's "Benefit of the Bargain" calculation is equivalent to that in McLean; he does 
nothing more than add up what is due under the terms of Bodell's contract with Jenson. There is 
no 'Value comparison" between the loan to Jenson as represented and the loan to Jenson as 
actually made. As in McLean, Weight's benefit of the bargain calculations should be excluded. 
III. WEIGHT'S CALCULATION OF "CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES" SHOULD 
BE EXCLUDED. 
To receive consequential damages, Bodell "must prove that consequential damages were 
in fact caused by the" alleged wrongdoing of Robbins. Castillo v. Atlanta Cas. Co., 939 P.2d 
1204, 1209 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (discussing consequential damages in breach of contract 
context). Bodell cannot show that the interest payments Weight includes in his calculation of 
consequential damages are actually attributable to Robbins' alleged wrongful actions; thus, 
Weight's testimony on consequential damages should be excluded. 
5 
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Weight does nothing more than provide a spread sheet showing Bodell's line of credit 
and all interest that has accrued on that line of credit since June 23, 2000. See Weight Report at 
Exh. 9.3 Weight does not discuss how these interest payments are attributable to the $4 million 
Jenson loan nor does Weight discuss other potential causes of this interest such as other 
investments made by Bodell or, perhaps, Michael Bodell's divorce payments. See Deposition of 
Marc Jenson ("Jenson Depo.") at 248, 251 (referring to conversations with Michael Bodell 
where Bodell stated that he needed money to "settle [his] divorce"). Specifically, Weight does 
not take into account the other $1 million loan Bodell made to Jenson that remained unpaid until 
2003. Jenson Depo. at 248. 
Moreover, a terse review of the spreadsheet attached to Weight's report—never produced 
during discovery—shows that all the interest that Weight includes in his "consequential 
damages" calculation cannot be as a result of defendants' actions. See Weight Report at Exh. 9. 
Specifically, Bodell loaned Jenson only $4 million. Yet, throughout the spreadsheet, there are 
periods of time where interest is accruing on more than $4 million. See Weight Report at Exh. 9 
(8-17-06, Principal Bal. $4,117,153,97; 8-31-06 through 9-06-06, Principal Bal. ranging from 
$4,232,603.22 to $5,081,805.86; 9-18-06, Principal Bal. $4,255,193.09; 9-21-06 through 10-11-
06, Principal Bal. ranging from $4,204,457.66 to $6,192,529.90; 10-10-06, Principal Bal. 
$4,015,673.77; 10-12-06, Principal Bal. $5,027,002.88). Weight does not control for the interest 
on amounts greater than $4 million. 
The Court should also be aware that Exhibit 9 to Weight Report appears to be incomplete. Specifically, it is dated 
6-23-00 to 12-31-06 but there are no entries from 6-23-00 through 4-01-02. Moreover, there are no entries between 
1-31-03 and 3-03-05. See Weight Report at Exh. 9. 
Relevant portions of Jenson Depo. are attached hereto as Exh. G. 
6 
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Bodell cannot show that but for Robbins actions it would not have had to incur interest on 
its line of credit; therefore, Weight's calculation should be excluded. 
IV. WEIGHT'S COMPARABLE RATE OF RETURN THEORY SHOULD BE 
EXCLUDED. 
Bodell cannot show that the 18% "comparable rate of return" Weight uses in his 
calculation of damages is equivalent to losses that are "a natural and proximate consequence of 
the defendant's misrepresentations." Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1329, 1250 (Utah 1980). 
Because an expert's calculations must be tied to the evidence and the evidence does not support 
an 18% rate of return, Weight's Comparable Rate of Return calculation should be excluded.5 
Weight's Comparable Rate of Return calculation fails because it is based on faulty 
assumptions. As the United States Supreme Court has explained: "nothing . . . requires a district 
court to admit opinion evidence which is connected to existing data only by the ipse dixit of the 
expert. A court may conclude that there is simply too great an analytical gap between the data 
and the opinion proffered." General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 147 (1997). See also 
Bass v. Spitz, 522 F. Supp. 1343, 1352 (E. D. Mich. 1981) (noting that without "connection" 
between an assumption relied on by an expert and actual evidence, an expert will not be allowed 
to base his testimony on those assumptions); Nebraska Plastics, Inc. v. Holland Colors Americas, 
Inc., 408 F.3d 410, 415 (8th Cir. 2005) ("An expert opinion that fails to consider the relevant 
facts of the case is fundamentally unsupported: 'If a party believes that an expert opinion has not 
considered all of the relevant facts, an objection to its admission is appropriate. Even a theory 
5
 In Ong Int'l (U.S.A.) v. 1 lth Ave. Corp., 850 P.2d 447 (Utah 1993), the plaintiffs were awarded their reasonable 
rate of return as proven by "uncontroverted expert testimony concerning the rate of return they would have received 
if the money had been invested elsewhere." Id. at 453. As discussed below, Weight's expert testimony in this case 
is controverted by the deposition testimony of Michael J. Bodell and Weight himself. 
7 
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that might meet certain Daubert factors, such as . . . general acceptance, should not be admitted if 
it does not apply to the specific facts of the case.7") (citation omitted); Elcock v. Kmart Corp., 
233 F.3d 734, 755, 756 (3d Cir. 2000) (affirming exclusion of damages expert who relied on 
assumptions that lacked foundation in record and failed to consider relevant facts). Weight 
makes several assumptions that are not supported by the evidence propounded during discovery: 
(1) that Bodell would have had an opportunity to loan to someone else the $4 million it had 
loaned to Jenson; (2) that Bodell would have attained roughly equivalent terms of loans made by 
other entities or individuals making similar loans; and (3) that Bodell would have actually been 
able to collect the principal and interest on its loan to someone else. See Weight Report at 8-9. 
First, Bodell has presented no evidence that it would have actually had an opportunity to 
fund a loan to someone else if it had not made the $4 million loan to Jenson. Rather, Weight's 
own deposition testimony indicates that Bodell does not regularly have such opportunities: "if 
we have excess funds that are available to make loans and we find an opportunity to loan those 
funds, then we pursue that, and have made loans." Deposition of Merrill Weight ("Weight 
Depo.")6 at 14:8-11. Nothing that has been produced by Bodell or relied on by Weight shows 
that Bodell would have been able to "find an opportunity to loan" the funds it provided to 
Jenson. hi fact, Bodell had limited opportunities to make such loans. Deposition of Michael 
Bodell ("Bodell Depo.")7 at 13:22-15:16 (indicating that Bodell has only made 10 to 15 loans in 
the past 15 years). Given the small quantity of loans it is unlikely that Bodell would have had 
such an opportunity. 
Relevant portions of Weight Depo. are attached as Exh. H. 
Relevant portions of Bodell Depo. are attached as Exh. I. 
8 
SLC_73104 
Second, Weight claims that Bodell would have been able to fund loans at 18% return. 
This assumption is based on the loan documents of MJB Ltd. and James H. Bodell but not 
Bodell's own interest rates on loans of this sort. Weight Report at 8-9. Weight ignores the fact 
that Bodell construction does not have any sort of set interest rate for these transactions: "There 
is not a typical rate of return." Bodell Depo. at 15:24-16:4. In fact, the interest rate on the loans 
made by Bodell ranges from 8% to 50%. Id at 17:21-18:8. Bodell camiot show that it would 
have actually attained loan terms equivalent to those of MJBN, Ltd. or James H. Bodell. 
Finally and importantly, Weight assumes that if Bodell had achieved loans with terms 
including 18% interest, Bodell would have actually been able to collect the principal plus 18% 
interest. However, Bodell's track record with these types of loans indicates otherwise: "The rate 
of return, I'd say, between 5 and 15 percent. . . to calculate them all, as a practical matter 
sometimes you don't get paid as much as you want on the return or get paid in part." Bodell 
Depo. at 16:7-18. See also Weight Depo. at 20:9-14 (There have been times that Bodell "didn't 
get paid what [it was] expecting to receive pursuant to the tenns of the loans."); 20:14-21 ("there 
were interest amounts on top of that that were not collected."). 
Weight's key assumptions as to the amount of interest Bodell would have realized had it 
been able to make other loans with the $4 million it loaned to Jenson are baseless in the current 
discovery record. Therefore, Weight's "Reasonable Rate of Return" theory should be excluded. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Weight's Benefit of the Bargain theory, Modified Benefit of the 
Bargain Theory, Consequential Damages calculation and Comparable Rate of Return calculation 
should be excluded, hi the alternative, defendants should be granted additional time to conduct 
SLC 73104 
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fact discovery relating to the facts that Weight bases his calculations on and the deadlines 
expert disclosures should be tolled until such additional discovery can be had. 
Dated: June 28, 2007 Du 
Jason R. Hull 
Attorneys for Mark Robbins 
RHAM JONES & JfINEGAR, Jf.CJ 
Frik A 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this ^ 7 ^day of June, 2007,1 caused a copy of the within and 
foregoing MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO EXCLUDE EXPERT 
TESTIMONY OF MERRILL WEIGHT to be sent via hand-delivery to the following: 
Richard D. Burbidge 
Stephen B. Mitchell 
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL 
215 South State Street, Suite 920 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
John A. Beckstead 
HOLLAND & HART 
60 East South Temple, Suite 2000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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RICHARD D. BURBIDGE, Esq., (#0492) 
JEFFERSON W. GROSS, Esq., (#8339) 
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Parkside Tower 
215 South State, Suite 920 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801) 355-6677 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BODELL CONSTRUCTION 
COMPANY, a Utah corporation 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MARK H. ROBBINS; CHEROKEE & 
WALKER INVESTMENT COMPANY, 
L.L.C., a Utah limited liability company; 
CHEROKEE AND WALKER, L.L.C., a 
Utah limited liability company; BANK 
ONE, UTAH, National Association, a 
Utah corporation; and DOES 1 through 
50, 
Defendants. 
Pursuant to Rule 26(a)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff Bodell 
Construction Company ("Bodell') hereby makes the following Initial Disclosures: 
1. The name, and, if known, the address and telephone number of each 
individual likely to have discoverable information supporting Bodell's claims, unless 
solely for impeachment, and the subjects of the information are as follows: 
PLAINTIFF BODELL 
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY'S 
RULE 26(a)(1) INITIAL 
DISCLOSURES 
Civil No. 030917018 
Judge William B. Bohling 
1. Michael Bodell C/O Burbidge & Mitchell 215 
South State Street, Suite 920, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, 
telephone (801)355-6677. Mr. Bodell has knowledge 
concerning the loans made by Bodell to MSF Properties, L.C. 
The communications relating to such loans and the 
representations made to Bodell that induced it to make the 
loans and the settlement entered into between Bodell, MSF 
and Marc Jenson and the communications concerning the 
settlement. 
2. Merrill Weight C/O Burbidge & Mitchell. Mr. 
Weight is an employee of Bodell Construction. He has 
knowledge concerning the loans made by Bodell to MSF, the 
amounts owing to Bodell on the loans and the settlement with 
MSF and Jenson and the communications between the parties 
concerning the settlement. 
3. Marc Jenson 2069 East Normandy Woods Court, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117. Mr. Jenson is believed to have 
knowledge concerning the loans made by Bodell and the 
communications with, and representations made to Bodell 
with respect to the loans, MSF's failure to pay the loans, the 
representations made by Robbins to Jenson, and the 
settlement between Bodell, MSF, and Jenson and the 
communications relating thereto. 
4. Mark H. Robbins C/O Jeffrey M. Jones, Durham 
Jones, & Pinegar, 111 East Broadway, Suite 900, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84111. Mr. Robbins is believed to have 
knowledge concerning his transactions with Cherokee and 
Walker, his communications with, and representations made 
to, Robbins, the loans that he obtained from MSF/Jenson and 
his failure to pay the loans. 
2. Bodell has in its possession or under its control the following categories of 
documents supporting its claims: 
a. Documents relating to the MSF loans and the 
amounts owing thereon. 
b. The August 22, 2001 letter from Ben Lightner to 
"Whom It May Concern" that is attached as Exhibit A to the 
Complaint. 
c. Documents relating to the settlement between 
Bodell, MSF and Jenson. 
3. Bodell's damages constitute the funds advanced, together with interest at the 
legal rate, less the payment received from MSF. The precise calculations have not yet 
been completed. Bodell will make available for inspection copying all discoverable 
documents or other evidentiary material on which a computation is based. 
4. There is no insurance agreement under which any person carrying on an 
insurance business may be liable to satisfy part or all of the judgment that may be entered 
in this case or to indemnify or reimburse for payments made to satisfy the judgmej&i 
DATED this day of January, 2004. 
BURBIDGE & 
RICHARD D. BURBIDGE 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
rftf\\„ 
B 
-'xtfn 
RICHARD D. BURBIDGE, Esq. (#0492) 
JEFFERSON W. GROSS, Esq. (#8339) 
ROBERT J. SHELBY, Esq. (#8319) 
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL 
215 South State Street, Suite 920 
Salt Lake City, Utah 841 111 
Telephone: 801-355-6677 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Bodell Construction Company 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY STATE OF UTAH 
BODELL CONSTRUCTION 
COMPANY, a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
MARK H. ROBBINS; CHEROKEE & 
WALKER INVESTMENT 
COMPANY, L.L.C., a Utah limited 
liability company; CHEROKEE AND 
WALKER, L.L.C., a Utah limited 
liability company; BANK ONE, UTAH, 
national Associations, a Utah 
corporation; and DOES 1 through 50, 
Defendants. 
Plaintiff Bodell Construction Company's responses to Robbins' First Set of 
Discovery Requests to Plaintiff. 
PLAINTIFF BODELL 
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY'S 
RESPONSES TO ROBBINS' FIRST 
SET OF DISCOVERY REQUESTS 
TO PLAINTIFF 
Case No. 030917018 
Judge William B. Bohling 
GENERAL OBJECTIONS 
Bodell objects to these discovery requests to the extent that: (1) they seek 
information that is not within Bodell's possession, custody or control; (2) they seek 
discovery that is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative of other discovery conducted in 
this matter and related matters or is obtainable from some other source that is more 
convenient, less burdensome, less expensive or is otherwise equally available to 
Defendants; (3) they may be construed to require responses beyond the duties and 
responsibilities of a responding party under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and 
other applicable discovery rules, if any; and (4) they seek documents that no longer exist 
or cannot be conveniently located. 
Bodell generally objects to these discovery requests to the extent they are vague, 
unduly burdensome, ambiguous, overly broad and not identified with reasonable 
particularity. 
Bodell generally objects to the use of the terms "every," "each," "all," "any," or 
other similar words of expansion as overly broad and unduly burdensome. 
Bodell generally objects to the discovery requests to the extent they call for 
information with respect to individuals or entities other than Bodell. 
In responding to these discovery requests, Bodell bases its answers, responses and 
objections upon currently available information that is now known. Bodell's 
investigation and search for responsive information is ongoing. Bodell has not completed 
its investigation of the facts pertinent to its action or its discovery in preparation for trial 
in its action and, therefore, reserves the right to amend, modify or supplement the 
2 
answers, responses and objections stated herein. Bodell further states that by making its 
general objection, it does not undertake any duty to supplement these discovery responses 
except to the extent specifically required by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
In responding to these discovery requests, Bodell does not in any manner, waive or 
intend to waive, but rather intend to preserve and is preserving: (1) all objections as to 
competency, relevancy, materiality and admissibility; (2) all rights to object on any 
ground to the use of any of the responses herein or documents in any proceeding, motion, 
hearing or the trial of its or any other action; and (3) all rights to object on any ground to 
further discovery requests involving or related to any of the requests herein. 
Bodell objects to these discovery requests to the extent they seek information 
protected by the attorney/client privilege or work product doctrine, including joint-
defense work product. Privileged information responsive to any request below is not 
provided. Bodell does not waive, intend to preserve and is preserving the attorney/client 
privilege, the work product privilege, and every other privilege with respect to each and 
every document protected by such privilege. 
Bodell generally objects to these discovery requests to the extent they seek 
information not relevant to the issues raised in its lawsuit and not reasonably calculated to 
lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. 
Bodell generally objects to these discovery requests to the extent they request 
disclosure of confidential or proprietary information and further assert each and every 
applicable privilege and rule governing confidentiality to the fullest extent provided by 
law. 
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RICHARD D. BURBIDGE, Esq, (#0492) 
STEPHEN B. MITCHELL, Esq. (#2278) 
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Parkside Tower 
215 South State, Suite 920 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801) 355-6677 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BODELL CONSTRUCTION 
COMPANY, a Utah corporation 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MARK H. ROBBINS; CHEROKEE & 
WALKER INVESTMENT COMPANY, 
L.L.C., a Utah limited liability company; 
CHEROKEE AND WALKER, L.L.C, a 
Utah limited liability company; BANK 
ONE, UTAH, National Association, a 
Utah corporation; and DOES 1 through 
50, 
Defendants. 
Plaintiff Bodell Construction Company ("Bodell") hereby responds to 
Defendant Bank One's First Set of Requests for Admissions, Interrogatories, and 
Requests for Production of Documents as follows: 
PLAINTIFF BODELL 
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY'S 
RESPONSES TO BANK ONE'S 
FIRST SET OF REQUESTS FOR 
ADMISSIONS, 
INTERROGATORIES, AND 
REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF 
DOCUMENTS 
Civil No. 030917018 
Judge William B. Bohling 
GENERAL OBJECTIONS 
Bodell objects to these discovery requests to the extent that: (1) they seek 
information that is not within Bodell's possession, custody or control; (2) they seek 
discovery that is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative of other discovery conducted in 
this matter and related matters or is obtainable from some other source that is more 
convenient, less burdensome, less expensive or is otherwise equally available to 
Defendants; (3) they may be construed to require responses beyond the duties and 
responsibilities of a responding party under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and other 
applicable discovery rules, if any; and (4) they seek documents that no longer exist or 
cannot be conveniently located. 
Bodell generally objects to these discovery requests to the extent they are vague, 
unduly burdensome, ambiguous, overly broad and not identified with reasonable 
particularity. 
Bodell generally objects to the use of the terms "every," "each," "all," "any," or 
other similar words of expansion as overly broad and unduly burdensome. 
Bodell generally objects to the discovery requests to the extent they call for 
information with respect to individuals or entities other than Bodell. 
In responding to these discovery requests, Bodell bases its answers, responses and 
objections upon currently available information that is now known. Bodell's 
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investigation and search for responsive information is ongoing. Bodell has not completed 
its investigation of the facts pertinent to its action or its discovery in preparation for trial 
in its action and, therefore, reserves the right to amend, modify or supplement the 
answers, responses and objections stated herein. Bodell further states that by making its 
general objection, it does not undertake any duty to supplement these discovery responses 
except to the extent specifically required by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
In responding to these discovery requests, Bodell does not in any manner, waive or 
intend to waive, but rather intends to preserve and is preserving: (1) all objections as to 
competency, relevancy, materiality and admissibility; (2) all rights to object on any 
ground to the use of any of the responses herein or documents in any proceeding, motion, 
hearing or the trial of its or any other action; and (3) all rights to object on any ground to 
further discovery requests involving or related to any of the requests herein. 
Bodell objects to these discovery requests to the extent they seek information 
protected by the attorney/client privilege or work product doctrine, including joint-
defense work product. Privileged information responsive to any request below is not 
provided. Bodell does not waive, intends to preserve and is preserving the attorney/client 
privilege, the work product privilege, and every other privilege with respect to each and 
every document protected by such privilege. 
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Bodell generally objects to these discovery requests to the extent they seek 
information not relevant to the issues raised in its lawsuit and not reasonably calculated to 
lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. 
Bodell generally objects to these discovery requests to the extent they request 
disclosure of confidential or proprietary information and further asserts each and every 
applicable privilege and rule governing confidentiality to the fullest extent provided by 
law. 
Bodell generally objects to these discovery requests to the extent they seek 
information and documents from time periods that are irrelevant to any issue in its 
lawsuit. 
These objections apply to each numbered response as if set forth therein unless 
otherwise specified. 
A republication or statement, in whole or in part, of any one or more of the 
foregoing objections is not intended to waive an objection otherwise not stated. 
By agreeing to produce documents in response to a particular request, Bodell does 
not thereby intend to represent, nor does it represent, that any such documents in fact exist 
or have ever existed in its possession, custody or control. Rather, by agreeing to produce 
documents in response to a particular request, Bodell intends thereby to represent that it 
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will produce non-privileged documents in its present custody, possession or control, if 
any, that are responsive to the request. 
Subject to such objections and without waiving the same, Bodell responds to the 
discovery requests as follows. 
INTERROGATORIES 
INTERROGATORY NO. 1: Identify each person you will or may call as a 
witness at trial and describe generally the matters to which each person is to testify. 
(Please comply with the definition of the term "identify" as expressed in paragraph 4, 
above.) 
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 1: Bodell has not yet 
determined the witnesses it will or may call as witnesses at trial or the matters to which 
they will testify. Bodell is willing to exchange witness lists with the Defendants after 
completion of discovery and a reasonable time prior to trial. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 2: Identify each person you have consulted in 
anticipation of or preparation for trial who is not expected to be called as a witness at 
trial, specifying the purpose for which he or she has been consulted by you. (Please 
comply with the definition of the term "identify" as expressed in paragraph 4, above.) 
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RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 2: Bodell objects to this 
interrogatory upon the ground that it seeks information that is protected under the work 
product privilege. Subject to such objection and without waiving the same, Bodell has 
not at this time consulted with any such person. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 3: Identify each document that you will or may 
introduce as an exhibit at trial. (Please comply with the definition of the term "identify" 
as expressed in paragraph 9, above.) 
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 3: Bodell has not yet 
determined the documents that it will or may introduce as exhibits at trial. Bodell is 
willing to exchange exhibit lists with the Defendants after completion of discovery and a 
reasonable time prior to trial. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 4: Identify all communications between Mark 
Robbins and Michael Bodell. (Please comply with the definitions of the term "identify" 
and "communications" as expressed in paragraphs 7 and 8 of the Definition section, 
above.) 
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 4: Bodell objects to this 
inteiTogatory on the ground that it is overbroad and burdensome. Subject to such 
objection and without waiving the same, Bodell responds as follows. The 
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communications that Michael Bodell presently recalls with Robbins are set forth in 
answer to Interrogatory No. 16. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 5: Identify each and every communication you 
attribute to Mark Robbins that you claim was fraudulent when spoken, and for each such 
allegedly fraudulent communication describe in detail every action you took (or did not 
take) in reliance on such communication(s). (Please comply with the definition of the 
terms "you," "identify," and "communications" as expressed in paragraphs 1, 7, and 8 of 
the Definitions section, above.) 
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 5: Bodell believes that 
Robbins made to Jensen the representations alleged in paragraph 12(a), (b) and (c) of the 
Complaint. Robbins then repeated these misrepresentations to Bodell. Bodell also 
believes that Robbins and Jenson obtained the August 22, 2000 Ben Lightner letter 
representing that Vtrax, Robbins and Jensen would be depositing $165 million into Bank 
One coming from a loan agreement between Vtrax and Arimex Investments, Ltd., and 
that Robbins knew or should have known that Jenson would utilize the letter to borrow 
funds to lend to Robbins. Jenson also represented to Bodell that Robbins and Jenson 
could repay the Bodell loan within thirty days. Jenson and Robbins failed to disclose to 
Bodell that the letter from Bank One was false and that Madwagon, Vtrax and Wasatch 
did not have a value any where near $16 million, that MSF's loan to Robbins' would 
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therefore be in large part unsecured and that Robbins' ability to repay the loan was highly 
suspect. In reliance upon these representations and omissions, Bodell made the $4 
million loan to Jenson's company, MSF Properties, LC ("MSF"). Bodell has not yet had 
an opportunity to conduct relevant discovery with respect to the information sought by 
this interrogatory, including the depositions of Robbins, Jenson, Lightner and Cherokee & 
Walker ("CW") and other individuals involved in the transactions, and reserves the right 
to supplement its answer after discovery is completed to the extent required by the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 6: State the factual basis for your allegation in 
paragraphs 22 and 27 of your Complaint that Robbins and the Doe Defendants "acted 
fraudulently, maliciously and with the specific intent of injuring Bodell and/or with 
reckless disregard of the substantial risk of harm to Bodell from their actions." (Please 
comply with the definition of the "state the factual basis" as expressed in paragraph 6 of 
the Definitions section, above.) 
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 6: See Response to 
Interrogatory Nos. 5 and 16. Robbins knew or should have known that Jenson and MSF 
were going to borrow from third parties, including Bodell, the money that MSF loaned to 
Robbins and that they would do so by repeating the representations that Robbins had 
made with respect to the value of the companies, Robbins' net worth, Robbins' ability to 
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acquire Mongoose, Robbins' ability to repay the loan and by providing the Bank One 
letter. Robbins knew that the representations were false because the value of the 
companies was far less than represented by Robbins, Robbins' net worth was far less than 
represented and it was unlikely that he could acquire Mongoose or pay back the $8 
million loan from Jenson. Robbins also knew, or should have known, that it was highly 
speculative whether Robbins could ever repay the $8 million loan to Jenson and therefore 
it was highly speculative whether Jenson could repay the $4 million loan from Bodell. In 
this regard, Vtrax, was a start up company that had little or no value. Wasatch Cycles had 
only been in business for one year and although documents reflect that it had made 
significant bicycles sales, it did not manufacture the bicycles itself and its source of 
supply was uncertain as was its ability to continue generating sales. Robbins had no 
agreement to acquire Mongoose and did not have the financial resources to do so. 
Contemporaneous financial statements prepared by Robbins vastly overstated his net 
worth based upon extremely inflated values of his interests in these companies and other 
assets. The agreements, financial statements, credit analyses, correspondence and other 
documents that have been produced by Robbins, CW and Bank One reflect these facts. 
Bodell has not yet had an opportunity to conduct relevant discovery with respect to the 
information sought by this interrogatory, including the depositions of Robbins, Jenson, 
Lightner and CW and other individuals involved in the transactions, and reserves the right 
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to supplement its answer after discovery is completed to the extent required by the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 7: State the factual basis for your allegation in 
paragraph 24 (and paragraph 11) of your complaint that "Robbins and the Doe 
Defendants formed and joined in a conspiracy with one another, the purpose of which 
was to raise money from Bodeli and other third parties through fraudulent 
misrepresentations and omissions for the purpose of paying Cherokee $8,000,000.00 and 
raising other funds in order to attempt to acquire Mongoose and for other purposes in 
order to enrich said Defendants." (Please comply with the definition of the "state the 
factual basis" as expressed in paragraph 6 of the Definitions section, above.) 
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 7: See Responses to 
Interrogatory Nos. 5, 6 and 16. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 8: Identify each and every person who participated 
in any way in the "conspiracy" (as alleged in the Second Claim for Relief of your 
Complaint), stating the factual basis of each persons' involvement in the alleged 
conspiracy. (Please comply with the definitions of the terms "identify" and "state the 
factual basis" as expressed in paragraphs 4 and 6 of the Definitions section, above.) 
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 8: Bodeli has not yet 
identified any members of the conspiracy other than Robbins. Bodeli has not yet had an 
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opportunity to conduct relevant discovery with respect to the information sought by this 
interrogatory, including the depositions of Robbins, Jenson, Lightner and CW and other 
individuals involved in the transactions, and reserves the right to supplement its answer 
after discovery is completed to the extent required by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 9: Identify all communications or other acts that 
were made in furtherance of the "conspiracy" as alleged in the Second Claim for Relief of 
your Complaint. (Please comply with the definitions of the terms "identify" and 
"communications" as expressed in paragraphs 7 and 8 of the Definitions section, above.) 
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 9: See Responses to 
Interrogatory Nos. 5, 6, 8 and 16. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 10: State the factual basis for your allegation that 
Robbins has been unjustly enriched as alleged in the Fourth Claim for Relief of your 
Complaint. (Please comply with the definition of the phrase "state the factual basis" as 
expressed in paragraph 6 of the Definitions section, above.) 
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 10: See Responses to 
Interrogatory Nos. 5, 6 and 16. Robbins received $4 million of Bodell's money through 
Jenson and MSF. Bodell believes that Robbins knew or should have known that the 
money was being borrowed by Jenson and MSF from Bodell or at least that Jenson and 
MSF were borrowing the money from one or more third parties and that Jenson would 
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obtain the money by repeating the misrepresentations made by Robbins and providing the 
Bank One letter to Bodell and other prospective lenders. It would be unjust to permit 
Robbins to retain the money that he wrongfully acquired. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 11: State the factual basis for your allegation 
(contained in paragraph 35 of your Complaint) that "the $4 Million loan made by Bodell 
to MSF . . . was in turn paid to Robbins and ultimately Cherokee." (Please comply with 
the definition of the phrase "state the factual basis" as expressed in paragraph 6 of the 
Definitions section, above.) 
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO, 11: See response to 
Interrogatory No. 16. Jenson informed Bodell that the $4 million that Bodell would loan 
to MSF would in turn be loaned to Robbins and Robbins confirmed that fact also. Jenson 
later confirmed that the money was loaned to Robbins. The documents that have been 
produced by Bank One, Robbins and CW reflect that MSF made an $8 million loan to 
Robbins which he deposited into his bank account at Bank One (which at the time was 
overdrawn) including a deposit of $4 Million on August 30, 2000. The documents also 
reflect that Robbins defaulted by failing to repay the loan. Finally, the documents reflect 
that Robbins utilized the loan proceeds to pay to CW. CW's interrogatory answer no. 6 
reflects that it received $6,079,862.52 from Robbins during the period from August 31, 
2000 through September 11, 2000. 
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INTERROGATORY NO. 12: State the factual basis for your allegation that 
"Madwagon, Vtrax and Wasatch were worth little, if anything." (Complaint, <fl 36) (Please 
comply with the definition of the phrase ustate the factual basis" as expressed in 
paragraph 6 of the Definitions section, above.) 
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 12: See Response to 
Interrogatory Nos. 5, 6 and 16. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 13: State the factual basis for all the allegations you 
make in paragraph 12 of your Complaint, including, in particular, the factual basis for 
your allegation that "Robbins knew and intended" that Jenson would repeat to Bodell the 
statements alleged in subparagraphs (a), (b) and (c) of paragraph 12, (Please comply with 
the definition of the phrase "state the factual basis" as expressed in paragraph 6 of the 
Definitions section, above.) 
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 13: Bodell objects to this 
interrogatory upon the ground that it is overbroad and burdensome. Subject to such 
objection and without waiving the same, Bodell responds as follows. See Responses to 
Interrogatory Nos. 5, 6 and 16 and Bodell's response to Bank One Interrogatory Nos. 7 
and 8. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 14: State the factual basis for your allegation that 
the statements found in subparagraphs (a), (b) and (c) of paragraph 12 of your Complaint 
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were false when made. (Please comply with the definitions of the phrase "slate the 
factual basis" as expressed in paragraph 6 of the Definitions section, above.) 
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 14: See Response to 
Interrogatory Nos. 5, 6 and 16 and Bodell's responses to Bank One Interrogatory Nos. 7 
and 8. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 15: State the factual basis for your allegation that 
Robbins had some participation in obtaining the letter dated August 22, 2000, signed by 
Ben Lightner of Bank One, as alleged in paragraph 13 of your Complaint, describing in 
detail the full extent of any such participation. (Please comply with the definition of the 
phrase "state the factual basis" as expressed in paragraph 6 of the Definitions section, 
above.) 
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 15: See response to 
Interrogatory No. 16. The allegation in paragraph 13 is made on information and belief 
based upon the fact that the letter represents that Vtrax, Jenson and Robbins would be 
depositing $165 million into Bank One coming from a loan agreement between Robbins' 
company, Vtrax and Arimex Investments, Ltd., that Robbins was a customer of Bank One 
and that Jenson utilized the letter to raise funding for Robbins. Bodell has not yet had an 
opportunity to conduct relevant discovery with respect to the information sought by this 
interrogatory, including the depositions of Robbins, Jenson, Lightner and CW and other 
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individuals involved in the transactions, and reserves the right to supplement its answer 
after discovery is completed to the extent required by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 16: Identify all communications between Mark 
Jenson and anyone acting on behalf of Bodell Construction Company concerning the 
$4,000,000 loan that Bodell made to MSF Properties, L.C. (Please comply with the 
definitions of the terms "identify " and "communications" as expressed in paragraphs 7 
and 8 of the Definitions section, above.) 
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 16: See Bodell's response to 
Bank One's Interrogatory No. 8. When the loans made by Bodell to MSF were not paid 
as agreed, Mr. Bodell contacted Marc Jenson to inquire why the loans had not been 
repaid. Jenson told him in substance that Robbins had not yet received the money that 
was coming in on the bike deal but was expecting it shortly, and that as soon as Robbins 
got the money he would repay Jenson who would then repay Bodell. During the period of 
time from September through mid-November 2000, Mr. Bodell had several conversations 
with Mr. Jenson in which these same types of statements were repeated. Mr. Bodell told 
Mr. Jenson during these conversations that it was very important that Bodell be repaid the 
money by the end of its fiscal year which was December 31, 2000. Jenson assured him 
that the money would be repaid prior to that time. 
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In approximately mid-November 2000, in response to continued inquiries from Mr. 
Bodell, Jenson arranged a meeting between Jenson, Robbins and Mr. Bodell. The 
meeting took place at the Market Street Grill in Cottonwood. At the meeting, Mr. Bodell 
told Robbins in substance that Jenson had told him that the money to repay Bodell was 
coming from Robbins and Bodell wanted some information and assurances as to when 
Robbins was going to repay Jenson so that Jenson could repay Bodell. Robbins stated in 
substance that he was glad for the opportunity to meet Mr. Bodell because he had not 
been aware of all of the investors who had invested money with Jenson to loan to 
Robbins. Robbins stated the loan he was obtaining for his bike business would close 
shortly, that there was plenty of money in the loan to take care of Bodell, that Robbins 
would see that Jenson was repaid shortly so that Jenson could repay Bodell and that 
Robbins would certainly repay Jenson before the end of the year. After dinner, Robbins 
and Jenson took Mr. Bodell to the Jazz game. Mr. Bodell does not recall any further 
discussion about business at the Jazz game. 
During the next few weeks, Mr. Bodell had a number of conversations with Mr. 
Jenson inquiring when the loan was going to be repaid. Jenson assured him during each 
conversation that the money would be forthcoming from Robbins shortly. 
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Near the end of December 2000, in a telephone conversation, Jenson told Mr. 
Bodell for the first time that it appeared that Jenson had been defrauded by Robbins, that 
there was ao loan and that the value of the bike company was not as represented. 
In approximately early 2001, Jenson told Mr. Bodell that he was taking over the 
bike company because of Robbins' default and misrepresentations. Jenson said that he 
would try to get Bodell repaid from other sources as soon as possible. 
During the next several months, Mr. Bodell had a number of conversations with 
Jenson in which Mr. Bodell would continually inquire as to the status of Jenson's efforts 
to repay Bodell and Jenson would respond essentially that he was working on it, but 
didn't have the money to do so yet. 
During this period of time, Jenson and Mr. Bodell had approximately three 
telephone conversations with Robbins. Jenson and Mr. Bodell were at Jenson's office. 
During these conversations, the discussions centered on how Robbins was going to repay 
the loan from Jenson so that Jenson could repay Bodell. Jenson accused Robbins of 
misrepresenting the transactions to him and stated that Robbins had gotten him into 
trouble by misrepresenting the transactions. Robbins admitted that he had misrepresented 
the transactions and told Jenson and Mr. Bodell that he would try to do whatever he could 
do to make it good. 
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Sometime in the Summer or early Fall of 2001, Mr. Bodell attended a meeting with 
Jenson and Robbins at Jenson's office. Bodell had heard that Robbins had thrown an 
$80,000 New Year's Eve party and had purchased a $200,000 Ferrari and questioned 
Robbins as to where the $8 Million he obtained from Jenson had gone. Robbins said that 
most of the money had gone to Cherokee & Walker. Mr. Bodell asked him how much 
Cherokee & Walker had made on the transaction. Robbins responded that Cherokee & 
Walker made more than $3 Million on the deal. 
During the same time frame, Jenson told Mr. Bodell that Robbins had impregnated 
a woman out of wedlock and that her father was extremely wealthy. Jenson said that 
Robbins had told him that Robbins had told the woman that he had defrauded Jenson and 
could be in trouble with the legal authorities unless he repaid Jenson. Robbins further 
told Jenson that the woman was attempting to convince her father to let her use family 
assets so that Robbins could repay Jenson and they would get married. Jenson also told 
Mr. Bodell during this time frame that he had actually spoken to the woman who 
confirmed to Jenson that she was working on getting money to give Robbins to repay 
Jenson. During a subsequent telephone conversation some time shortly thereafter, 
Robbins confirmed this story to Mr. Bodell. 
During the 2001-2002 time frame, Jenson told Bodell that he had retained 
attorneys who were working on recovering from Robbins but gave no further details. 
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Jenson told Mr. Bodeli that he wanted Robbins' cooperation in determining Cherokee & 
Walker's liability so that Jenson could determine whether to pursue Cherokee & Walker 
and that Jenson did not want to sue Robbins until he had obtained that information. 
During late 2001 and early 2002, Mr. Bodeli continued to have conversations with 
Jenson about repayment of the loan. Jenson continued to tell Mr. Bodeli that he was 
working on other sources to come up with the money. 
In early 2002, Mr. Bodeli ran into Robbins at a restaurant. Robbins told him that 
he felt bad about what had happened and he was still working on trying to raise the 
money to repay Jenson so that Jenson could repay Bodeli. 
Sometime in 2003, Mr. Bodeli ran into Robbins at the XCEL Gym in Holladay. 
Robbins again repeated that he felt bad about what had happened and that he was still 
hopeful that he could repay the money. 
Sometime during late 2002, Mr. Bodeli and Bodeli's attorney, Bruce Nelson, met 
with Jenson and his attorney, Mark James. Demand was again made for repayment of the 
loan. Mr. Bodeli threatened suit if the loan was not repaid shortly. Jenson acknowledged 
the debt and said he just needed time to repay it. Mr. James said in substance that Jenson 
had experienced financial problems before but always seemed to be able to come up with 
the money to resolve the problems and requested additional time. 
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During late 2002, Jenson told Mr. Bodell that he had some land up near Ogden that 
the State of Utah was looking to purchase for a substantial amount of money that would 
allow him to repay Bodell and that he was expecting this transaction to be completed 
shortly. 
In early 2003, Mr. Bodell and his attorney, Richard Burbidge, met with Jenson and 
Mark James. At that meeting, Jenson was informed that unless the loan was paid 
promptly, suit would be filed. Jenson again asked for more time and said he hoped to be 
able to repay the loan shortly and paid $25,000 of the loan at that meeting. Jenson said 
that he needed more time and that a lawsuit would jeopardize his ability to complete 
transactions necessary to pay Bodell because his reputation is everything and a lawsuit 
would be a matter of public record. 
In March 2003, Jenson called Mr. Bodell and told him that he had received $3 
Million in a transaction and that he was willing to pay it all to Bodell if Bodell would 
release Jenson and MSF from further liability. Jenson said that the deal had to be done 
that day. Bodell agreed to do so and an agreement was drafted and signed. 
INTERROGATORY NO, 17: Describe in detail all of the evidence that traces 
the disposition of the $4,000,000 that Bodell Construction Company loaned to MSF 
Properties LC. IF you do not have any such evidence, please say so. (See Complaint, ^ ] 
15.) 
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RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 17: The information to answer 
this interrogatory is contained in the documents already produced by Bodell, as well as 
the documents produced by Bank One, Robbins and CW demonstrating that Bodell 
loaned $4 Million to MSF, which in turned loaned $8 million to Robbins who in turn 
funded his Purchase and Settlement Agreement with CW with the proceeds. Bodell has 
not yet obtained the records of MSF and Jenson with respect to these transactions. Bodell 
has not yet had an opportunity to conduct relevant discovery with respect to the 
information sought by this interrogatory, including the depositions of Robbins, Jenson, 
Lightner and CW and other individuals involved in the transactions, and reserves the right 
to supplement its answer after discovery is completed to the extent required by the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 18: State the factual basis for the allegations you 
make in paragraph 16 of your Complaint. (Please comply with the definition of the 
phrase "state the factual basis" as expressed in paragraph 6 of the Definitions section, 
above.) 
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 18: Bodell objects to this 
interrogatory upon the ground that it is overbroad and burdensome. Subject to such 
objection and without waiving the same, Bodell responds as follows. See Responses to 
Interrogatory Nos. 5, 6 and 16. 
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INTERROGATORY NO. 19: Identify all amounts that you have been paid on 
the obligation that underlies the Promissory Note attached as an exhibit to your 
Complaint, specifying the amount paid, the date it was paid, who paid it, who received the 
payment, and identifying all documents that pertain to each such payment. 
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 19: Bodell has already 
provided this information in response to CW's interrogatory no. 4 and all relevant 
documents have already been produced. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 20: Identify each person who took any action in 
reliance upon fraudulent conduct you attribute to any of the defendants (including the Doe 
Defendants), explaining in detail the action that person took and what fraudulent conduct 
you attribute thereto. 
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 20: Bodell objects to this 
interrogatory upon the grounds that it is overbroad and burdensome, vague and 
ambiguous. Subject to such objection and without waiving the same, see Responses to 
Interrogatory Nos. 5, 6 and 16 and Bodell's responses to CW's and Bank One's discovery 
requests. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 21: Identify each and every loan made by Bodell 
Construction Company or Michael Bodell to Marc Jensen, Mark Robbins, or any entity 
with which Mr. Jensen or Mr. Robbins is or was affiliated. (An adequate response should 
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state the amount of the loan, the entity making the loan, the entity receiving the loan, the 
purpose for making the loan, and the current status of the loan.) 
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 21: This information has 
already been provided in response to CW's Interrogatory Nos. 2 and 4 and all relevant 
documents have already been produced. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 22: Describe in detail all of the damages that you 
allege you have suffered because of Robbins, giving a detailed calculation of how you 
arrive at such damages, and identifying all witnesses, documents, or other evidence that 
supports your claim for such damages. 
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 22: Bodell objects to this 
interrogatory upon the ground that it is overbroad and burdensome to the extent that it 
calls for the identification of "all witnesses, documents or other evidence that supports 
your claim for such damages." Subject to said objection and without waiving the same, 
Bodell responds as follows: See Bodell's responses to CW's Interrogatory No. 4. Bodell 
has been damaged in the principal sum of $4 million representing the amount that Bodell 
was fraudulently induced to loan to MSF to in turn loan those funds to Robbins. Bodell 
also contends that it is entitled to recover interest at the legal rate. Bodell also contends 
that it is entitled to recover punitive damages. The documents supporting this calculation 
of damages have already been produced. Persons having knowledge of these damages 
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include Michael Bodell and Merrill Weight of Bodell Construction Company, Marc 
Jenson and Mark Robbins. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 23: Describe in detail all contracts, covenants, 
promises or expectations of performance that you have received for Marc Jensen. 
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 23: Bodell objects to this 
interrogatory upon the grounds that it is vague and ambiguous. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 24: Identify every communication that you, or 
someone acting on your behalf, including your attorneys, has had with Marc Jensen. 
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 24: See Bodell's responses to 
Interrogatory No. 4 and Bank One's Interrogatory No. 8. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 25: If you deny all or any portion of any of the 
Requests for Admission served herewith for any reason, state the factual basis for your 
denial. 
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 25: Bodell objects to this 
interrogatory upon the ground that it is overbroad and burdensome. Bodell further objects 
on the basis that this interrogatory constitutes a separate interrogatory for each Request 
for Admission that Bodell denies and, therefore, Robbins has exceeded the 25 
interrogatories permitted by the Scheduling Order. Subject to such objections and 
without waiving the same, see Bodell's responses to the foregoing interrogatories. 
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REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION 
REQUEST NO. 1: All documents identified in your response to the 
interrogatories served herewith. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 1: All non-privileged documents within the 
scope of this request have already been produced. 
REQUEST NO. 2: All documents, mentioned, referred to, or relied on in your 
response to any of the interrogatories served herewith. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 2: All non-privileged documents within the 
scope of this request have already been produced. 
REQUEST NO. 3: All documents that you claim support any of your claims pled 
in your Complaint. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 3: Bodell objects to this request upon the 
ground that it is overbroad and burdensome and does not describe a category of 
documents with reasonable particularity and seeks work product of counsel. 
REQUEST NO. 4: All documents pertaining to each of the factual allegations 
contained in your Complaint. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 4: See objection to Request No. 3. 
REQUEST NO. 5: All documents that you will or may introduce as exhibits at 
the trial of this matter. 
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RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 5: Bodell has not yet determined what 
documents it will or may introduce as exliibits at the trial of this action. Bodell is willing 
to exchange exhibits lists with Defendants after completion of discovery and a reasonable 
time prior to trial. 
REQUEST NO. 6: All documents that discuss, memorialize, constitute, or pertain 
to any communication between you and Marc Jensen. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 6: All non-privileged documents within the 
scope of this request have already been produced. 
REQUEST NO. 7: All documents that discuss, memorialize, constitute, or pertain 
to any communication between you and Robbins. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 7: No such documents exist other than 
documents relating to communications with Jenson. 
REQUEST NO. 8: All documents that discuss, memorialize, constitute, or pertain 
to any communication between you and any of the Doe Defendants. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 8: Bodell has not yet identified what 
individuals or entities may be the Doe Defendants. Bodell cannot therefore respond to 
this request. 
REQUEST NO. 9: All documents that discuss, memorialize, constitute, or pertain 
to any communication (including internal communications) between you and any person 
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pertaining to the $4,000,000 loan that Bodell Construction Company made to MSF 
Properties LC. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 9: All non-privileged documents within the 
scope of this request have already been produced. 
REQUEST NO. 10: All documents that discuss, memorialize, constitute, 
demonstrate, or pertain to any damages that you claim to have suffered. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 10: All non-privileged documents within the 
scope of this request have already been produced. 
REQUEST NO. 11; The journal, diary, calendar, day planner or similar 
document(s) of Michael Bodell covering the time period from May 2000 to the present. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 11: Bodell objects to this request upon the 
grounds that it is overbroad and burdensome and seeks documents that are irrelevant to 
the subject matter of this action and the claims and defenses of the parties and are not 
reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Subject to such 
objection and without waiving the same, Bodell will produce responsive documents, if 
any, containing entries relating to the transactions that are the subject of this action. 
REQUEST NO. 12: All financial statements, balance sheets, profit and loss 
statements, income statements or similar financial documents reflecting the financial 
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condition of Bodell Construction Company as of the time of the $4,000,000 loan that 
Bodell Construction Company made to MSF Properties LC. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO, 12: Bodell objects to this interrogatory upon 
the ground that it seeks confidential financial information that is irrelevant to the subject 
matter of this action and the claims and defenses of the parties and is not reasonably 
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. 
REQUEST NO. 13: All documents that discuss, memorialize, constitute, or 
pertain to the negotiations, formation, or performance of that certain Settlement 
Agreement entered into on March 18, 2003, by and among Bodell Construction Company, 
Michael Bodell, Marc S. Jensen and MSF Properties LC. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 13: All non-privileged documents within the 
scope of this request have already been produced. 
REQUEST NO. 14: All documents that discuss, memorialize, constitute 
any communication pertaining to that certain Settlement Agreement entered into on 
March 18, 2003, by and among Bodell Construction Company, Michael Bodell, Marc S. 
Jensen and MSF Properties LC. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 14: All non-privileged documents within the 
scope of this request have already been produced. 
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REQUEST NO. 15: All documents that discuss, memorialize, constitute, or 
pertain to any loans made [sic] Bodell Construction Company to MSF Properties LC. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 15: All non-privileged documents within the 
scope of this request have already been produced. 
REQUEST NO. 16: All documents that discuss, memorialize, constitute, or 
pertain to all loans made [sic] Bodell Construction Company to Robbins or any entity 
with which Robbins is or was affiliated in some manner. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 16: All non-privileged documents within the 
scope of this request have already been produced. Other than the loan made to Jensen, 
the proceeds of which were then loaned to Robbins, no such documents exist. 
REQUEST NO. 17: All documents that discuss, memorialize, constitute, or 
pertain to all loans made [sic] Bodell Construction Company to Marc Jensen or any entity 
with which Mr. Jensen is or was affiliated in some manner. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 17: All non-privileged documents within the 
scope of this request have already been produced. 
REQUEST NO. 18: All documents that discuss, memorialize, constitute, or 
pertain to each and every loan made by Bodell Construction Company or Michael Bodell 
to Marc Jensen, Mark Robbins, or any entity with which Mr. Jensen or Mr. Robbins is or 
was affiliated. 
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RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 18: See Response to Requests Nos. 16 and 
17. 
REQUEST NO. 19: All documents that discuss, memorialize, constitute, or 
pertain to any communication to, from, or concerning those persons identified in your 
response to interrogatory no. 1, above. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 19: Bodell objects to this request as 
overbroad and burdensome and upon the ground that it does not describe a category of 
documents with reasonable particularity. Subject to such objections and without waiving 
the same, Bodell responds as follows: Bodell has not yet determined what persons it will 
or may call as witnesses at trial. Bodell cannot therefore respond to this request. 
REQUEST NO. 20: All documents that discuss, memorialize, constitute, or 
pertain to those persons identified in your response to interrogatory no. 1, above. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 20: See Response to Request No. 19. 
REQUEST NO. 21: All documents that discuss, memorialize, constitute, or 
pertain to any communications (including internal communications) involving Bodell 
Construction Company or Michael Bodell, or their agents, employees, or attorneys, 
pertaining to the transactions alleged in the Complaint. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 21: Bodell objects to this request upon the 
ground that it is overbroad and burdensome and does not describe a category of 
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documents to be produced with reasonable particularity. Subject to such objection and 
without waiving the same, Bodell believes that it has already produced all non-privileged 
documents within the scope of this request. 
REQUEST NO, 22: All documents that constitute any communication 
between (1) Bodell Construction Company or Michael Bodell, their agents, employees 
and/or attorney, and (2) Marc Jensen, or his agents, employees, or attorneys. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 22: All non-privileged documents within the 
scope of this request have already been produced. 
REQUEST NO. 23: All documents that discuss, memorialize, constitute, or 
pertain to each and every contract, covenant, promise, or expectations of performance of 
whatever nature that you have received for Marc Jensen. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 23: Bodell objects to this request upon the 
ground that it is vague and ambiguous. 
REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 1: Admit that there has never been any 
communications between Mark Robbins and Michael Bodell. 
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RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 1: Denied. Michael 
Bodell had direct communications with Mark Robbins. In addition, Michael Bodell had 
direct communication with Robbins through his agent, Marc Jenson. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 2: Admit that there has never been any 
communication between Mark Robbins and any agent of Bodell Construction Company. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 2: Denied. See 
response to Request No. 1. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 3: Admit that there has never been any 
communication between any agent of Mark Robins [sic] and any agent of Bodell 
Construction Company. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 3: Denied. See 
response to Request No. 1. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 4: Admit that Mark Robbins did not receive 
any of the proceeds of the $4,000,000 loan made by Bodell Construction Company to 
MSF Properties, LC. (This is reference to the loan alleged in paragraph 15 of the 
Complaint.) 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 4: Denied. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 5: Admit that Mark Robbins did not benefit 
in any way as a result of the $4,000,000 loan made by Bodell Construction Company to 
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MSF Properties, LC. (This is a reference to the loan alleged in paragraph 15 of the 
Complaint.) 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 5: Denied. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 6: Admit that you have not suffered any 
damages whatsoever. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 6: Denied. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 7: Admit that Mark Robbins was not 
involved in any "scheme and conspiracy for the purposes of raising $8,000,000.00 in 
order to Robbins to pay Cherokee and to raise other funds through fraudulent means." 
(See Complaint, ^ 11.) 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 7: Denied. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 8: Admit that Mark Robbins never had any 
understandings with Marc Jensen whereby Mr. Robbins expected Mr. Jensen to make 
false representations to Michael Bodell. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 8: Denied. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 9: Admit that at no time has Marc Jensen 
ever made any false representations to Michael Bodell. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 9: Denied. 
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REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 10: Admit that as of August 2000, 
Madwagon, Vtrax and Wasatch (as those terms are defined in your Complaint) had a fair 
market value in excess of $16,000,000. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO, 10: Denied. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 11: Admit that you do not have any 
evidence to support your allegation in paragraphs 22 and 27 of your Complaint that 
Robbins and the Doe Defendants "acted fraudulently, maliciously and with the specific 
intent of injuring Bodell and/or with reckless disregard of the substantial risk of harm to 
Bodell from their actions." 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 11: Denied. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 12: Admit that you do not have any 
evidence to support your allegation in paragraph 12 of your Complaint that Robbins 
caused Jensen to make fraudulent statements to Michael Bodell. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 12: Denied. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 13: Admit that Mark Robbins did not 
have any involvement whatsoever in the issuance of the August 22, 2004, letter signed by 
Ben Lightner of Bank One. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 13: Denied. 
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REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 14: Admit that the statements made in 
the August 22, 2004, letter signed by Ben Lightner of Bank One are true and accurate in 
every way. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 14: Denied. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 15: Admit that Mark Robbins did not 
have any involvement whatsoever in the conversations between Marc Jensen and Michael 
Bodell that resulted in Bodell Construction Company making a loan of $4,000,000 to 
MSF Properties LC. (This is a reference to the loan alleged in paragraph 15 of the 
Complaint.) 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 15: Bodell admits that 
Robbins was not directly involved in those conversations, but contends that Jenson acted 
as Robbins5 agent in obtaining the loan from Bodell to in turn loan the proceeds to 
Robbins and that Robbins knew or should have known that Jenson would make the 
misrepresentations that he made to Bodell as set forth in the Complaint and above. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 16: Admit that Mark Robbins did not 
participate in any common law fraud with respect to Bodell Construction Company. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 16: Denied. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 17: Admit that Mark Robbins did not 
commit any common law fraud with respect to Bodell Construction Company. 
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RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 17: Denied. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 18: Admit that Mark Robbins did not 
participate in any common law fraud with respect to any person. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 18: Denied. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 19: Admit that Mark Robbins did not 
commit any common law fraud with respect to any person. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 19: Denied. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 20: Admit that you do not have any 
evidence to support your allegation in paragraphs 18 through 22 of your Complaint that 
Mark Robbins participated in fraud with respect to Bodeil Construction Company. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 20: Denied. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 21: Admit that Mark Robbins is not 
involved in any civil conspiracy with any Doe Defendants with respect to Bodeil 
Construction Company. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 21: Bodeil does not have 
sufficient information to either admit or deny this request until Bodeil is able to conduct 
further discovery in this action, including the depositions of Robbins, Jenson, Lightner, 
CW and other individuals with knowledge of the transactions. 
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REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 22: Admit that you do not have any 
evidence to support your allegation in paragraphs 23 through 27 of your Complaint that 
Mark Robbins is involved in a civil conspiracy with any person with respect to Bodell 
Construction Company. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 22: Denied. See 
responses to interrogatories. See also Response to Request No. 21. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 23: Admit that you have not conferred 
any benefit on Mark Robbins. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 23: Denied. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 24: Admit that Mark Robbins has not 
retained any benefit that you have conferred on him. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 24: Denied. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 25: Admit that Mark Robbins has not 
been unjustly enriched in any way with respect to the $4,000,000 loan made by Bodell 
Construction Company to MSF Properties LC. (This is a reference to the loan alleged in 
paragraph 15 of the Complaint.) 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 25: Denied. 
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REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 26: Admit that you do not have any 
evidence to support your allegations in paragraphs 34 through 38 of your Complaint Mark 
Robbins has been unjustly enriched by you. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 26: Denied. 
DATED this t h e ^ day of September, 2004. ^ ^ ^ -
RICHARD D. BURBIDGE 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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VERIFICATION 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
MICFIAEL BODELL, being first duly sworn, deposes and says that he is the 
President of Plaintiff Bodell Construction Company in the above-captioned action; that he 
has read the foregoing responses to Interrogatories and that the contents contained therein 
are true and accurate to the best of his knowledge, information and belief. 
MICHAEL BODELL 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this ^.2
 d a y o f 
September, 2004. 
, NOTAWPUBLIC 
My Commission Expires: £•/(''#3 Residing in Salt Lake City, Utah 
P \JGlines\Clients\BODELL\DISCOVERYRESPONSCSROBBlNS wpd 
r~ "Z^C Notary Public 
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L.2 
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Bodell generally objects to these discovery requests to the extent they seek 
information and documents from time periods that are irrelevant to any issue in its 
lawsuit. 
These objections apply to each numbered response as if set forth therein unless 
otherwise specified. 
A republication or statement, in whole or in part, of any one or more of the 
foregoing objections is not intended to waive an objection otherwise not stated. 
By agreeing to produce documents in response to a particular request, Bodell does 
not thereby intend to represent, nor does it represent, that any such documents in fact exist 
or have ever existed in its possession, custody or control. Rather, by agreeing to produce 
documents in response to a particular request, Bodell intends thereby to represent that it 
will produce non-privileged documents in its present custody, possession or control, if 
any, that are responsive to the request. 
Subject to such objections and without waiving the same, Bodell responds to the 
discovery requests as follows. 
REQUESTS FOR ADMISSIONS 
REQUEST NO. 1: Admit that the sole representation made by or attributable to 
Bank One upon which Bodell relied in making the $4 Million Bodell Loan was the 
Lightner Letter. 
RESPONSE: Bodell admits that the only representation letter received by Bodell 
attributable to Bank One was the letter signed by its bank officer, Mr. Lightner. The 
letter, however, carries with it both facial and inferential representations. Bank One is 
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believed to be one of the largest banks in the United States and advertises to the world its 
financial soundness and trustworthiness. The representations in the letter inferentially 
carry the representation that this bank and its authorized officer, with the bases upon 
which to verify the representations made, were making representations of fact that Bank 
One had confirmed. The letter was addressed "To Whom It May Concern" and thus 
understandably was expected to be utilized in causing other individuals to rely on the 
representations made. 
REQUEST NO. 2: Admit that Bodell had no communications with or attributable 
to Bank One concerning the $4 Million Bodell Loan prior to making $4 Million Bodell 
Loan, other than the Lightner Letter. 
RESPONSE: Admit, subject to response to Request No. 1 and specifically 
including the public image and representations presented by Bank One and the common 
perceptions generated as a result thereof. 
REQUEST NO. 3: Admit that Bodell took no action to investigate, confirm, or 
verify the statements in the Lightner Letter prior to making the $4 Million Bodell Loan. 
RESPONSE: Bodell admits that it gave full faith and credit to the letter based 
upon the information and representations therein contained, together with inferential 
information as referenced in response to Request No. 1. Further, the representations of 
the letter were corroborated by Jenson, informing Bodell that the transaction was a "done 
deal." 
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REQUEST NO. 4: Admit that, prior to making the $4 Million Bodell Loan, 
Bodell did not determine whether the $165,000,000 deposit described in the Lightner 
Letter had been made. 
RESPONSE: See response to Request No. 1. Bodell admits that he relied upon 
the representations of the letter with regard to the $165,000,000 deposit. 
REQUEST NO. 5: Admit that, prior to Bodell making the $4 Million Bodell Loan, 
no representation was made to Bodell that the $165,000,000 deposit described in the 
Lightner Letter had been made. 
RESPONSE: Bodell admits that prior to making the $ Million Bodell Loan, no 
specific representation was made to Bodell that the $165,000,000 deposit described in the 
Lightner Letter had been made. However, the letter from Bank One states as a matter of 
fact that the $165,000,000 will be deposited in Bank One and then further makes the 
direct objective representation "The funding is coming from a loan agreement between 
MaxTrax Group LLC, a Utah limited liability company and Arimex Investments, LTD, a 
Bahamian company. The sum of $165,000,000 will be deposited into an interest bearing 
account in the name of the Company and managed by its Members." [Emphasis 
supplied] Those direct objective representations clearly confirm that Bank One has done 
the confirmation necessary to make those representations. 
REQUEST NO. 6: Admit that Bodell has received payment of at least three 
million dollars pursuant to the Settlement Agreement. 
RESPONSE: Admit. 
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REQUEST NO. 7: Admit that if Bodell prevails on all claims, the only amounts 
Bodell is entitled to recover from Bank One are the principal amount outstanding on the 
$4 Million Bodell Loan, interest on that amount at the rate provided in Utah Code §§ 15-
1-1 and 15-1-4, and costs of court. 
RESPONSE: Bodell admits that at this time he is not seeking punitive damages 
against Bank One. However, discovery is in its infancy and Bank One has not been 
forthcoming with all of the information requested. Accordingly, Bodell reserves the right 
to amend the complaint and seek such punitive damages should subsequent discovery so 
justify. 
INTERROGATORIES 
INTERROGATORY NO. 1: For each of the foregoing Requests for Admissions 
for which your response was anything other than an unequivocal admission: 
a. Set forth in detail all facts, identify all oral communications, 
and identify all documents which support or evidence the basis for not 
responding with an unequivocal admission. 
b. Identify all persons with material knowledge of such facts and 
summarize the knowledge of each person. 
RESPONSE: Not applicable. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 2: Itemize each and every payment and recovery you 
have received on the $4 Million Bodell Loan and the $1 Million Bodell Loan, including 
the date received, the amount, and the person who made the payment. Identify all 
documents constituting such payments. 
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RESPONSE: This information has already been provided in response to 
Cherokee & Walker's discovery requests. All responsive documents have been 
previously produced. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 3: Itemize each and every payment and recovery you 
have received pursuant to the Settlement Agreement, including the date received, the 
amount, and the person who made the payment. Identify all documents constituting such 
payments. 
RESPONSE: See response to Interrogatory No. 2. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 4: As to the payments and recoveries identified in 
response to Interrogatories Nos. 2 and 3, identify the obligations to which such payments 
and recoveries were applied, set forth the calculations showing such applications in detail, 
and identify all documents showing such applications. 
RESPONSE: See response to Interrogatory No. 2. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 5: As to the payments and recoveries identified in 
response to Interrogatories Nos. 2 and 3, set forth in detail all facts, identify all oral 
communications, and identify all documents authorizing and justifying such application 
of the payments and recoveries set forth in response to Interrogatory No. 4. 
RESPONSE: See response to Interrogatory No. 2, Bodell is unaware of any oral 
communications with respect to how the payments were applied. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 6: Identify all persons, other than Lightner, who you 
claim acted as an agent, representative, or on behalf of Bank One in connection with the 
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$4 Million Bodell Loan and set forth in detail all facts, identify all oral communications, 
and identify all documents supporting your claim 
RESPONSE: At the present time, Bodell is not aware of any such persons. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 7: Do you claim that Bank One failed to disclose 
any facts or information to Bodell which Bank One had a duty to disclose? If so: 
a. Set forth in detail all facts or information which you claim 
Bank One had a duty to disclose but failed to do so. 
b. Set forth in detail the facts, identify all oral communications, 
and identify all documents creating a duty on Bank One to disclose 
such facts and information. 
c. Identify all persons with material knowledge of such facts, oral 
communications and documents and summarize the material 
knowledge of each person. 
RESPONSE: Bodell objects to this interrogatory on the basis that Bodell has not 
yet received Bank One's documents that have been requested and has not yet been able to 
conduct discovery concerning Bank One's knowledge, information and conduct with 
respect to the subject transactions. Subject to such objection, and without waiving the 
same, Bodell responds as follows: Yes. 
As referenced above, the letter authored and signed by Ben Lightner, Wealth 
Advisor, Private Banking Group for Bank One, makes certain factual representations, 
including the fact that $165,000,000 will be deposited into Bank One. The letter goes on 
to make the representation that "The funding is coming from a loan agreement between 
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One had no reasonable basis for its representation and knew or should have known it was 
unlikely the deposit would be made. 
Mark Robbins, Ben Lightner and Marc Jenson. Bodell does not yet know the 
exact information and knowledge these individuals have concerning the transactions. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 8: As to any due diligence, review, investigation 
and/or decision to make the $1 Million Bodell Loan and/or the $4 Million Bodell Loan, 
provide the following information: 
a. Set forth in detail all such due diligence, review and 
investigation which was performed. 
b. Identify all persons who participated in such due diligence, 
review, investigation and/or decision and describe the role and 
participation of each such person. 
c. Identify all oral communications constituting, evidence, and/or 
referring to such due diligence, review, investigation and/or decision, 
d. Identify all documents constituting, evidencing, and/or 
referring to such due diligence, review, investigation and/or decision. 
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RESPONSE: See response to Interrogatory No. 7, incorporated herein. 
a. Jenson first contacted Michael Bodell, President of Bodell Construction, 30 
to 60 days prior to Bodell making the $1 Million loan. Jenson asked to meet with Mr. 
Bodell for lunch. They met at the American Grill at the Cottonwood Mall in May 2000. 
Jenson had been a neighbor and member of the same LDS ward as Bodell many years 
before. During the meeting, Jenson told Bodell that he was doing very well financially 
and explained his hard money lending business. They agreed to stay in touch. 
Approximately two weeks later, Jenson telephoned Bodell and told him that he was 
looking for a loan at 25% interest that Jenson would then re-lend at a much higher rate. 
Jenson said he would guarantee the loan. Mr. Bodell said he would consider such a loan. 
Within a week after that conversation, Jenson and Mr. Bodell met at Bodell's office. Mr. 
Bodell agreed to make the loan. Thereafter, the loan documents were prepared and 
signed at Bodell's office. 
Bodell next heard from Jenson in mid-August 2000. Jenson asked for a 
meeting. Mr. Bodell and Merrill Weight met with Jenson at Bodell's office. Jenson 
made the representations alleged in the Complaint. Jenson gave Mr. Bodell the Bank One 
letter signed by Ben Lightner and told Bodell that the $165 Million transaction was a 
"done deal", and that the amount would be deposited in Bank One shortly. 
The letter in question was on Bank One's stationary signed by a bank officer 
employed by Bank One. In the course of discovery, Bodell has received no information 
indicating that Lightner was not such a bank officer and authorized to issue the letter on 
bank stationary that was provided to Bodell. The letter is addressed "To Whom It May 
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Concern" and thus obviously was to be utilized in providing the representations to an 
indiscriminate number of individuals. Bank One is a large federally regulated banking 
organization and presents itself to the public in public communications as a stable, sound 
and trustworthy organization. Further, Bank one, on the face of the letter, as well as by 
inference, would have the means by which to know concerning the information that was 
represented. 
Jenson stated that he was putting in $4 Million of his own money to purchase 
Cherokee Walker's interest and the company was going to buy Mongoose Bicycle and it 
was a real hot deal. Jenson stated he was giving a Rolex watch to Cherokee Walker's 
President in order to extend the time to buy Cherokee Walker out until the next week. 
Jenson represented the $4 Million loan from Bodell was required in order to purchase 
Cherokee Walker's interest and that the $165 Million would be utilized to repay the loan, 
to purchase Mongoose and the balance for Jenson's hard money lending business. Mr. 
Bodell stated that Bodell was interested in considering the loan and asked Jenson for a 
personal financial statement. 
Jenson came back a day or two later with the financial statement. At that 
meeting, Mr. Bodell was present. The financial statement showed Jenson had a 
substantial net worth. Jenson stated repeatedly that he could easily repay the loan within 
30 days. Jenson stated that his attorneys had checked out the $165 Million transaction 
and that it was solid. Mr. Bodell stated that Bodell would consider the loan. Jenson 
called back later that day and Mr. Bodell told him Bodell would make the $4 Million 
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loan. Within a day or two after that the loan documents were signed and Bodell gave 
Jenson a check. 
b. Michael Bodell, President of Bodell, negotiated the transactions. Merrill 
Weight was present at some meetings with Jenson. 
c. Any responsive documents have already been produced with the exception 
of Jenson's financial statement which is subject to a confidentiality agreement. 
d. See the documents previously produced. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 9: Identify and describe in detail all business 
transactions and dealings you have had with Jenson, Robbins, and/or any company or 
entity in which Jenson and/or Robbins was involved. 
RESPONSE: None, other than the subject loans. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 10: Describe in detail all actions taken by or on 
behalf of Bodell to recover on the $1 Million Bodell Loan and/or the $4 Million Bodell 
Loan and the results of such actions. Identify all documents evidencing such actions, 
excluding pleadings filed in this lawsuit. 
RESPONSE: See documents previously produced. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 11: With respect to your allegations in Paragraph 11 
of the Complaint that "Robbins and the Doe Defendants entered into a scheme and 
conspiracy for the purpose of raising $8,000,000.00 in order for Robbins to Pay Cherokee 
and to raise other funds through fraudulent means", do you claim that Bank One was part 
of that scheme and conspiracy? If so: 
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a. Set forth in detail all facts supporting the claim that Bank One 
was part of that scheme and conspiracy. 
b. Identify all persons with material knowledge of that claim and 
summarize the material knowledge of each such person. 
c. Identify all oral communications supporting or evidencing that 
claim. 
d. Identify all documents supporting or evidencing that claim. 
OBJECTION: Bodell objects to Interrogatory No. 11 on the basis of the 
objections above set forth. Bodell objects further on the grounds and for the reasons that 
Bank One has not provided the information requested in discovery to which Bodell is 
entitled. Subject to the foregoing objections and without waiving same, Bodell responds 
as follows: 
RESPONSE: At the present time, Bodell has not been permitted the discovery 
necessary to determine whether Bank One was part of the scheme and conspiracy. Bodell 
has yet to obtain discovery from Bank One and the other parties to the transactions 
necessary to determine Bank One's precise involvement. Inferentially, by reason of the 
fact the letter is addressed "To Whom It May Concern" and makes factual representations 
concerning matters which a reasonable individual would expect Bank One to have means 
to verify, it appears that Bank One may have been assisting users of the letter, namely 
Jenson and Robbins, to garner funds. That appears a reasonable, if not the most probable, 
explanation concerning why the letter was prepared in the first place, especially in light of 
the fact that it was, in fact, being used to make misrepresentations of fact and raise funds. 
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INTERROGATORY NO. 12: With respect to your allegations in Paragraph 13 
of the Complaint that "Bank One knew, or should have known, that it had no reasonable 
basis for the statements in the letter and/or acted in reckless disregard of the 
consequences of providing the assurances contained in the letter without conducting 
appropriate due diligence: 
a. Set forth in detail all facts supporting this claim. 
b. Identify all person with material knowledge of this claim. 
c. Identify all oral communications supporting or evidencing this 
claim. 
d. Identify all documents supporting or evidencing this claim. 
RESPONSE: See objection to Interrogatory No. 7 and responses to previous 
interrogatories and requests for production of documents. Subject to such objection and 
without waiving the same, Bodell responds as follows: 
a. Bank One gave Robbins and/or Jenson the Ben Lightner letter 
representing that $165 Million would be deposited into a Bank One 
account. That letter enabled Robbins and Jenson to raise funding 
through fraudulent representations and omissions. Bank One has 
come forward with no evidence that there was any reasonable basis for 
the representations contained in the letter. Bodell believes that 
discovery will demonstrate that Bank One was knowledgeable 
concerning the financial condition of Jenson and Robbins and their 
various companies and that there was no reasonable basis for the 
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representations contained in the letter. Bodell further believes that 
discovery will demonstrate that Bank One did not conduct any due 
diligence or investigation to verify that $165 Million would be 
deposited into Bank One. Bank One failed to disclose in the letter or 
otherwise to Bodell that it had no reasonable basis for the 
representations in the letter or that it had not conducted any due 
diligence or investigation and was relying solely on representations 
made to Bank One by Robbins and/or Jenson. 
b. Bodell is presently unaware of all persons have material 
knowledge of this claim. Bodell believes that Robbins, Jenson and 
Lightner have knowledge concerning this claim. 
c. Bodell is presently unaware of any oral communications 
supporting this claim other than the representations that were made to 
Bodell by Jenson as alleged in the Complaint and stated above at the 
same time Jenson gave a copy of Bank One's letter to Bodell. 
d. See documents previously produced. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 13: With respect to your allegations in Paragraph 24 
of the Complaint that "Robbins and the Doe Defendants formed and joined in a 
conspiracy with one another, the purpose of which was to raise money from Bodell and 
other third parties through fraudulent misrepresentations and omissions", do you claim 
that Bank One was part of that conspiracy? If so: 
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a. Set forth in detail all facts supporting the claim that Bank One 
was part of that conspiracy. 
b. Identify all person with material knowledge of that claim and 
summarize the material knowledge of each person. 
c. Identify all oral communications supporting or evidencing that 
claim. 
d. Identify all documents supporting or evidencing that claim. 
RESPONSE: See response to Interrogatory No. 11. Bodell has no information 
at the present time that Bank One was part of the scheme or conspiracy. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 14: With respect to your allegations in Paragraph 35 
of the Complaint that "Bodell has conferred a substantial benefit on Robbins, Cherokee 
and Does 1 through 50", do you claim that any such benefit was conferred on Bank One? 
If so: 
a. Set forth in detail all facts supporting the claim that such 
benefit was conferred on Bank One. 
b. Identify all person with material knowledge of that claim and 
summarize the material knowledge of each person. 
c. Identify all oral communications supporting or evidencing that 
claim. 
d. Identify all documents supporting or evidencing that claim. 
RESPONSE: Bodell has no information at the present time that any of the 
funds loaned by Bodell were paid to Bank One or for its benefit 
18 
INTERROGATORY NO. 15: Identify each witness you may call at trial and 
give a summary of the testimony you anticipate will be given by each witness. 
RESPONSE: Bodell has not yet determined what witnesses it may call at trial. 
Bodell is willing to exchange witness lists with the Defendants after completion of 
discovery and a reasonable time prior to trial. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 16: Identify each exhibit you may introduce at trial. 
RESPONSE: Bodell does not yet know what exhibits it will introduce at trial. 
Bodell is willing to exchange exhibit lists with the Defendants after completion of 
discovery and a reasonable time prior to trial. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 17: Have you obtained a statement from any person 
concerning this case? If so, provided the following information: 
a. Identify the person who gave the statement. 
b. Identify the person to whom the statement was given. 
c. The date the statement was given. 
d. Identify all documents constituting or evidencing the statement. 
e. Identify all drafts and revisions to the statement. 
RESPONSE: Bodell objects to this interrogatory upon the ground that it seeks 
information that is protected under the work product privilege. Subject to such objection 
and without waiving the same, Bodell responds as follows: 
Bodell has not obtained any statements from any person concerning this case. 
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REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS 
Pursuant to Rule 34, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Defendant is requested to 
produce for inspection and copying the following documents within thirty (30) days after 
receipt hereof. 
REQUEST NO. 1: All documents identified in Plaintiff Bodell Construction 
Company's Rule 26(a)(1) Initial Disclosures dated January 27, 2004, which have not been 
previously produced. 
RESPONSE: All non-privileged documents within the scope of this request 
have previously been produced. 
REQUEST NO. 2: All documents identified in response to the foregoing 
interrogatories. 
RESPONSE: See response to Request No. 1. 
REQUEST NO. 3: All files of Bodell on the $1 Million Bodell Loan, the $4 
Million Bodell Loan, and the Settlement Agreement. 
RESPONSE: See response to Request No. 1. 
REQUEST NO. 4: All drafts of the Settlement Agreement, all copies of the 
Settlement Agreement or any drafts thereof containing any notes, comments or markings, 
all documents referring to the Settlement Agreement and/or referring to any draft or prior 
version of the Settlement Agreement, and all documents containing any negotiation or 
discussion of the terms of the Settlement Agreement, any prior draft or version of the 
Settlement Agreement, or the terms of any proposed settlement concerning the $1 Million 
Bodell Loan and/or the $4 Million Bodell Loan. 
20 
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RESPONSE: See response to Request No. 1. 
DATED this / V ^ d a y of June, 2004. 
BURBIDGE & 
RICHARD D. BURBIDGE 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
MERRILL L. WEIGHT, being first duly worn, deposes and says that he is 
Jj^EJ/Myfa&Mfof Plaintiff Bodell Construction Company ifl the above-captioned 
action; that he has read the foregoing responses to Admissions and Interrogatories and 
that the contents contained therein are true and accurate to the best of his knowledge, 
information and belief, 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 7 day of 
June, 2004. 
My Commission Expires: [bl^jc^ 
^AR^PUBLIC 
(esiding in Salt Late City, Utah 
^-~-3te 1 r ^ r^r Notary Public s & S ^ ELIZABETH GRAHAM j 
&ahUkfiClty,Utm84l15 i 
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RICHARD D. BURBIDGE, Esq., (#0492) 
STEPHEN B. MITCHELL, Esq. (#2278) 
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Parkside Tower 
215 South State, Suite 920 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801)355-6677 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BODELL CONSTRUCTION 
COMPANY, a Utah corporation 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MARK H. ROBBINS; CHEROKEE & 
WALKER INVESTMENT COMPANY, 
L.L.C., a Utah limited liability company; 
CHEROKEE AND WALKER, L.L.C., a 
Utah limited liability company; BANK 
ONE, UTAH, National Association, a 
Utah corporation; and DOES 1 through 
50, 
Defendants. 
Plaintiff Bodell Construction Company ("Bodell") hereby supplements its 
response to Defendant Bank One's First Set of Requests for Admissions as follows: 
PLAINTIFF BODELL 
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY'S 
SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE TO 
BANK ONE'S FIRST SET OF 
REQUESTS FOR ADMISSIONS 
Civil No. 030917018 
Judge William B. Bohling 
REQUESTS FOR ADMISSIONS 
REQUEST NO. 7: Admit that if Bodell prevails on all claims, the only amounts 
Bodell is entitled to recover from Bank One are the principal amount outstanding on the 
$4 Million Bodell Loan, interest on that amount at the rate provided in Utah Code §§15-
1-1 and 15-1-4, and costs of court. 
SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE: Admit. Discovery is in its infancy and 
Bank One has not been forthcoming with all of the information requested. Accordingly, 
Bodell reserves the right to amend its Complaint to seek punitive damages should 
subsequent discovery justify such relief. 
DATED this Q day of August, 2004. 
BURBIDGE 
RICHARD D T B U R B I D G E 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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RICHARD D. BURBIDGE, Esq., (#0492) 
STEPHEN B. MITCHELL, Esq. (#2278) 
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Parkside Tower 
215 South State, Suite 920 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801)355-6677 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BODELL CONSTRUCTION ) 
COMPANY, a Utah corporation ] 
7 IT J 
Plaintiff, \ 
vs. \ 
MARK H. ROBBINS; CHEROKEE & ; 
WALKER INVESTMENT COMPANY, ; 
L.L.C., a Utah limited liability company; ] 
CHEROKEE AND WALKER, L.L.C., a ; 
Utah limited liability company; BANK ] 
ONE, UTAH, National Association, a ] 
Utah corporation; and DOES 1 through ] 
50, ; 
Defendants. 
. PLAINTIFF BODELL 
' CONSTRUCTION COMPANY'S 
> RESPONSES TO CHEROKEE & 
) WALKER'S REQUESTS FOR 
, ADMISSIONS, FIRST SET OF 
INTERROGATORIES AND 
' REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF 
) DOCUMENTS 
) Civil No. 030917018 
) Judge William B. Bohling 
GENERAL OBJECTIONS 
Bodell objects to these discovery requests to the extent that: (1) they seek 
information that is not within Bodell's possession, custody or control; (2) they seek 
discovery that is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative of other discovery conducted 
in this matter and related matters or is obtainable from some other source that is more 
convenient, less burdensome, less expensive or is otherwise equally available to 
Copy 
Defendants; (3) they may be construed to require responses beyond the duties and 
responsibilities of a responding party under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and 
other applicable discovery rules, if any; and (4) they seek documents that no longer 
exist or cannot be conveniently located. 
Bodell generally objects to these discovery requests to the extent they are vague, 
unduly burdensome, ambiguous, overly broad and not identified with reasonable 
particularity. 
Bodell generally objects to the use of the terms "every," "each," "all," "any," or 
other similar words of expansion as overly broad and unduly burdensome. 
Bodell generally objects to the discovery requests to the extent they call for 
information with respect to individuals or entities other than Bodell. 
In responding to these discovery requests, Bodell bases its answers, responses 
and objections upon currently available information that is now known. Bodell's 
investigation and search for responsive information is ongoing. Bodell has not 
completed its investigation of the facts pertinent to its action or its discovery in 
preparation for trial in its action and, therefore, reserves the right to amend, modify or 
supplement the answers, responses and objections stated herein. Bodell further states 
that by making its general objection, it does not undertake any duty to supplement these 
discovery responses except to the extent specifically required by the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure. 
In responding to these discovery requests, Bodell does not in any manner, waive 
or intend to waive, but rather intend to preserve and is preserving: (1) all objections as 
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to competency, relevancy, materiality and admissibility; (2) all rights to object on any 
ground to the use of any of the responses herein or documents in any proceeding, 
motion, hearing or the trial of its or any other action; and (3) all rights to object on any 
ground to further discovery requests involving or related to any of the requests herein. 
Bodell objects to these discovery requests to the extent they seek information 
protected by the attorney/client privilege or work product doctrine, including joint-
defense work product. Privileged information responsive to any request below is not 
provided. Bodell does not waive, intend to preserve and is preserving the 
attorney/client privilege, the work product privilege, and every other privilege with 
respect to each and every document protected by such privilege. 
Bodell generally objects to these discovery requests to the extent they seek 
information not relevant to the issues raised in its lawsuit and not reasonably calculated 
to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. 
Bodell generally objects to these discovery requests to the extent they request 
disclosure of confidential or proprietary information and farther assert each and every 
applicable privilege and rule governing confidentiality to the fullest extent provided by 
law. 
Bodell generally objects to these discovery requests to the extent they seek 
information and documents from time periods that are irrelevant to any issue in its 
lawsuit. 
These objections apply to each numbered response as if set forth therein unless 
otherwise specified. 
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A republication or statement, in whole or in part, of any one or more of the 
foregoing objections is not intended to waive an objection otherwise not stated. 
By agreeing to produce documents in response to a particular request, Bodell 
does not thereby intend to represent, nor does it represent, that any such documents in 
fact exist or have ever existed in its possession, custody or control. Rather, by 
agreeing to produce documents in response to a particular request, Bodell intends 
thereby to represent that it will produce non-privileged documents in its present 
custody, possession or control, if any, that are responsive to the request. 
Subject to such objections and without waiving the same, Bodell responds to the 
discovery requests as follows. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS 
REQUEST NO. 1: Admit that on or before March 18, 2003, pursuant to a 
Settlement Agreement, Bodell recovered from MSF at least $3 million of the money it 
had previously loaned to MSF, Jenson, and/or Robbins. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 1: Admit. 
REQUEST NO. 2: Admit that Bodell does not seek to recover from Cherokee & 
Walker the $80,000 loan fee, late charges, or accrued interest at the rate of one percent 
per week that MSF agreed to pay Bodell in its Promissory Note dated August 30, 2000, 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 2: Admit. 
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REQUEST NO. 3: Admit that prior to the filing of this action, there was never 
any verbal, written or other contact between Bodell and Gregg Christensen, Shane Perry, 
or any other representative of Cherokee & Walker. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 3: Admit, that there was no direct contact. 
INTERROGATORIES 
INTERROGATORY NO. 1: If your answer to any of the foregoing Requests 
for Admissions was anything other than an unconditional admission, please state by 
number the precise Admission, or portion thereof, that Bodell did not unconditionally 
admit, and state with reasonable particularity the basis for your denial or response and 
identify all facts and documents that support your denial or response. 
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 1: Not applicable. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 2: Identify and generally describe each instance in 
which Bodell loaned or otherwise conveyed money to MSF, Jenson, and/or Robbins, 
including, but not limited to the date of each such transaction, the amount of each such 
transaction, the recipient in each such transaction, and the general terms governing each 
such transaction. 
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 2: Bodell made a loan of $ 1 
million to MSF guaranteed by Jenson on June 23, 2000. Bodell made a loan to MSF 
guaranteed by Jenson in the amount of $4 million on August 30, 2000. The terms of these 
transactions are described in the June 23, 2000 MSF Properties, L.C., Certificate of 
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Participation, June 23, 2000 Guaranty, August 30, 2000 Promissory Note and August 30, 
2000 Guaranty that are produced herewith. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 3: With respect to each of the transactions 
identified in response to Interrogatory No. 2, identify each employee, agent, member, 
manager, and/or attorney of Bodell who had any involvement in the transaction, and 
generally describe the nature of each such individual's involvement. 
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 3: Michael Bodell, president of 
Bodell Construction Company negotiated the transactions. Michael L. Weight, 
secretary/treasurer of Bodell Construction Company directed the preparation and delivery 
of the checks and was present at one meeting with respect to each transaction. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 4: With respect to each of the transactions 
identified in response to Interrogatory No. 2, set forth a detailed accounting of all funds 
disbursed by or received by Bodell, including the date, amount, payment method, payor, 
and recipient of each payment or receipt of funds. 
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 4: See Schedules attached hereto. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 5: Except for this action, identify by case name, 
court, and case number any legal action that Bodell has initiated relating in any way to 
any of the transactions identified in response to Interrogatory No. 2. 
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 5: None. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 6: Identify each employee, agent, member, 
manager and/or attorney of Bodell who had involvement in the negotiation, execution, or 
performance of the Settlement Agreement executed by Bodell, Michael Bodell, MSF, and 
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Jenson on or about March 18, 2003, and generally describe the nature of each such 
individual's involvement. 
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 6: Michael Bodell was involved 
in the discussions and negotiations concerning the settlement and signed the agreement. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 7: State specifically the amount of money Bodell 
contends it is entitled to receive from Cherokee & Walker in this action and explain in 
detail how that amount has been calculated. 
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 7: Bodell contends it is entitled to 
recover from Cherokee and Walker the principal sum of $4 million representing the 
amount that Bodell was fraudulently induced to loan to Robbins and by which amount 
Bodell contends Cherokee and Walker was unjustly enriched. Bodell contends it is also 
entitled to recover interest at the legal rate. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 8: Identify all individuals, other than those listed in 
Plaintiff Bodell Construction Company's Rule 26(a)(1) Initial Disclosures, who you 
believe possess any knowledge or information concerning any of the allegations in the 
Complaint, and briefly describe the knowledge or information you believe each such 
individual possesses. 
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 8: Bodell objects to this 
interrogatory upon the ground that is over broad and burdensome. Subject to such 
objection and without waiving the same, Bodell is unaware of any persons that may have 
knowledge or information concerning the allegations of the complaint other than is stated 
in the parties' Rule 26(a)(1) initial disclosures. 
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INTERROGATORY NO. 9: State eveiy fact and identify every document 
that you contend supports the allegation in paragraph 17 of the Complaint that "[tjhere is 
now due, owing and unpaid to Bodell the sum of $4,280,000.00, together with unpaid 
interest." 
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 9: Bodell objects to this 
interrogatory upon the grounds that it is over broad and burdensome. Subject to such 
objection and without waiving the same, the schedules attached hereto show the payments 
and credits made with respect to the subject loan and how the amount of $4,280,000 was 
calculated. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 10: State every fact and identify every document 
that you contend support Bodell's claim in its prayer for judgment u[f]or compensatory 
damages of $4,000,000.00, plus interest against Cherokee." 
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 10: Bodell objects to this 
interrogatory upon the ground that it is over broad and burdensome. Bodell further 
objects on the basis that discovery has only recently commenced and Bodell has not 
conducted the discovery necessary in order to fully answer this interrogatory. Bodell 
reserves the right to supplement this answer to the extent required by the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. Subject to such objections and without waiving the same, Bodell 
responds as follows: 
On January 7, 2000, Cherokee & Walker Investment Company, L.L.C. 
("CWIC"), loaned Mark H. Robbins ("Robbins") $4,500,000. $500,000 of the loan 
proceeds were contributed to Vtrax Sports, L.L.C, a newly formed company, in exchange 
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for which Cherokee & Walker, L.L.C. ("CW"), received a 50% membership interest in 
Vtrax. $3 million of the loan was to fund the repayment of bridge loans made to Robbins 
for the repurchase of all outstanding shares of the capital stock of Wasatch Cycles, 
$500,000 was to fund working capital of Wasatch Cycles and $500,000 went to Robbins 
individually. Bodell is presently conducting discovery as to the assets and business of 
Vtrax, but presently does not believe that Vtrax had any significant assets or business. 
Greg Christensen, a CW principal, was appointed as an initial manager of Vtrax. 
Consequently, CW and CWIC had detailed knowledge concerning 0Vtrax's business and 
assets. 
Effective June 10, 2000, CWIC and CW entered into a Purchase and Settlement 
Agreement with Robbins pursuant to which Robbins agreed to pay $4,683,391.25 in full 
payment of the loan previously made by CWIC and in addition to pay to CW 
$3,316,608.80 on or before June 30, 2000, to purchase CW's membership interest in 
Vtrax. 
CWIC and CW knew that Robbins was going to have to borrow the money in 
order to pay the money due under the agreement and specifically to purchase CW's 
interest in Vtrax. CWIC and CW knew or should have known that Robbins had no way 
to borrow such a large sum of money without misrepresenting the value of Vtrax and/or 
related companies. CWIC and CW specifically knew that Robbins was borrowing money 
from Jenson and checked the status of that loan on more than one occasion. Bodell is 
presently conducting discovery with respect to these transactions and what knowledge 
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CWIC and CW had of Robbins' financial affairs and the value of Vtrax and related 
companies. 
Jenson obtained a $4 million loan for his company, MSF Properties, Inc., from 
Bodell on August 30, 2000, by repeating the misrepresentations Robbins had made to him 
as alleged in the complaint. Robbins then paid the money to CWIC and CW to pay off 
the CWIC loan and purchase CW's interest in Vtrax. 
CWIC and CW would be unjustly enriched if they are permitted to retain the $4 
million that Robbins fraudulently obtained indirectly from Bodell because they knew or 
should have known that Robbins would have to fraudulently raise this money. 
All non-privileged documents in Bedell's possession or control relating to these 
transactions and to the claims asserted in the complaint are produced herewith. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 11: State every fact and identify every document 
that you contend supports the allegation in paragraph 36 of the Complaint that "Cherokee 
knew, or should have known, that its interest in Madwagon, Vtrax and Wasatach [sic] 
were worth little, if anything, and that Robbins would raise funds to pay Cherokee by 
using the amount for which he was purportedly acquiring Cherokee's interest in those 
entities as proof of the value of those entities." 
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 11: See Response to Interrogatory 
10. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 12: State every fact and identify every document 
that you contend supports Bodell's claim that Cherokee & Walker has been unjustly 
enriched. 
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RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO.12: See Response to Interrogatory 
10. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 13: Identify each individual who assisted in 
responding to these requests for admission, interrogatories, and requests for production of 
documents. 
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 13: Michael J. Bodell and Merrill 
L. Weight. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS 
REQUEST NO. 1: All documents and things that relate to, support, or 
contradict the claims alleged by you in your pleadings. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 1: Bodell objects to this request upon the 
ground that it is over broad and burdensome and does not reasonably describe a 
particularly category of documents. Subject to such objection, and without waiving the 
same, all non-privileged documents within Bodell's possession or control that are 
responsive to this request are produced herewith. 
REQUEST NO. 2: All documents that you identified or were requested to 
identify in response to the foregoing interrogatories. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 2: See Response to Request No. 1. 
REQUEST NO. 3: All documents referred to or utilized in responding to 
the foregoing requests for admission and interrogatories. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 3: See Response to Request No. 1. 
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REQUEST NO. 4: All "[documents relating to the MSF loans and the 
amounts owing thereon," as described in Plaintiff Bodell Construction Company's Rule 
26(a)(1) Initial Disclosures. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 4: See Response to Request No. 1. 
REQUEST NO. 5: All "[documents relating to the settlement between 
Bodell, MSF and Jenson," as described in Plaintiff Bodell Construction Company's Rule 
26(a)(1) Initial Disclosures. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 5: See Response to Request No. 1. 
REQUEST NO. 6: All documents that support or relate in any way to your 
calculation of damages to which you claim Bodell is entitled. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 6: See Response to Request No. 1. 
REQUEST NO. 7: All documents, including but not limited to daytimers, 
journals, personal notes, e-mails, correspondence, memoranda, calendars, schedules, 
contracts, financial statements, balance sheets, profit and loss statements, pro formas, and 
any drafts or electronic versions thereof, that relate in any manner to MSF, Jenson, 
Robbms, Cherokee & Walker, Bank One, Vtrax, Wasatch Cycles, Madtrax, Madwagon, 
Mongoose, or Brunswick. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 7: See Response to Request No. 1. 
REQUEST NO. 8: All documents, including but not limited to contracts, 
agreements, check stubs, correspondence, notes, memoranda, loan documents, and any 
drafts or electronic versions thereof, relating in any manner to any of the transactions 
identified in response to Interrogatory No. 2. 
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RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 8: See Response to Request No. 1. 
REQUEST NO. 9: All documents, including but not limited to contracts, 
agreements, check stubs, correspondence, notes, memoranda, loan documents, and any 
drafts or electronic versions thereof, relating in any manner to the Settlement Agreement 
between Bodell, Michael Bodell, MSF, and Jenson 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 9: See Response to Request No. 1. 
REQUEST NO. 10: All documents relating in any manner to any 
communications between Bodell and MSF or Jenson concerning the transactions 
described in Request Nos. 8 and 9 and/or relating in any manner to Robbins, Cherokee & 
Walker, Bank One, Vtrax, Wasatch Cycles, Madtrax, Madwagon, Mongoose, or 
Brunswick. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 10: See Response to Request No. 1. 
REQUEST NO. 11: All documents relating in any manner to any 
communications between Bodell and Robbins concerning the transactions described in 
Request Nos. 8 and 9 and/or relating in any manner to MSF, Jenson, Cherokee & Walker, 
Bank One, Vtrax, Wasatch Cycles, Madtrax, Madwagon, Mongoose, or Brunswick 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 11: See Response to Request No. 1. 
REQUEST NO. 12: All documents relating in any manner to any 
communications between Bodell and Bank One concerning the transaction described in 
Request Nos. 8 and 9 and/or relating in any manner to MSF, Jenson, Robbins, Cherokee 
& Walker, Vtrax, Wasatch Cycles, Madtrax, Madwagon, Mongoose, or Brunswick. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 12: See Response to Request No. 1. 
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REQUEST NO, 13: All documents relating in any manner to any due 
diligence conducted by Bodell in connection with any of its loans to MSF, Jenson, and/or 
Robbins, including but not limited to any appraisals or investigations into the value of 
Vtrax, Wasatch Cycles, Madtrax, Madwagon, Mongoose, or Brunswick, and/or any 
investigations into the financial situation of MSF and/or Jenson. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 13: See Response to Request No. 1. 
REQUEST NO. 14: All documents relating in any manner to any payments 
made by Bodell to MSF, Jenson, and/or Robbins. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 14: See Response to Request No. 1. 
REQUEST NO. 15: All documents relating in any manner to any payments 
made by MSF, Jenson, and/or Robbins to Bodell. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 15: See Response to Request No. 1. 
DATED this of April, 2004. 
BURBIDGE & MI 
RICHARD D. BURBIDGE 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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VERIFICATION 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
)ss. 
COUNT OF SALT LAKE ) 
MICHAEL J. BODELL, being first duly sworn, deposes and says that he is 
President of Plaintiff Bodell Construction Company in the above-captioned action; that he 
has read the foregoing responses and that the contents contained therein are true and 
accurate to the best of his knowledge, information and belief. 
MICHAEL J. BODELL 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this the day of April, 2004. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing in: 
My Commission Expires: 
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BODELL CONSTRUCTION PRINT DATE 6/9/2003 9t50 
MSF PROPERTIES, L.C. 
$1,000,000.00 NOTE 
AMORTIZATION SCHEDULE 
INTEREST RATE 2 5 . 0 0 % APR 
3 6 5 DAY YEAH 
DESCRIPTION 
ORIGINAL LOAN 
INTEREST ADDED TO PRINC 
INTEREST ADDED TO PRINC 
PAYMENT 
PAYMENT 
PAYMENT 
PAYMENT 
DATE 
6/23/2000 
9/21/2000 
12/22/2000 
2/5/2003 
2/11/2003 
2/14/2003 
3/18/2003 
NUMBER 
OP DAYS 
90 
92 
775 
6 
3 
32 
PRINCIPAL 
INCREASE 
1,000,000.00 
61,643.84 
66,898.10 
TOTAL 
PAYMENT 
100,000.00 
25,000.00 
25,000.00 
1,609,288.67 
INTEREST 
ACCRUED 
61,643.84 
66,898.10 
599,054.80 
4,637.84 
2,318.92 
24,735.17 
INTEREST 
PAID OR ADJ 
61,643.84 
66,898.10 
100,000.00 
25,000.00 
25,000.00 
480,746.73 
INTEREST 
BALANCE 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
499,054.80 
478,692.64 
456,011.56 
0.00 
PRINCIPAL 
PAID 
1,128 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
541.94 
PRINCIPAL 
BALANCE 
1,000,000.00 
1,061,643.84 
1,128,541.94 
1,128,541.94 
1,128,541.94 
1,128,541.94 
0.0^ 
s^> ^ 
CD 
o 
O 
o 
NJ 
CO 
& 
• ^ 
U 
^ 
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BODELL CONSTRUCTION PRINT DATE 6/9/2003 14»49 
MSF PROPERTIES, L.C. 
$4,000,000.00 NOTB 
AMORTIZATION SCHEDULE 
INTEREST RATE 1.00% PER WEEK IN ADVANCR BACH WEDNESDAY 
DESCRIPTION DATE 
NUMBER 
OP WEEKS 
PRINCIPAL 
INCREASE 
TOTAL 
PAYKKNT 
INTBRKST 
ACCRUED 
INTIRKST 
PAID OR ADJ 
INTEREST 
BALANCE 
PRINCIPAL 
PAID 
PRINCIPAL 
BALANCE 
ORIGINAL LOAN 
INTEREST ADDED TO PRINC 
LOAN FEB 
LATE CHARGE ON DEFAULT 
INTEREST ACCRUAL THROUGH 
PAYMENT (NOTE 1) 
INTEREST ACCRUAL THROUGH 
PAYMENT 
INTEREST ACCRUAL THROUGH 
8/30/2000 
10/3/2000 
10/3/2000 
10/3/2000 
5/1/2001 
5/2/2001 
3/18/2003 
3/18/2003 
6/10/2003 
5 
0 
0 
30 
0 
98 
0 
12 
00 
00 
00 
00 
00 
00 
00 
00 
4, 000 
200 
80 
42 
000 
000 
000 
800 
00 
00 
00 
00 
250, 
1,385, 
000 
621 
00 
84 
200, 
1,296 
4, 194 
513 
000 
0 
0 
840 
0 
400 
0 
600 
00 
00 
00 
00 
00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
200, 
207 
1,385 
000 
0 
0 
0 
200 
0 
621 
0 
00 
00 
00 
00 
00 
.00 
.84 
.00 
1 
1 
5 
3 
4 
296 
089, 
284 
898 
412 
0 
0 
0 
0 
840 
640 
040 
418 
018 
00 
00 
00 
00 
00 
00 
00 
.16 
.16 
0 
0 
0 
0 
42,800 
0 
0 
0 
00 
00 
00 
00 
00 
00 
. 00 
00 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
000, 
200 
280 
322 
322 
280 
280 
280 
280 
000 
000 
000 
800 
800 
000 
000 
000 
000 
00 
00 
00 
00 
00 
00 
00 
.00 
00 
TOTAL BALANCE DUE THROUGH 6/10/2003 
PRINCIPAL 
INTEREST 
LEGAL FEES, COLLECTION COSTS THROUGH 5/31/03 
COMBINED 
INTEREST ACCRUAL PER WEEK SUBSEQUENT TO 6/10/2003 
PRINCIPAL BALANCE 
TIMES WEEKLY RATE 
WEEKLY INTEREST CHARGES IN ADVANCE BACH WEDNESDAY 
4,280,000.00 
4,412,018.16 
20,357.97 
8,712,376.13 
4,280,000.00 
1.00% 
4 2,800.00 
(NOTB 1) PAYMENT APPLIED FIRST TO LATE FEB AS REDUCTION OF PRINCIPAL, AND REMAINDER TO INTEREST 
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BODELL CONSTRUCTION COMPANY 
MSF PROPERTIES / MARC JENSON NOTES RECEIVABLE 
LEGAL FEES FOR COLLECTION ACTIONS 
AND APPLICATION OF 3/18/03 PAYMENT 
6/9/03 
LAW FIRM INVOICE DATE INVOICE AMOUNT 
NELSON RASMUSSEN & 
NELSON RASMUSSEN & 
NELSON RASMUSSEN & 
NELSON RASMUSSEN & 
NELSON RASMUSSEN & 
NELSON RASMUSSEN & 
BURBIDGE& MITCHELL 
BURBIDGE& MITCHELL 
BURBIDGE& MITCHELL 
BURBIDGE& MITCHELL 
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL 
CHRISTENSEN 
CHRISTENSEN 
CHRISTENSEN 
CHRISTENSEN 
CHRISTENSEN 
CHRISTENSEN 
4/30/01 
5/31/01 
W30/01 
1/16/02 
2/28/02 
6/30/02 
1/31/03 
2/28/03 
3/31/03 
4/30/03 
5/31/03 
415.00 
230.00 
^25 00 
717.50 
115.00 
262.50 
5,104.50 
9,695 12 
6,054.09 
368.75 
2,360.00 
TOTAL LEGAL FEES FOR COLLECTION THROUGH 5/31/03 
ALLOCATION TO NOTES RECEIVABLE: 
NOTE DATED 6/23/2000 ORIGINAL PRINCIPAL AMOUNT 
NOTE DATED 8/30/2000 ORIGINAL PRINCIPAL AMOUNT 
25,447.46 
|ORIG. PRINC. 
1,000,000.00 
4,000,000.00 
5,000,000.00 
PERCENT| 
20.00% 
80.00% 
100.00% 
ALLOC. OF FEES | 
5,089.49 
20,357.97 
25,447.46 
APPLICATION OF 3/18/03 PAYMENT 
6/23/2000 NOTE PRINCIPAL 
6/23/2000 NOTE INTEREST 
6/23/2000 NOTE COLLECTION COSTS 
8/30/00 NOTE INTEREST 
1,128,541.94 
480,746.73 
5,089.49 
1,385,621.84 
TOTAL 3/18/03 PAYMENT 3,000,000.00 
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borrower on a transaction, I believe, if they're 
the same company that's based out of east, back 
east, and I think they're -- the ones I heard 
about are a hard-money lender, bridge loans. 
Q. Have you ever had any dealings with 
Unisource Cap? 
A. No. 
Q. As you know, one of the companies that's 
the subject of this lawsuit is Brunswick 
Corporation and their Mongoose Bicycle division. 
Have you ever had any communications with them? 
A. No. 
Q. Has anyone on behalf of Bodell 
Construction? 
A. No. 
Q. How long have you been President of 
Bodell Construction? 
A. I think I mentioned that just a bit ago. 
Approximately 2 5 years. 
Q. Tell me about your background and 
experience as a lender. Have you ever made loans? 
A. That's pretty . . . 
Q. I can be more specific if you'd like. 
Have you ever made loans? 
A. Yes. 
CitiCourt, LLC 
(801) 532-3441 
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Q. You or Bodell Construction? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Would this be through Bodell 
Construction or personally? 
A. Both, but primarily through Bodell 
Construction. Well, actually, nothing personally 
that I can think of. 
Q. Approximately how many loans have been 
made by Bodell Construction? 
A. Oh, man. That would be hard to say. 
Including little loans to maybe -- if you're going 
to include loans to, for example, to 
subcontractors to meet their payroll until the 
following payment request, it could be some, a lot 
more numerous than what you might call a 
loan-loan. 
Q. Let's exclude those. 
A. You know what I mean? 
Q. Yes. Let's exclude loans to 
subcontractors and payroll advances to employees, 
things like that. 
A. If you're going to talk about loans 
outside of the general contracting realm? Is that 
maybe kind of what you're . . . 
Q. Yes. 
CitiCourt, LLC 
(801) 532-3441 
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A. I'm going to say between 10 and 15. 
Q. Over what period of time? 
A. 15 years. 
Q. How many of those would be business or 
5
 commercial loans versus consumer loans? 
6
 A. You'd have to -- I'd have to hear a 
7
 definition of consumer loan. 
8
 Q. I would define that as a loan to an 
individual for his personal or family uses. 
A. I would say, and this is a real rough 
estimate, but 90 percent would be business. 
Q. Who would be the types of people or 
businesses that you would make these loans to? 
A. For the most part they were entities 
that were reloaning the funds to someone else or 
reinvesting for an investment purpose. 
Q. Why does Bodell Construction do that 
type of lending? It's obviously unrelated to your 
19
 construction business. 
20
 A. To increase the rate of return on some 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
of our working capital from time to time, as we've 
had excess. As opposed, for example, as opposed 
to investing it in the stock market. 
Q. What type of return do you typically get 
on these loans that you make? 
CitiCourt, LLC 
(801) 532-3441 
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MR. SHELBY: Well, if there's a typical 
rate of return, answer the question. Otherwise if 
you - -
A. There is not a typical rate of return. 
Q. (By Mr. Beckstead) Can you give me a 
range of what the rate of return has been? 
A. Oh, you know, I don't think we've ever 
really calculated over the long haul. The rate of 
return probably is, I'd say, between 5 and 15 
percent. 
Q. Annually? 
A. Well, I'm making a wild speculative 
guess on that because I've never done it, but to 
calculate them all, as a practical matter 
sometimes you don't get paid as much as you want 
on the return or get paid in part. So I don't 
know. I don't know the answer to your question, I 
guess would have been the simple answer. 
Q. Let me see if I can be more specific so 
it's easier for you to answer. 
A. Okay. 
Q. Of the 10 to 15 times, 90 percent 
business loans that you've made, were they all 
structured, other than the one we've seen with 
Marc Jenson, as a promissory note? 
CitiCourt, LLC 
(801) 532-3441 
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A. I don't remember. By the most part, 
they would have been. 
Q. Are they all structured in a way that 
the borrower agrees to pay you a fixed rate of 
interest? 
A. By the most part. There may have been 
some exceptions to that. 
Q. How many of them does the borrow agree 
to pay you a rate of interest higher than 15 
percent per annum? 
A. I don't know. 
Q. Is that because you just don't remember 
or are you just giving --
A. I just -- there's been enough of them 
that there's a broad range, I mean. 
MR. SHELBY: Try to allow Mr. Beckstead 
to finish his question before you start to answer 
so the court reporter can get down everything 
you're saying. 
THE WITNESS: Oh, okay. 
Q. (By Mr. Beckstead) Can you give me a 
sense of when you're making one of these types of 
loans what you consider an average return that's 
acceptable to you? And I'm asking what the 
borrower agrees to pay, not what you actually 
CitiCourt, LLC 
(801) 532-3441 
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receive. 
A. It would depend on the terms and the 
circumstances and the times, so to speak. But I 
would say anywhere between, on a per annum basis, 
between 8 percent and it could be -- if it was a 
per annum it sounds high, but they're never really 
year-long deals -- but on a per annum basis, it 
could go up to 40 and 50 percent. 
Q. How do you decide what rate to charge? 
A. Well, it's a variety. Often it's what 
the person, the borrower, if you will, in some 
cases states, tells what they're willing to pay. 
Q. Do you negotiate the rate? 
A. Sometimes. 
Q. Of the 10 or 15 business loans you've 
made, how many lenders -- excuse me -- how many 
borrowers are involved? 
A. I'm really not certain. I'd say that if 
you pin me down on a range, I'd say five to eight. 
Q. One of those is Marc Jenson? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And we're aware of two transactions: a 
million dollar loan in June of 2000 and a $4 
million loan in August of 2000. Did you ever do 
any other loans with Mr. Jenson? 
CitiCourt, LLC 
(801) 532-3441 
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EXPERT WITNESS REPORT 
Bodell Construction Company, a Utah corporation 
v. 
JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., et. al. 
Submitted by: 
Merrill Weight 
Date of Report 
June 11, 2007 
I. INTRODUCTION 
I am the Secretary and Treasurer at Bodell Construction Company 
("Bodell Construction"). In that capacity, I have been asked to calculate the damages 
suffered by Bodell Construction as a result of the events described in a lawsuit filed in 
Third District Court, State of Utah, styled Bodell Construction Company v. MarkH. 
Robbins, et al, Civil Case Number 030917018. 
This report and the attached schedules describe and reflect my work in connection 
with calculating the damages, summarize my opinions concerning the amount of those 
damages, and provide the bases for those opinions. The opinions and findings expressed 
herein are based upon my own investigation and work to date, as well as the facts of the 
discreet transactions at issue in this case as I understand them. My opinions and findings 
are also based upon my review of the documents and information itemized in Exhibit 1 of 
this report. 
In preparing this report, I have made no assumptions concerning who is liable for 
the claims alleged by Bodell Construction. While I have made certain assumptions about 
the facts of this case for purposes of my analysis, I do not intend to opine on the veracity 
of any specific evidence other than that with which I have personal knowledge and 
information by virtue of being a fact witness to some of the events at issue in this case. I 
may supplement, update or modify this report at a later date if additional information 
becomes available. 
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II. QUALIFICATIONS OF WITNESS 
I have a B.S. degree with a major in Accounting and a minor in Business 
Management from Brigham Young University. I am a Certified Public Accountant 
licensed to practice by the State of Utah. 
I am presently employed as the Secretary and Treasurer at Bodell Construction. I 
have held that position since September 1, 2000. In that capacity I am responsible for all 
accounting functions, financial reporting functions, and financial management for the 
Company. I have considerable experience in managing investments of the Company and 
in preparing financial analyses. Attached as Exhibit 2 is a copy of my resume. I have not 
testified as an expert at trial within the last four years. I have, however, testified in 
various depositions and in arbitrations and trials purely as a fact witness within the last 
four years. 
III. CASE BACKGROUND 
The following is a summary of certain events leading up to this litigation and is 
not meant to be testimony regarding the factual background of the case; it simply serves 
as a frame of reference for the opinions that follow this section. 
Michael Bodell met Marc Jenson ("Jenson") many years ago when the two were 
neighbors. After a period of many years without much interaction, Jenson approached 
Mr. Bodell in early summer 2000 with a business opportunity. Jenson told Mr, Bodell 
that he operated a "hard money" lending company, MSF Properties, that provided high-
return, short-term bridge loans. Jenson persuaded Mr. Bodell to cause Bodell 
Construction to lend MSF Properties one million dollars ($1,000,000.00) in June 2000 for 
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use in hard money loans to third-parties. The terms of the June 2000 loan agreement are 
the subject of a Private Placement Agreement and a Guaranty, both dated June 23, 2000. 
Benjamin Lightner, who was a Wealth Advisor in the Private Banking Group of 
Bank One (a predecessor in interest of Chase), and its authorized agent, authored a letter 
(the "Letter") dated August 22, 2000, addressed 'To Whom it may concern'5 and 
representing that: 
MadTrax Group, LLC (the "Company") and its individual members Mark Robbings 
and Marc Jenson (the "Members") will be depositing $165,000,000 into Bank One, 
Utah NA. The funding is coming from a loan agreement between MadTrax Group, 
LLC, a Utah limited liability company and Arimex Investments, LTD., a Bahamian 
corporation. The sum of $165,000,000 will be deposited into an interest bearing 
account in the name of the Company and managed by its Members. 
Should you have any questions with respect to this matter, please contact the 
undersigned. 
Lightner drafted the Letter at Mark Robbins' ("Robbins") request. Bank One and 
Lightner acknowledge these representations were false at the time they were made. 
Bodell alleges that Lightner and Bank One made those representations knowing that they 
were false or, at a minimum, that Lightner and Bank One negligently made those 
misrepresentations. Bodell further alleges that Lightner knew or could reasonably 
foresee that potential third-party lenders, a class that included Bodell, could see and rely 
on the Letter and, as a result, provide financing to Robbins, Jenson or MadTrax Group. 
Jenson obtained a copy of the Letter from Robbins and used it to induce Bodell to make a 
four million dollar ($4,000,000.00) loan in August 2000. Bodell claims it reasonably 
relied upon the representations and assurances made in the Letter in making the loan. 
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Bodell would not have made the loan absent the Letter from Bank One and the 
representations contained therein. 
Consistent with the stated purpose of the loan, Jenson combined the four million 
dollars from Bodell Construction with another four million dollars from another source 
and loaned a total of eight million dollars ($8,000,000.00) to Robbins to retire a personal 
loan and repurchase a fifty percent interest in Robbins5 bicycle business. Robbins 
thereafter defaulted on the Jenson loan, and Jenson in turn defaulted on the four million 
dollar loan from Bodell Construction. 
Jenson made several payments to Bodell Construction for the June loan, and one 
payment earmarked for the August loan. Prior to filing this lawsuit, Bodell Construction 
settled its claims against Jenson in exchange for a settlement payment. 
IV. SUMMARY OPINIONS AND GROUNDS THEREOF 
A. Damages Related To Fraud 
I am informed that the court will instruct the jury on the law governing the 
calculation of damages. I am not an attorney, nor do I intend to offer opinions at trial 
about the law applicable to the calculation of damages. 
For purposes of my calculations, I have been instructed that when a plaintiff is 
fraudulently induced to enter into a transaction, Utah courts award damages based on the 
so-called ''benefit of the bargain rule." I am instructed that under the benefit of the 
bargain rule, a plaintiff is entitled to compensation for the loss of his bargain and is not 
limited to his out-of-pocket damages. I have also been instructed that, in at least one 
case, a Utah appellate court affirmed an award of damages based on an alternative theory. 
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Under this alternative theory, the plaintiff was awarded damages based on the rate of 
return the plaintiff would have received if he had invested his money elsewhere. I will 
henceforth refer to this theory as the comparable rate of return rule. 
I have been further instructed that under either the benefit of the bargain rule or 
the comparable rate of return rule, a plaintiff is also entitled to compensation for any 
additional pecuniary loss that was a consequence of the fraud (i.e., consequential 
damages). 
1. Benefit Of The Bargain Rule 
As a result of the fraudulent misrepresentations in the Letter, Bodell Construction 
made a four million dollar ($4,000,000.00) loan to Jenson. Bodell Construction, in 
return, was promised that it would receive interest on the loan at the rate of one percent 
(1.0 %) per week, accruing on the outstanding balance weekly, in advance, at the 
beginning of each Wednesday, until it was repaid. The specific repayment terms of the 
loan are set forth in a Promissory Note signed by Jenson on August 30, 2000. I 
understand that courts that have applied the benefit of the bargain rule in similar 
situations have awarded damages based on the contractual rate of interest. 
Bodell Construction made the loan on August 30, 2000. Applying interest at the 
contractual rate described in the Promissoiy Note, and accounting for the contractual loan 
fees and default fees, and after making adjustments for monies received in from Jenson, 
the outstanding amount of principal and interest due and owing on the loan as of October 
22, 2007 (the first day of trial) is $18,449,872.41. The Promissory Note also provides 
and Bodell bargained for "all reasonable costs of collection or other costs incurred in the 
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protection of [Bodell Construction], including, but not limited to, reasonable attorneys 
fees and costs incurred by [Bodell Construction] if [the] Promissory Note is referred to an 
attorney for collection." Through April 30, 2007, Bodell has incurred $393,417.98 in 
attorneys5 fees and costs attempting to recover for breach of the Promissory Note. That is 
part of the agreement Bodell Construction bargained for. Adding that sum to the total for 
principle and interest, Bodell Construction is entitled to $18,843,290.39 (plus attorneys' 
fees and costs through triall) if the jury concludes it should receive the benefit of the 
bargain it made in reliance on the fraudulent misrepresentations made by Bank One in its 
Letter. Attached as Exhibit 4 is a spreadsheet detailing the specific calculations used to 
reach this figure. 
I am informed that consequential damages are also recoverable in fraud cases. I 
am instructed that consequential damages include (but are not necessarily limited to) the 
following: expenses resulting from the misrepresentations; loss of goodwill; any amounts 
expended in mitigation of damages; lost earnings; pre-judgment interest; and interest on 
loans required to finance plaintiffs business due to the unpaid loan. For purposes of my 
analysis, I have conservatively identified as consequential damages only the amount of 
interest Bodell Construction was required to pay on money it was forced to borrow 
against its line of credit as a result of not receiving the payments promised in connection 
with the August 2000 Jenson loan. Attached as Exhibit 9 is a spreadsheet detailing my 
calculations of those actual consequential damages incurred by Bodell as a result of the 
$4,000,000 loan it was induced to make. As shown in Exhibit 9, those damages total 
$127,281.18. 
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Adding Bodell Construction's consequential damages to the other totals results in 
total damages of $18,970,571 57 under the benefit of the bargain rule 
Acknowledging that Bodell Construction entered into the August 2000 Jenson 
loan with an expectation that the loan was to be relatively short-term m nature, I have 
been asked to perform a modified benefit of the bargain rule analysis as an aid to the jury 
For purposes of this analysis, I applied the terms and conditions of the August 2000 loan 
agreement only through October 3, 2000, the date specified m the contract for payment of 
all outstanding principal and interest (and fees, etc ) From that date forward, I 
substituted the statutory rate of interest (10%) for the contractual rate of interest (one 
percent per week) For purposes of this analysis, I also excluded the default and late fees 
for which the contract provides All other aspects of my previous calculation remained in 
effect (attorneys' fees and costs per the contract, and interest payments as consequential 
damages) Applying the statutory rate of return, instead of the contract rate, from the date 
on which all the principal and interest was due and owing, results m total damages to 
Bodell Construction of $5,890,768 12 under the modified benefit of the bargain rule 
Attached as Exhibit 6 is a spreadsheet detailing the specific calculations used to reach this 
result 
2. Comparable Rate of Return 
MJB Ltd , a Bodell Family Partneiship and James H Bodell, a Bodell 
Construction Stockholder have made loans to other budge loan companies ovei the years 
that have had rates of return ranging between 18 and 36 percent, with 25 percent 
representing a fair estimate of the average rate of return for this kind of transaction This 
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figure is confirmed by loan documents generated in connection with those loans. Bodell 
Construction very likely could have achieved returns above 18 percent had it invested 
elsewhere the four million dollars it was instead induced to loan to Jenson. Nonetheless, 
for purposes of my comparable rate of return analysis here I have assumed a rate of 18 
percent as a comparable rate of return available through other investments. Applying that 
rate from the date of the Jenson loan, it is my opinion that Bodell Construction would 
have earned $3,510,352.96, in addition to the payments applied to the note, had Bodell 
Construction invested in its traditional method the four million dollars it was instead 
fraudulently induced to loan to Jenson. Thus, Bodell Construction's damages under the 
comparable rate of return rule is $7,510,352.96 including the $4,000,000.00 of the 
original loan. Attached as Exhibit 5 is a spreadsheet detailing my calculations of those 
damages. 
Because this calculation is not directly based on the contractual terms of the 
Jenson loan, I have not included in this analysis attorneys' fees, costs or consequential 
damages, such as interest paid on lines of credit Bodell Construction was forced to tap 
when Jenson failed to make payments on the August 2000 loan. 
3. Total Fraud Damages 
Based on the calculations described above, it is my opinion that the fraudulent 
misrepresentations made in the August 22, 2000 letter caused Bodell Construction to 
incur damages totaling $18,970,571.57 under the benefit of the bargain rule; 
$5,890,768.12 under the modified benefit of the bargain rule; or totaling $7,510,352.96 
under the comparable rate of return rule. These amounts do not include any allocation for 
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punitive damages, which I am told are subject to a separate analysis for the jury to 
conduct after instruction by the court. 
B. Damages Related to Negligent Misrepresentations 
I have been instructed that the proper measure of damages in an action for 
negligent misrepresentation is that amount necessary to compensate the plaintiff for the 
pecuniary loss to him for which the misrepresentation is the legal cause, and often is 
measured as the difference between the value received in a transaction and any value 
given for it, plus any additional pecuniary losses otherwise suffered as a consequence of 
the misrepresentation (i.e., consequential damages). I am informed that under Utah law 
the total measure of such damages includes statutory prejudgment interest at a rate of 
10% per annum as the damages become liquidated. 
L Difference Between Value Received and Value Given 
In this case, the difference between the value that Bodell Construction received in 
connection with the August 2000 loan and the value given was $4,000,000, minus funds 
received from Jenson and applied against the August 2000 loan. Exhibit 10 shows the 
$4,000,000 loan accruing interest at the statutory rate (10%) from the date of the loan 
through the first day of trial, making adjustments for payments received by Jenson 
against the August 2000 loan. Statutory interest is applied here because the damages 
were liquidated when Bodell Construction made the loan in August 2000. After 
accounting for the Jenson payments, the difference between the value given and the value 
received is $4,939,195.32. 
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As I did previously in the benefit of the bargain analysis, I conservatively apply as 
consequential damages here only interest payments Bodell Construction was forced to 
make when it had to draw on its line of credit as a result of Jenson missing payments 
under the August 2000 loan. As shown in Exhibit 9, those payments totaled $127,281.18. 
2. Total Negligent Misrepresentation Damages. 
Adding consequential damages to the analysis above for the difference between 
the value given and the received in connection with the August 2000 loan, Bodell 
Construction's damages under a negligent misrepresentation analysis conservatively total 
$5,066,476.50. This does not include application of prejudgment interest to the 
consequential damages as they became liquidated. 
V. COMPENSATION AND PUBLICATIONS 
Save for my regular salary, I am receiving no compensation for my work on this 
report. There have been no publications authored by me within the preceding ten years. 
As this case progresses, I reserve the right to supplement this report as needed or 
as additional relevant information becomes available. 
Sincerely, 
yLm\\ Weight ~~/ 
- 1 1 -
BODELL CONSTRUCTION Fax 8012611020 Jun 11 2007 15 57 P 01 
EXHIBIT 1 
Bodell Constriction Company 
v 
JPMorgan Chase Bank 
DOCUMENTS AND INFORMATION REVIEWED BY MERRILL L WEIGHT FOR 
PREPARATION OF EXPERT WITNESS REPORT 
MSF Properties, L C Certificate of Participation, dated June 23, 2000 
MSF Properties Private Placement Agreement, dated June 23, 2000 
Guaranty, dated June 23, 2000. 
Promissory Note, Dated August 30, 2000 
Guaranty, dated August 30, 2000 
Payment documentation for payments on the Certificate of Completion and Promissory 
Note 
Legal fees and cost billmgs for collection actions on the Certificate of Completion and 
Promissory Note 
Bank and accounting information for mteiest paid on the Bodell line of credit 
Letter, dated August 22, 2000 from Benjamin Lightner 
Bridge Loan terms from Waterford Funding, LLC, and Cypress Capital 
JODELL CONSTRUCTION Fax:8012611020 11 2007 15:57 P.02 
EXHIBIT 2 
As Secretary and Treasurer of Bodell Construction Company, Mr. 
Weight is responsible for all financial operations within the Company. 
This includes the preparation of financial statements, management 
reports, corporate and field office administration, tax management, and 
resolution of perception differences. 
Bodell Construction Company maintains it's financial stability and 
viability, due to Mr Weight's years of experience and accounting 
responsibilities. 
Summary of Experience 
Prior to joining Bodell Construction, Mr. Weight worked for the following 
organizations: 
Project Analysts, Executive Vice President 
Mr Weight was responsible for office administration, sales, preparation 
of construction claims and expert witness testimony. 
Jelco, Inc., Secretary /Treasurer 
Responsible for accounting operations, including financial and job cost 
management, income taxes, and corporate/field office administration. 
Cooper & Lybrand, Senior Staff Auditor 
Mr. Weight performed certified audits of client financial statements and 
prepared income tax returns, with construction clients as a specialty. 
Merrill L Weight 
Secretary / Treasurer 
Construction 
Experience: 
37 years 
Experience with 
Bodell Construction 
Company: 
17 years 
Credentials 
BS Accounting 
Brigham Young University 
Licensed Certified 
Public Accountant 
Specialized project 
costing and reporting 
Income lax Planning 
Extensive knowledge 
of the construction 
industry 
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BODELL CONSTRUCTION COMPANY 
MSF PROPERTIES, LX. 
$4,000,000 NOTE 
COMPARISON TOTALS 
As At 10-22-07 (LEGAL FEES AND COSTS ONLY THROUGH 4-30-07) 
Print Date 
EXHIBIT 3 
6/11/07 
Exhibit 4 
I Par Original 
L Note Terms 
Exhibits ~] 
Comparable 
Interest 
Rate 
at_1B% APR 
Exhibit 6 1 
Alternative 1 
Ujiing Original 1 
Note Terms 
Excluding 
Default Penalty 
Through 10-3-00 
Subsequent at 
i 10% APR | 
Principal Balance 
Accrued Interest Balance 
Subtotal For Principal And Interest 
Legal Fees And Costs Through 4-30-07 (Exhibit 7) 
Subtotal Including Principal, Interest, and Legal Fees And Costs 
Consequential Damages - Interest on Bank Line of Credit Borrowing 
Total including Principal, Interest, Legal Fees and Costs, and Consequential Damages 
$4,280,000.00 $4,000,000.00 $3,694,000.12 
14,169,872.41 3,510,352.96 1,699,240.06 
18,449,872 41 
393,417.98 
18,843,290.39 
127,281.18 
$18,970,571.57 
7,510,352.96 
7,510,352.96 
$7,510,352.96 
5,393,240.18 
370,246.76 
5,763,486.94 
127,281.18 
$J±890,768.X2 
BODELL CONSTRUCTION 
MSR PROPERTIES, L.C. 
$4,000,000-00 NOTE 
AMORTIZATION SCHEDULE 
INTEREST RATE 
ORIGINAL PER NOTE TERMS 
1.00% PER WEEK IN ADVANCE EACH WEDNESDAY 
PRINT DATE 
EXHIBIT 4 
6 / 1 1 / 2 0 0 7 1 5 : 4 4 
DESCRIPTION DATE 
NUMBER 
OF WEEKS 
PRINCIPAL 1 TOTAL 
INCREASE J PAYMENT 
INTEREST 
ACCRUBP 
INTEREST 
PAID OR ADJ 
INTEREST 
BALANCE 
PRINCIPAL 
PAID 
PRINCIPAL 
BALANCE 
ORIGINAL LOAN 
INTEREST ADDED TO PRINC 
LOAN FEE 
LATE CHARGE ON DEFAULT 
INTEREST ACCRUAL THROUGH 
PAYMENT (NOTE 1) 
INTEREST ACCRUAL THROUGH 
PAYMENT 
INTEREST ACCRUAL THROUGH 
8/30/2000 
10/3/2000 
10/3/2000 
10/3/2000 
5/1/2001 
5/2/2001 
3/18/2003 
3/18/2003 
.0/23/2007 
5 
0 
0 
30 
0 
98 
0 
240 
$4, ,000, 
200, 
80, 
42, 
, 000. 
, 000. 
,000. 
,800. 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
$250, 
1,386, 
,000. 
.167. 
.00 
.59 
$200, 
1,296, 
4,194, 
10,272, 
,000-00 
o.oo 
o.oo 
,840-00 
o.oo 
, 400 - 00 
o.oo 
.000-00 
$200, 
207, 
1,386, 
,000-00 
0.00 
0-00 
0.00 
,200-00 
0.00 
,167.59 
0.00 
1, 
1, 
5, 
3, 
14, 
,296, 
,089, 
,284, 
,897, 
,169, 
$0.00 
0.00 
o.oo 
0.00 
, 840.00 
,640.00 
, 040.00 
,872.41 
.872.41 
$0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
42,800-00 
0 .00 
0.00 
0.00 
$4,000,000.00 
4,200,000.00 
4,280,000.00 
4,322,800.00 
4,322,800.00 
4,280,000 . 00 
4,280,000.00 
4,280,000.00 
4,280,000.00 
TOTAL BALANCE DUE THROUGH 10/23/2 0 07 
PRINCIPAL 
INTEREST 
TOTAL PRINCIPAL AND INTEREST 
LEGAL FEES, COLLECTION COSTS THROUGH 4/30/07 
COMBINED 
$4,280,000.00 
14,169,872.41 
18,449,872.41 
393,417-98 
$18,843,290.39 
INTEREST ACCRUAL PER WEEK SUBSEQUENT TO 10/23/2007 
PRINCIPAL BALANCE 
TIMES WEEKLY RATH 
WEEKLY INTEREST CHARGES IN ADVANCE EACH WEDNESDAY 
$4,280,000.00 
1.00% 
$42,800-00 
(NOTE 1) PAYMENT APPLIED FIRST TO LATE FEE AS REDUCTION OF PRINCIPAL, AND REMAINDER TO INTEREST 
BODELL CONSTRUCTION 
MSF P R O P E R T I E S , L - C . 
$ 4 , 0 0 0 / 0 0 0 . 0 0 NOTE 
AMORTIZATION SC.HKDTTLB 
INTEREST RATE 
COMPARABLE RATE 
I S . 0 0 % APR 
3 6 5 DAY YEAR. 
PRINT DATE 
EXHIBIT 5 
6 / 1 1 / 2 0 0 7 1 5 : 4 6 
DESCRIPTION DATE 
NUMBER 
OP DAYS 
PRINCIPAL 
INCREASE 
TOTAL 
PAYMENT 
INTEREST 
ACCRUED 
INTEREST 
PAID OR ADJ 
. _. ._. .— 
INTEREST 
BALANCE 
PRINCIPAL 
PAID 
PRINCIPAL 
BALANCE 
ORIGINAL LOAN 
INTEREST ACCRUAL THROUGH 
PAYMENT 
INTEREST ACCRUAL THROUGH 
PAYMENT 
INTEREST ACCRUAL THROUGH 
8/30/2000 
5/2/2001 
5/2/2001 
3/18/2003 
3/18/2003 
10/22/2007 
245 
0 
685 
0 
1,679 
$4,000,000.00 
$250,000.00 
1,386,167.59 
483,287.67 
0.00 
1,351,232.88 
0.00 
3,312,000.00 
0.00 
250,000-00 
0.00 
1,386,167.59 
0.00 
$0.00 
483,287.67 
233,287.67 
1 , 5 8 4 , 5 2 0 . 5 5 
1 9 8 , 3 5 2 . 9 6 
3 , 5 1 0 , 3 5 2 . 9 6 
0 . 0 0 
0 . 0 0 
0 . 0 0 
0 . 0 0 
0 . 0 0 
$ 4 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 
4 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 
4 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 
4 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 
4 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 
4 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 
TOTAL 3ALANCE DUE THR.OUGH 1 0 / 2 2 / 2 0 07 
PRINCIPAL 
INTEREST 
TOTAL PRINCIPAL AND INTERS ST 
INTEREST ACCRUAL PER DAY SUBSEQUENT TO 
PRINCIPAL BALANCE 
TIMES DAILY RATE 
DAILY INTEREST CHANGES 
$ 4 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 
3 , 5 1 0 , 3 5 2 . 9 6 
7 , 5 1 0 , 3 5 2 - 9 6 
1 0 / 2 2 / 2 0 0 7 
$ 4 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 
0 . 0 4 9 3 % 
$ 1 , 9 7 2 . 0 0 
BODELL CONSTRUCTION 
H S F P R O P E R T I E S , L . C . 
5 4 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 NOTE 
A M O R T I Z A T I O N SCHBDULE 
I N T E R E S T RATE 
ALTERNATIVE PRE-JUDGMENT RATE AFTER O R I G I N A L DUE DATE 
1 . 0 0 % PER WEEK I N ADVANCE EACH WEDNESDAY THROUGH 1 0 - 3 - 0 0 
1 0 . 0 0% APR SUBSEQUENT TO 1 0 - 3 - 0 0 CALCULATED ON DAYS OUTSTANDING 
3 6 5 DAY YEAR 
PRINT DATE 
EXHIBIT 6 
6 / 1 1 / 2 0 0 7 15:47 
DESCRIPTION DATE 
NUMBER OF T MEEKLY OR 
WEEKS/DAYS j DAILY CALC 
PRINCIPAL | TOTAL 
INCREASE j PAYMENT 
INTEREST 
ACCRUED 
INTEREST 
PAID OR ADJ 
INTEREST 
BALANCE 
PRINCIPAL 
PAID 
PRINCIPAL 
BALANCE 
O R I G I N A L LOAN 8 / 3 0 / 2 0 0 0 
INTEREST ADDED TO PRINC 1 0 / 3 / 2 0 0 0 
LOAN F E E 1 0 / 3 / 2 0 0 0 
LATE CHARGE ON D E F A U L T ( 1 1 0 / 3 / 2 0 0 0 
I N T E R E S T ACCRUAL THROUGH 5 / 2 / 2 0 0 1 
PAYMENT 5 / 2 / 2 0 0 1 
I N T E R E S T ACCRUAL THROUGH 3 / 1 8 / 2 0 0 3 
PAYMENT 3 / 1 8 / 2 0 0 3 
I N T E R E S T ACCRUAL THROUGH 1 0 / 2 2 / 2 0 0 7 
5 
0 
0 
211 
0 
685 
0 
WEEKLY 
WEEKLY 
WEEKLY 
DAILY 
DAILY 
DAILY 
DAILY 
$ 4 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 
200,000-00 
8 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 
0 . 0 0 
$ 2 5 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 
1 , 3 8 6 , 1 6 7 . 5 9 
1 , 6 7 9 DAILY 
$ 2 0 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 
0 . 0 0 
0 . 0 0 
2 4 7 , 4 1 9 . 1 8 
0 . 0 0 
8 0 2 , 7 4 8 . 5 3 
0 . 0 0 
1 , 6 9 9 , 2 4 0 . 0 6 
$ 2 0 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 
0 - 0 0 
0 . 0 0 
0 . 0 0 
2 4 7 , 4 1 9 - 1 8 
0 . 0 0 
8 0 2 , 7 4 3 . 5 3 
0 . 0 0 
247 
802 
699 
$0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
419.IS 
0.00 
748.53 
0.00 
240.06 
2 
583 
$0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
580.82 
0.00 
419.06 
0.00 
$4.000,000.00 
4,200,000.00 
4,280,000.00 
4,280,000.00 
4,280,000.00 
4,277,419.18 
4,277,419.18 
3,694,000.12 
3,694,000.12 
TOTAL BALANCE DUE THROUGH 1 0 / 2 2 / 2 0 0 7 
P R I N C I P A L 
I N T E R E S T 
TOTAL P R I N C I P A L AND I N T E R E S T 
LEGAL F E E S , C O L L E C T I O N C O S T S 8 / 1 / 0 3 THROUGH 4 / 3 0 / 0 7 
COMBINED 
$ 3 , 6 9 4 , 0 0 0 . 1 2 
1 , 6 9 9 , 2 4 0 . 0 6 
5 , 3 9 3 , 2 4 0 . 1 8 
3 7 0 , 2 4 6 . 7 6 
$ 5 , 7 6 3 , 4 8 6 . 9 4 
I N T E R E S T ACCRUAL PER DAY SUBSEQUENT TO 
P R I N C I P A L BALANCE 
T I M E S D A I L Y RATE 
DAILY I N T E R E S T CHARGES 
1 0 / 2 2 / 2 0 0 7 
$ 3 , 6 9 4 , 0 0 0 . 1 2 
0 . 0 2 7 4 % 
$ 1 , 0 1 2 . 1 6 
NOTE ( 1 ) LATE CHARGE ON DEFAULT NOT A S S E S S E D I N T H I S CALCULATION 
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BODELL CONSTRUCTION COMPANY 
MSF PROPERTIES / MARC JENSON NOTES RECEIVABLE 
LEGAL FEES FOR COLLECTION ACTIONS THROUGH 4 30 07 
AND APPLICATION OF 3/18/03 PAYMENT 
EXHIBIT 7 
6/11/07 
LAW FIRM INVOICE DATE INVOICE AMOUNT SUBTOTAL 
ALLOCATED TO 
6 23 00 NOTE 20% 
ALLOCATED TO 
8 30 00 NOTE 
NELSON RASMUSSEN & 
NELSON RASMUSSEN & 
NELSON RASMUSSEN & 
NELSON RASMUSSEN & 
NELSON RASMUSSEN & 
NELSON RASMUSSEN & 
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL 
BUR8IDGE & MITCHELL 
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL 
CHRISTFNSEN 
CHRISTENSEN 
CHRISTENSEN 
CHRISTENSEN 
CHRISTENSEN 
CHRISTENSEN 
4/30/01 
5/31/01 
11/30/01 
1/18/02 
2/28/02 
6/30/02 
1/31/03 
2/28/03 
3/31/03 
$415 00 
230 00 
125 00 
717 50 
11500 
262 60 
5 104 50 
9 695 12 
6.0S4 09 S22 718 71 $4 543 74 
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL 
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL 
BURBIOGE & MITCHELL 
4/30/03 
5/31/03 
7/31/03 
368 75 
2 360 00 
2,249 50 
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL 
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL 
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL 
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL 
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL 
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL 
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL 
8URBIDGE & MITCHELL 
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL 
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL 
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL 
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL 
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL 
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL 
BURBIOGE & MITCHELL 
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL 
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL 
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL 
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL 
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL 
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL 
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL 
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL 
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL 
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL 
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL 
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL 
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL 
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL 
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL 
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL 
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL 
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL 
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL 
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL 
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL 
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL 
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL 
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL 
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL 
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL 
BURBIDGE MITCHELL & GROSS 
BURBIDGE MITCHELL & GROSS 
BURBIDGE MITCHELL & GROSS 
BURBIDGE MITCHELL & GROSS 
8/31/03 
9/30/03 
10/31/03 
11/30/03 
12/31/03 
1/31/04 
2/29/04 
3/31/04 
4/30/04 
5/31/04 
6/30/04 
7/31/04 
8/31/04 
9/30/04 
10/31/04 
11/30/04 
12731/04 
1/31/05 
2/28/05 
3/31/05 
4/30/05 
5/31/05 
6/30/05 
7/31/05 
8/31/05 
9/30/05 
10/31/05 
11/30/05 
12/31/05 
1/31/06 
2/28/06 
3/31/06 
4/30/06 
5/31/06 
6/30/06 
7/31/06 
8/31/06 
9/30/06 
10/31/06 
11/30/06 
12/31/06 
1/31/07 
3/13/07 
3/31/07 
4/30/07 
103 75 
1 496 25 
1 807 50 
4 939 46 
8 605 40 
3 680 79 
5 704 84 
3 068 50 
6 711 07 
1 088 15 
3 965 75 
1 285 00 
2 264 75 
11 52100 
8 381 75 
752 00 
935 75 
1 497 75 
708 75 
494 00 
7 800 71 
30 625 42 
39 381 35 
7 673 23 
8 255 65 
6 232 77 
627 43 
120 00 
455 25 
3 192 25 
6 371 05 
2 337 25 
17 730 10 
41 564 35 
31 616 92 
2 635 85 
14 395 15 
20 854 10 
2 591 75 
2 629 75 
3 443 89 
10 394 72 
9 729 32 
6 452 38 
24 141 91 
$397 96172 
370 264 76 370 264 76 
$397 961 72 $4 543 74 $393 4i7~9(T TOTAL LEGAL FEES FOR COLLECTION THROUGH 4/3O/07 
ALLOCATION PERCENTAGE FOR FEES THROUGH 3 31 03 
NOTE DATED 6/23/2000 ORIGINAL PRINCIPAL AMOUNT 
NOTE DATED 8/30/2000 ORIGINAL PRINCIPAL AMOUNT 
| ORIG PRINC | 
$1 000 000 00 
4 000 000 00 
55 000 000 00 
PERCENT 
20 00% 
80 00% 
100 00% 
APPLICATION OF 3/18/03 PAYMENT 
6/23/2000 NOTE PRINCIPAL (TO EXHIBIT 8) $1 128 541 94 
6/23/2000 NOTE INTEREST (TO EXHIBIT 8) 480 746 73 
6/23/2000 NOTE LEGAL FEES AND COLLECTION COSTS (ABOVE) 4 543 74 
8/30/00 NOTE INTEREST (TO EXHIBIT 4) 1 386 167 59 
TOTAL 3/18/03 PAYMENT $3 000 000 00 
BODELL. CONSTRUCTION 
MSF P R O P E R T I E S , L . C . 
$ 1 , 0 0 0 / 0 0 0 . 0 0 NOTE 
AMORTIZATION SCHEDULE 
PRINT DATE 
EXHIBIT 8 
6/11/2007 15:51 
ORIGINAL PER NOTE TERMS 
INTEREST RATE 
DESCRIPTION 
ORIGINAL LOAN 
INTEREST ADDED TO PRXNC 
INTEREST ADDED TO PRINC 
PAYMENT 
PAYMENT 
PAYMENT 
PAYMENT 
25.00% 
365 
DATE 
5/23/2000 
9/21/2000 
12/22/2000 
2/5/2003 
2/11/2003 
2/14/2003 
3/18/2003 
APR 
DAY YEAR 
NUMBER 
OF DAYS 
90 
92 
775 
6 
3 
32 
PRINCIPAL 
INCREASE 
$1,000,000.00 
61,643.84 
66,898.10 
TOTAL 
PAYMENT 
$100,000.00 
25,000.00 
25,000.00 
1,609,288.67 
INTEREST 
ACCRUED 
$61,643.84 
66,898.10 
S99,054.80 
4,637.84 
2,318.92 
24,735.17 
INTEREST 
PAID OR ADJ-
$61,643.84 
66,898.10 
100,000.00 
25,000.00 
25,000.00 
480,746.73 
INTEREST 
BALANCE 
$0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
499,054.80 
478,692.64 
456,011.56 
0.00 
PRINCIPAL 
PAID 
$0.00 
0.00 
O.OO 
0.00 
0.00 
1,128,541.94 
PRINCIPAL 
BALANCE 
$1,000,000.00 
1,061,643.84 
1,128,541.94 
1,128,541.94 
1,128,541.94 
1,128,541-94 
0.00 
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BODELL CONSTRUCTION COMPANY EXHIBIT 9 
CALCULATION OF CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES 
LINE OF CREDIT STATEMENT - INTEREST COSTS 
6-23-O0 TO 12-31-06 
FROM 
04/01/02 J 
05/01/02 
06/01/02 
07/01/02 
08/01/02 
09/01/02 
10/01/02 
11/01/02 
12/01/02 
01/01/03 
03/03/05 
03/03/05 
03/04/05 
03/07/05 
03/08/05 
03/08/05 
03/09/05 
03/09/05 
03/01/05 
03/10/05 
03/11/05 
03/14/05 
03/14/05 
03/15/05 
03/15/05 
03/16/05 
03/17/05 
03/17/05 
03/18/05 
03/18/05 
03/21/05 
03/21/05 
03/22/05 
03/22/05 
03/23/05 
03/25/05 
03/28/05 
03/29/05 
03/30/05 
03/31/05 
04/01/05 
04/01/05 
04/01/05 
04/04/05 
04/04/05 
04/05/05 
12/27/05 
12/27/05 
12/28/05 
12/28/05 
12/29/05 
12/29/05 
I 01/09/06 
TO 
04/30/02 1 
05/31/02 
06/30/02 
07/31/02 
08/31/02 
09/30/02 
10/31/02 
11/30/02 
12/30/02 
01/31/03 
03/04/05 
03/04/05 
03/07/05 
03/08/05 
03/09/05 ! 
03/10/05 
03/11/05 
03/15/05 
03/16/05 
03/18/05 
03/21/05 
03/22/05 
03/23/05 
04/04/05 
04/05/05 
12/28/05 
12/29/05 
12/30/05 
TRANS TYPE 
ADV/PAY/INT I 
ADV/PAY/INT 
ADV/PAY/INT 
ADV/PAY/INT 
ADV/PAY/INT 
ADV/PAY/INT 
ADV/PAY/INT 
ADV/PAY/INT 
ADV/PAY/INT 
ADV/PAY/INT 
ADVANCE 
INTEREST 
PAYMENT 
ADVANCE | 
ADVANCE ! 
INTEREST 
ADVANCE 
INTEREST 
PAYMENT 
INTEREST 
PAYMENT 
ADVANCE 
INTEREST 
ADVANCE 
INTEREST 
PAYMENT 
ADVANCE 
INTEREST 
ADVANCE 
INTEREST 
ADVANCE 
INTEREST 
ADVANCE 
INTEREST 
PAYMENT 
ADVANCE 
PAYMENT 
ADVANCE 
ADVANCE 
ADVANCE 
ADJ INTEREST 
ADVANCE 
INTEREST 
PAYMENT 
INTEREST 
PAYMENT 
ADVANCE 
INTEREST 
ADVANCE 
INTEREST 
ADVANCE 
INTEREST 
I PAYMENT 
ADVANCE 
4,938,899 46 I 
5,050,101 70 
2,099,312 36 
1,202,794 26 
400,987 22 
618,953 22 
101,509 74 
569 969 84 
327,409 77 
160,248 95 
396,272 47 
162,545 95 
291,637 34 
118,899 81 
213,993 63 
330,434 38 
102,687 16 
213,594 17 
153,046 42 
446,268 24 
838,179 58 
188,457 32 
PAYMENT 
3,549,064 15 I 
4,509,327 33 
3,603,436 81 
1,629,279 49 
44,067 80 
744,109 84 
903,242 38 
487,658 72 
969,355 57 
110,635 40 
78,005 21 
825,115 15 
PRINC BAL 
1,389,835 31 I 
1,930,609 68 
426,485 23 
426,485 23 
426,485 23 
426,485 23 
426,485 23 
426,485 23 
426,485 23 
400,987 22 
400,987 22 
356,919 42 
975,872 64 
1,077,382 38 
1 077,382 38 
1,647,352 22 
1,647,352 22 
903,242 38 
903,242 38 
-
327,409 77 
327,409 77 
487,658 72 
487,658 72 
-
396,272 47 
396,272 47 
558,818 42 
558,818 42 
850,455 76 
850,455 76 
969,355 57 
969,355 57 
-
213,993 63 
103,358 23 
433,792 61 
536,479 77 
750,073 94 
750,073 94 
903,120 36 
903,120 36 
825,115 15 
825,115 15 
-
446,268 24 
446,268 24 
1 284,447 82 
1,284,447 82 
1,472,905 14 
I 1 472,905 14 
I 1,472 905 14 I 
INT ACCRUE 
7,010 97 I 
706 06 
5,257 55 
123 59 
92 17 
72 72 
61.26 
163.59 ! 
149.09 ; 
164 60 
251 68 
138 00 
50 02 
74 50 
60 54 
256 13 
129 93 
154 83 
393 82 
432 75 
13179 
89 87 
258 67 
296 63 
J 
RATE 
5 50% 
5 50% 
5 50% 
5 50% 
5 50% 
5 50% 
5 50% 
5 50% 
5 50% 
5 50% 
5 50% 
5 75% 
5 75% 
5 75% 
5 75% 
7 25% 
7 25% 
7 25% 
1,654 17 
958 36 
645 17 
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LINE OF CREDIT STATEMENT - INTEREST COSTS 
6-23-00 TO 12-31-06 
FROM TO TRANS TYPE ADVANCE PAYMENT PRINCBAL INT ACCRUE RATE INT PAID 
06/30/06 I 
1
 06/30/06 
06/01/06 
07/01/06 
07/01/06 
07/03/06 
07/03/06 
07/05/06 
07/05/06 
07/06/06 
07/06/06 
07/07/06 
07/14/06 
07/14/06 
07/17/06 
07/17/06 
07/18/06 
07/18/06 
07/19/06 
07/19/06 
07/20/06 I 
07/20/06 , 
07/21/06 | 
07/21/06 
07/24/06 
07/25/06 
07/26/06 
07/27/06 
07/28/06 
07/31/06 
08/01/06 
08/01/06 
08/01/06 
08/02/06 
08/02/06 
08/03/06 
08/03/06 
08/04/06 
08/04/06 
08/07/06 
08/07/06 
08/08/06 
08/08/06 
08/09/06 
08/09/06 
08/10/06 
08/10/06 
08/11/06 
08/11/06 
08/14/06 
08/14/06 
08/15/06 
08/15/06 
08/16/06 
08/16/06 
I 08/17/06 
06/30/06 
07/03/06 
07/05/06 
07/06/06 
07/07/06 
07/17/06 
07/18/06 
07/19/06 
07/20/06 
07/21/06 
07/24/06 
08/02/06 
08/03/06 
08/04/06 
08/07/06 
I 08/08/06 
08/09/06 
08/10/06 
08/11/06 
08/14/06 
08/15/06 
08/16/06 
08/17/06 
I 
ADVANCE I 
PAYMENT 
INTEREST 
ADJ INTEREST 
INTEREST 
ADVANCE 
INTEREST 
ADVANCE 
INTEREST 
PAYMENT 
INTEREST 
PAYMENT 
ADVANCE 
INTEREST 
ADVANCE 
INTEREST | 
ADVANCE i 
INTEREST 
ADVANCE 
INTEREST 
ADVANCE 
INTEREST 
ADVANCE 
INTEREST 
ADVANCE 
PAYMENT 
ADVANCE 
ADVANCE 
PAYMENT 
ADVANCE 
ADJINTEREST 
ADVANCE 
INTEREST 
ADVANCE 
INTEREST 
PAYMENT 
INTEREST 
[PAYMENT 
INTEREST 
[ADVANCE 
INTEREST 
ADVANCE 
INTEREST 
ADVANCE 
INTEREST 
ADVANCE 
INTEREST 
PAYMENT 
INTEREST 
ADVANCE 
INTEREST 
PAYMENT 
INTEREST 
ADVANCE 
INTEREST 
(ADVANCE 
2 117,321 53 I 
124,804 04 
61,471 82 
743,621 24 
830,254 93 
243 271 19 i 
913,087 95 
606,082 19 
287,413 20 
265,578 75 
564,088 83 
205,555 25 
127 329 81 
231,143 07 
135,706 00 
461,353 99 
213,764 20 
263 816 02 
200 39105 
583,959 63 
297,305 87 
I 167,536 43 
374,057 19 
592,799 13 
1,336,741 07 
918,550 48 
34,026 19 
! 1,669,388 76 
5 193 15 
269,770 50 
327,177 55 
2 117 321 53 I 
1,743,264 34 
1,743,264 34 
1,743,264 34 
1,743,264 34 
1,868,068 38 
1,868,068 38 
1,929,540 20 
1,929,540 20 
1,336,741 07 
1,336,741 07 
! 
743,621 24 ] 
743,621 24 j 
1,573,876 17 
1,573,876 17 
1,817,147 36 
1,817 147 36 
2,730,235 31 
2,730 235 31 
3,336 317 50 
3,336,317 50 
3,623,730 70 
3,623,730 70 
3,889,309 45 
2,970,758 97 
3,534,847 80 
3,740,403 05 
3,706 376 86 
3,833,706 67 
3,833,706 67 
4,064,849 74 
4 064,849 74 
4,200,555 74 
4,200,555 74 
2,531,166 98 
2,531,166 98 
2,525,973 83 
2,525,973 83 
2,987,327 82 
2,987,327 82 
3,201,092 02 
3,201 092 02 
3,464,908 04 
3,464,908 04 
3,665,299 09 
3 665,299 09 
3 395,528 59 
3,395,528 59 
3,979,488 22 
3,979,488 22 
3,652,310 67 
3 652,310 67 
3,949,616 54 
10,866 46 
204 08 
799 00 
856 20 
442 18 
306 34 
511 24 
360 68 
416 43 
625 68 | 
764 57 
2,491 32 
(464 37) 
931 53 
962 63 
580 06 
1,736 60 
684 60 
733 58 
794 04 
839 97 
2,334 42 
911 97 
836 99 
3 949,616 54 I 905 12 
]_4 117,152 97 j 
8 00% 
8 00% 
8 25% 
8 25% 
8 25% 
8 25% 
8 25% 
8 25% 
8 25% 
8 25% 
8 25% 
8 25% 
8 25% 
8 25% 
8 25% 
8 25% 
8 25% 
8 25% 
8 25% 
8 25% 
8 25% 
8 25% 
8 25% 
8 25% 
8 25% 
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LINE OF CREDIT STATEMENT - INTEREST COSTS 
6-23-00 TO 12-31-06 
FROM TO TRANS TYPE ADVANCE PAYMENT PRINC BAL INT ACCRUE RATE INT PAID 
08/17/06 I 
08/18/06 
08/18/06 
08/21/06 
08/21/06 
I 08/22/06 
08/22/06 
08/23/06 
08/23/06 
08/24/06 
08/24/06 
08/25/06 
08/28/06 
08/29/06 
08/30/06 i 
08/31/06 i 
09/01/06 
09/01/06 
09/01/06 
09/05/06 
09/05/06 
09/06/06 
09/06/06 
09/07/06 
09/07/06 
09/08/06 
09/08/06 
09/11/06 
09/11/06 
09/12/06 
09/12/06 
09/13/06 
09/13/06 
09/14/06 
09/14/06 
09/15/06 
09/15/06 
09/18/06 
09/18/06 
09/19/06 
09/19/06 
09/20/06 
09/20/06 
09/21/06 
09/21/06 
09/22/06 
09/25/06 
09/26/06 
09/27/06 
09/28/06 
09/29/06 
10/01/06 
10/01/06 
10/02/06 
10/02/06 
I 10/03/06 
08/18/06] 
08/21/06 
08/22/06 
08/23/06 
08/24/06 
09/01/06 
09/05/06 
09/06/06 
09/07/06 
09/08/06 
09/11/06 
09/12/06 
09/13/06 
09/14/06 
09/15/06 
09/18/06 
09/19/06 
09/20/06 
09/21/06 
10/01/06 
10/02/06 
10/03/06 
INTEREST I 
PAYMENT 
INTEREST 
ADVANCE 
INTEREST 
PAYMENT 
INTEREST 
ADVANCE 
INTEREST 
ADVANCE 
INTEREST 
PAYMENT 
PAYMENT J 
ADVANCE ! 
ADVANCE 
ADVANCE 
ADJ INTEREST 
PAYMENT 
INTEREST 
ADVANCE 
INTEREST 
PAYMENT 
INTEREST 
ADVANCE 
INTEREST 
ADVANCE 
INTEREST 
PAYMENT 
INTEREST 
ADVANCE 
INTEREST 
ADVANCE 
INTEREST 
ADVANCE 
INTEREST 
ADVANCE 
INTEREST 
ADVANCE 
INTEREST 
PAYMENT 
INTEREST 
ADVANCE 
INTEREST 
ADVANCE 
INTEREST 
ADVANCE 
ADVANCE 
ADVANCE 
ADVANCE 
ADVANCE 
ADVANCE 
ADJ INTEREST 
INTEREST 
ADVANCE 
[ADVANCE 
1,733,413 22 
90,302 15 
357,061 11 
772,719 81 
88,900 74 ! 
2,643,784 87 , 
849,202 64 
464,810 82 
609,482 45 
114,908 22 
1,223,622 59 
195,899 17 
125 82 
580,330 89 
344,621 89 
1,405,700 54 
141,51407 
292,225 58 
444,077 56 
308t980 84 
242,503 49 
83,500 33 
116,859 20 
] 125,727'63 
2,686 445 71 
725,654 30 
170,100 73 | 
1,664,334 95 | 
324,195 96 
2,270,701 62 
1,745,091 11 
1 801,057 86 
4,117,152 97 I 
1,430,707 2 6 ] 
1,430,707 2 6 | 
3,164,120 48 
3,164,120 48 
2,438,466 18 
2,438,466 18 
2,528,768 33 
2,528,768 33 
2,885,829 44 
2,885,829 44 
2,715,728 71 
1,051,393 76 
1,824,113.57 
1,913,014.31 
4,556,799 18 
4,556,799 18 
4,232,603 22 
4,232 603 22 
5,081,805 86 
5,081,805 86 
2,811,104 24 
2,811,10424 
3,275,915 06 
3,275,915 06 
3,885,397 51 
3,885,397 51 
2,140,306 40 
2,140,306 40 
2,255,214 62 
2,255,214 62 
3,478,837 21 
I 3,478,837 21 
3,674,736 38 
3,674,736 38 
3,674,862 20 
3,674,862 20 
4,255,193 09 
4,255,193 09 
2,454,135 23 
2,454,135 23 
2,798,757 12 
2,798,757 12 
4,204 457 66 
4,204,457 66 
4,345,971 73 
4,638,197 31 
5,082,274 87 
5,391,255 71 
5,633,759 20 
5,717,259 53 
5,717,259 53 
5 717,259 53 
5,834,118 73 
5,834,118 73 
| 5,959,846 36 
943 51 ] 
983 61 
725 12 
558 81 
579 51 
5,290 69 
(620 65) 
3,879 88 
1,164 58 
644 21 
750 73 
2,671 21 
490 49 
516 82 
797 24 
842 12 
2,526 47 
975 15 
562 40 
641 39 
9,635 21 
1,690 75 
1,310 20 
1,336 99 
8 25% I 
8 25% 
8 25% 
8 25% 
8 25% 
8 25% 
8 25% 
8 25% 
8 25% 
8 25% 
8 25% 
8 25% 
8 25% 
8 25% 
8 25% 
8.25% 
8 25% 
8 25% 
8 25% 
8 25% 
8 25% 
8 25% 
8 25% 
8 25% 
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LINE OF CREDIT STATEMENT - INTEREST COSTS 
6-23-00 TO 12-31-06 
FROM TO TRANS TYPE ADVANCE PAYMENT PRINC BAL INT ACCRUE RATE INT. PAID 
10/03/06 I 
10/04/06 
10/04/06 
10/05/06 
10/05/06 
10/06/06 
10/06/06 
| 10/10/06 
10/10/06 
10/11/06 
10/11/06 
10/12/06 
10/12/06 
10/13/06 
10/13/06 
10/16/06 
10/16/06 | 
10/17/06 ! 
10/17/06 
10/18/06 
10/18/06 
10/19/06 
10/19/06 
10/20/06 
10/20/06 
10/23/06 
10/23/06 
10/24/06 
10/24/06 
10/25/06 
10/26/06 
10/27/06 
10/30/06 
10/31/06 
11/01/06 
11/01/06 
11/01/06 
11/02/06 
11/03/06 
11/03/06 
11/06/06 
11/06/06 
11/07/06 
11/07/06 
11/08/06 
11/08/06 
11/09/06 
11/09/06 
11/10/06 
11/10/06 
11/13/06 
11/13/06 
11/14/06 
11/14/06 
11/15/06 
I 11/15/06 
10/04/06 I 
10/05/06 
10/06/06 
10/10/06 
10/11/06 
10/12/06 
10/13/06 
10/16/06 
10/17/06 
10/18/06 
10/19/06 
10/20/06 
10/23/06 
10/24/06 
11/01/06 
11/02/06 
11/06/06 
11/07/06 
11/08/06 
11/09/06 
11/10/06 
11/13/06 
11/14/06 
11/15/06 
I 11/16/06 
INTEREST I 
PAYMENT 
INTEREST 
ADVANCE 
INTEREST 
ADVANCE 
INTEREST 
PAYMENT 
INTEREST 
PAYMENT 
INTEREST 
ADVANCE 
INTEREST 
PAYMENT 
INTEREST | 
PAYMENT 
INTEREST 
ADVANCE 
INTEREST 
ADVANCE 
INTEREST 
ADVANCE 
INTEREST 
ADVANCE 
INTEREST 
PAYMENT 
INTEREST 
ADVANCE 
INTEREST 
ADVANCE 
ADVANCE 
PAYMENT 
PAYMENT 
.ADVANCE 
ADJ INTEREST 
PAYMENT 
INTEREST 
PAYMENT 
ADVANCE 
INTEREST 
ADVANCE 
INTEREST 
ADVANCE 
INTEREST 
ADVANCE 
INTEREST 
PAYMENT 
INTEREST 
PAYMENT 
INTEREST 
ADVANCE 
INTEREST 
ADVANCE 
INTEREST 
ADVANCE 
I INTEREST 
388,195.68 
101,290.36 
1,723,509.83 
250,458.34 
271,227.40 
161,473.52 
159,832.07 
161,893.54 
113,759.22 
1,473,610.85 
146,376.74 
595,905.01 
150,925.18 
527,937.71 
457,252.40 
100,718.99 
135,450.13 
81,239.68 
J 
256,802.50 
2,176,856.13 
702,180.72 
2,643,061.14 
45,916.79 
2,098,713.24 
84,258.31 
1,992,182.23 
68,451.57 
843,051.28 
208,478.89 
369,042.87 
5,959,846.36 I 
5,703,043.86 
5,703,043.86 
6,091,239.54 
6,091,239.54 
6,192,529.90 
6,192,529.90 
4,015,673.77 
4,015,673.77 
3,313,493.05 
3,313,493.05 
5,037,002.88 
5,037,002.88 
2,393,941.74 
2,393,941.74 
2,348,024.95 
2,348,024.95 
2,598,483.29 
2,598,483.29 
2,869,710.69 
2,869,710.69 
3,031,184.21 
3,031,184.21 
3,191,016.28 
3,191,016.28 
1,092,303.04 
1,092,303.04. 
1,254,196.58 
1,254,196.58 
1,367,955.80 
2,841,566.65 
2,757,308.34 
765,126.11 
911,502.85 
911,502.85 
843,051.28 
843,051.28 
I 
595,905.01 
595,905.01 
746,830.19 
746,830.19 
1,274,767.90 
1,274,767.90 
1,732,020.30 
1,732,020.30 
1,523,541.41 
1,523,541.41 
1,154,498.54 
1,154,498.54 
1,255,217.53 
1,255,217.53 
1,390,667.66 
1,390,667.66 
1,471,907.34 
1,365.80 I 
1,306.94 
1,395.91 
5,676.49 
920.26 
759,34 
1,154.31 
1,645.84 
538.09 
595.48 
657.65 
694.64 
2,193.83 
250.31 
2,299.37 
I 1,232.61 
193.20 
409.69 
171.15 
292.13 
396.92 
349.15 
793.71 
287.66 
318.69 
I 1,471,907.34 I 337.32 
8.25% I 
8.25% 
8.25% 
8.25% 
8.25% 
8.25% 
8.25% 
8.25% 
8.25% 
8.25% 
8.25% 
8.25% 
8.25% 
8.25% 
8.25% 
i 8.25% 
8.25% 
8.25% 
8.25% 
8.25% 
8.25% 
8.25% 
8.25% 
8.25% 
8.25% 
J J.25% 
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LINE OF CREDIT STATEMENT - INTEREST COSTS 
6-23-00 TO 12-31-06 
FROM TO TRANS TYPE ADVANCE PAYMENT PRINCBAL INT ACCRUE RATE INT. PAID 
I 11/16/06 I 
11/16/06 
11/17/06 
11/17/06 
11/20/06 
11/20/06 
11/21/06 
! 11/21/06 
11/22/06 
11/22/06 
11/24/06 
11/27/06 
11/28/06 
11/29/06 I 
11/30/06 
12/01/06 
12/01/06 
12/01/06 
12/04/06 
12/04/06 
12/05/06 
12/05/06 
12/06/06 
12/06/06 
12/07/06 
12/07/06 
12/08/06 
12/08/06 
12/11/06 
12/11/06 
12/12/06 
12/12/06 
12/13/06 
12/13/06 
12/14/06 
12/14/06 
12/15/06 
12/15/06 
12/18/06 
12/18/06 
12/19/06 
12/19/06 
12/20/06 
12/20/06 
M2/21/06 
12/21/06 
12/22/06 
12/26/06 
12/27/06 
I 12/31/06 
11/17/06 
11/20/06 
11/21/06 
11/22/06 
12/01/06 
12/04/06 
12/05/06 
12/06/06 
12/07/06 
12/08/06 
12/11/06 
12/12/06 
12/13/06 
12/14/06 
12/15/06 
! 12/18/06 
12/19/06 
12/20/06 
12/21/06 
01/01/07 
ADVANCE I 
INTEREST 
ADVANCE 
INTEREST 
ADVANCE 
INTEREST 
ADVANCE 
INTEREST 
ADVANCE 
INTEREST 
ADVANCE 
ADVANCE 
PAYMENT 
PAYMENT 
ADVANCE 
ADJ INTEREST 
ADVANCE 
INTEREST 
PAYMENT 
INTEREST 
ADVANCE 
INTEREST 
ADVANCE 
INTEREST 
PAYMENT 
INTEREST 
ADVANCE 
INTEREST 
ADVANCE 
INTEREST 
ADVANCE 
INTEREST 
ADVANCE 
INTEREST 
ADVANCE 
INTEREST 
ADVANCE 
INTEREST 
ADVANCE 
INTEREST 
ADVANCE 
INTEREST 
ADVANCE 
INTEREST 
PAYMENT 
INTEREST 
PAYMENT 
ADVANCE 
(PAYMENT 
[ JADJI INTEREST 
94,991.14 I 
183,083.86 
63,424.87 
439,471.46 
236,022.92 
370,978.15 
319,886.92 
355,327.80 
152,675.59 
837,462.59 
265,306.82 
154,210.03 
175,280.45 
115,156.13 
129,303.64 
48,831.27 
233,168.66 
651,234.11 
158,857.04 
89,071.54 
57,310.98 
2,123,011.70 
1,006,657.45 
181,582.25 
46,077.44 
2,353,246.50 
525,705.21 
366,682.76 
1,566,898.48 I 
1,566,898.48 
1,749,982.34 
1,749,982.34 
1,813,407.21 
1,813,40721 
2,252,878.67 
2,252,878.67 
2,488,901.59 
2,488,901.59 
2,859,879.74 
3,179,766.66 
1,056,754.96 
50,097.51 
405,425.31 
405,425.31 
558,100.90 
558,100.90 
376,518.65 
376,518.65 
1,213,981.24 
1,213,981.24 
1,479,288.06 
1,479,288.06 
1,433,210.62 
1,433,210.62 
1,587,420.65 
1,587,420.65 
•1,762,701.10 
1,762,701.10 
1,877,857.23 
1,877,857.23 
2,007,160.87 
2,007,160.87 
2,055,992.14 
2,055,992.14 
2,289,160.80 
2,289,160.80 
2,940,394.91 
2,940,394.91 
3,099,251.95 
3,099,251.95 
3,188,323.49 
3,188,323.49 
835,076.99 
835,076.99 
309,371.78 
366,682.76 
(0.00) 
J (0.00) 
359.08 
1,203.11 
415.57 
516.29 
5,133.36 
(951.19) 
383.69 
86.29 
278.20 
339.01 
328.44 
1,091.35 
403.96 
430.34 
459.97 
471.17 
1,573.80 
673.84 
710.24 
730.66 
2,105.09 
J (1,546.10) 
8.25% 
8.25% 
8.25% 
8.25% 
8.25% 
8.25% 
8.25% 
8.25% 
8.25% 
8.25% 
8.25% 
8.25% 
8.25% 
8.25% 
8.25% 
8.25% 
8.25% 
8.25% 
8.25% 
8.25% 
8.25% ! 
I 8.25% 
TOTAL INTEREST COSTS $127,281.18 "$127,281.18 
Page 5 of 5 
BODELL CONSTRUCTION 
MSP PROPERTIES, L-C. 
$4,000,000.00 NOTE 
AMORTIZATION SCHEDULE 
INTEREST RATE 
PRINT DATE 
EXHIBIT 10 
6 / 1 1 / 2 0 0 7 1 6 : 1 0 
STATUTORY PREJUDGEMENT RATE 
1 0 . 0 0 % APR 
3 6 5 DAT YEAR 
DESCRIPTION DATE 
8/30/2000 
5/2/2001 
5/2/3001 
3/18/2003 
3/18/2003 
10/22/2007 
NUMBER 
OF DAYS 
245 
0 
685 
0 
1.679 
PRINCIPAL 
INCREASE 
TOTAL-
PAYMENT 
INTEREST 
ACCRUED 
INTEREST 
PAID OR ADJ 
INTEREST 
BALANCE 
PRINCIPAL 
PAID 
PRINCIPAL 
BALANCE 
ORIGINAL LOAN 
INTEREST ACCRUAL THROUGH 
PAYMENT 
INTEREST ACCRUAL THROUGH 
PAYMENT 
INTEREST ACCRUAL THROUGH 
$ 4 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 
$250,000.00 
1,386,167.59 
268,493.15 
0.00 
750,684.93 
0.00 
1,556,184.83 
0.00 
250,000.00 
0.00 
769,178.08 
0.00 
$0.00 
268,493.15 
18,493.15 
769,178.08 
0.00 
1,556,184.83 
616 
0.00 
0,00 
0.00 
989.51 
0.00 
$ 4 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 
4 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 
4 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 
4 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 
3 , 3 8 3 , 0 1 0 . 4 9 
3 , 3 8 3 , 0 1 0 . 4 9 
TOTAL BALANCE DUE THROUGH 1 0 / 2 2 / 2 0 0 7 
PRINCIPAL 
INTEREST 
TOTAL P R I N C I P A L AND INTEREST 
INTEREST ACCRUAL PER DAY SUBSEQUENT TO 
PRINCIPAL BALANCE 
TIMES DAILY RATE 
DAILY INTEREST CHARGES 
1 0 / 2 2 / 2 0 0 7 
$ 3 , 3 8 3 , 0 1 0 . 4 9 
1 , 5 5 6 , 1 8 4 . 8 3 
4 , 9 3 9 , 1 9 5 . 3 2 
$ 3 , 3 8 3 , 0 1 0 . 4 9 
0 . 0 2 7 4 % 
$ 9 2 6 . 9 4 
H 
Deposition of Marc Jensen, (Volume II) 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
1 0 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
1 6 
17 
18 
19 
20 
1 21 
• 22 
23 
24 
25 
Page 198 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
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1 had that specific conversation. 
2 Q. Where were you when you had that 
3 conversation? 
4 A. In my office. 
5 Q. Was that on or about March 18? 
6 A. It was March 18th. 
7 Q. 2003? 
8 A. Yes. 
9 Q. You say that it was your understanding 
10 that Mike Bodell was releasing all claims against 
11 all other parties. Tell me everything you 
12 remember Mr. Bodell telling you in connection 
13 with, with your understanding about that. 
14 A. I--we had the--we had signed--he was 
15 on--I think he was on the phone with his lawyer; 
16 I was on the phone with mine. Mike wanted to add 
17 some language, and that's this language that I 
18 handwrote in here. And so I guess there was a 
19 little bit of back and forth on that. 
20 I had the $3 million cashier's check 
21 there. We signed it and, and Mike said, "This is 
22 great. This helps me. I can now go and finish 
23 my divorce." He said, "I've got my money now. 
24 You should go get yours. Don't let these guys 
25 off the hook." He said, "You know, I"--he said, 
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1 "You know, I don't know anything about Mark 
2 Robbins, but you've got to collect some payment." 
3 He said, "You need to go to Bank One. They've 
4 got deep pockets. They'll pay you something." 
5 Q. Do you remember any--Mr. Bodell saying 
6 anything besides what you've just told us? 
7 MR. TUFTS: Objection. Vague as to 
8 time. (Multiple voices.) 
9 A. He said, "I"--he said, "I wish you the 
10 best. I hope that you can recover from this." 
11 He felt very good at that time. He felt very, 
12 very good that night. And it, and it was my 
13 understanding and my intention of this agreement 
14 to retain those other claims for myself. 
15 Q. My, my question for you is whether we 
16 exhausted your memory of specific comments made by 
17 Mr. Bodell during that meeting, as it would relate 
18 to any waiver of any claims. 
19 MR. TUFTS: Vague. 
2 0 A. That's, that's pretty much what I 
21 remember offhand right now. 
2 2 BY MR. SHELBY: 
23 Q. Can you direct me to where the 
24 settlement agreement--there's reference to Mr. 
25 Bodell making a waiver of the claims against 
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1 everyone besides yourself? 
2 MR. JAMES: Objection. The agreement 
3 speaks for itself. 
4 MR. BECKSTEAD: It also asks him for a 
5 legal interpretation of the document. 
6 MR. TUFTS: I'll join in both those 
7 objections. 
8 BY MR. SHELBY: 
9 Q. Would you like a minute to review the 
10 document? 
11 A. Yes. 
12 MR. SHELBY: Why don't we take a short 
13 break and see if we can't--
14 MR. JAMES: Well, I--I'm--
15 MR. SHELBY: Well, go ahead. Why don't 
16 we stay. There's a question pending to you. Why 
17 don't we go ahead and have you answer that. Take 
18 whatever time you need. (Pause) 
19 A. It says here under 2B, "Without 
20 limiting the generalities, the foregoing 
21 acknowledges that Bodell and BCC from self and 
22 others acknowledges and agrees that the 
23 obligations of the MSF parties in connection with 
24 the loans, including all principal and interest 
2 5 that may have been deemed to have accrued thereon 
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1 are-~have been fu l l y s a t i s f i e d and repaid in 
2 full." 
3 Q. You said earlier that Mr. Bodell told 
4 you he got his money and now you go get yours, or 
5 words to that effect. Is that right? 
6 A. Yes. 
7 Q. You owed Mr. Bodell in excess of $5 
8 million in March of 2003? 
9 A. Yes. 
10 Q. You paid him far less than that? 
11 A. I paid him about--almost 3.8 total. 
12 And there was a time when Mike Bodell came to my 
13 office and said, "Marc, I need 2.8. If I get 
14 2.8, I can settle my divorce, my divorce in the 
15 courts." I said, "Mike, just a little bit longer 
16 and you'll get all of your money." 
17 Q. Well, you agree that Mr. Bodell--or 
18 Bodell Construction was not paid in full of their 
19 loans to you from early 2000? 
2 0 MR. BECKSTEAD: Objection. He 
21 (multiple voices) just read from a document that 
22 states--
2 3 BY MR. SHELBY: 
24 Q. Well, my question--
2 5 MR. BECKSTEAD: Let me make my objec-
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participated in securing lines of credit for the 
company to borrow. 
Q. Does Bodell Construction company make 
loans as part of their business? 
A. Yes. 
6
 Q. What would be the circumstances under 
7
 which they'd make loans? 
8
 A. Well, there are a number of them. If we 
9
 have excess funds that are available to make loans 
and we find an opportunity to loan those funds, 
then we pursue that, and have made loans. 
Q. How do you identify people that would be 
interested in making a loan? 
14
 A. You mean in -- I need you to rephrase 
that question. 
Q. When Bodell Construction Company has 
some excess funds and they want to make loans, do 
you run advertisements? Do you do it by word of 
mouth? How do you find people wanting to borrow 
from you? 
A. Generally it's by word of mouth. 
Q. What type of people do you loan to? 
A. Various and sundry kinds of people, I 
mean. 
Q. Are they -- I'm sorry, I cut you off. 
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A. 
Q-
Page 2 0 
MR. SHELBY: Same objection. It's also 
answered. 
No. 
(By Mr. Beckstead) Other than the 
transactions with Mr. Jenson, have you ever had a 
loss on any of these hard-money loans in the last 
five years? 
A. 
Q. 
expecting 
loan. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
incurred? 
A. 
I guess I need you to define "loss." 
You didn't get paid what you were 
to receive pursuant to the terms of your 
Yes. 
How many times has that happened? 
A couple of times. 
How large were the losses that you 
Well, the reality is we collected all of 
the principal that had been advanced, and so there 
were interest amounts on top of that that were not 
collected 
mind. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
And I don't have the amounts in my 
Did any of those result in litigation? 
No. 
Have you had problems collecting on any 
of those other loans? 
CitiCourt, LLC 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
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BANK ONE'S JOINDER IN ROBBINS 
MOTION TO EXCLUDE EXPERT 
TESTIMONY OF MERRILL WEIGHT 
AND MOTION TO EXTEND EXPERT 
DEADLINES 
Civil No. 030917018 
Judge John P. Kennedy 
Defendant JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., as successor by merger to Bank One, N.A. 
("Bank One"), hereby joins the Motion of Mark Robbins to Exclude the Testimony of Merrill 
Weight ("Robbins Motion"). 
Bank One also moves to change the dates for submitting its rebuttal expert reports. Bank 
07JUL 12 AMIhSI 
One is seeking to exclude the testimony of both expert witnesses designated by Bodell 
Construction. The matter of exclusion cannot be resolved prior to the current deadline for 
designate rebuttal expert witnesses. Bank One requests that the date for its rebuttal expert 
reports be extended to avoid incurring the substantial expense of designating potentially 
unnecessary rebuttal witnesses. The reasons for this Motion are more fully set forth in the 
accompanying Memorandum. 
Bank One requested Plaintiffs assent to delay the dates for submitting Bank One's 
rebuttal expert reports until after the motions to exclude are decided, but Plaintiff declined. 
Dated th i s / ^ day of July, 2007. 
HOLLAND & HART LLP 
John A. Bedstead 
H. Douglas Owens 
Romaine C. Marshall 
Attorneys for Defendant JP Morgan Chase Bank, 
N.A., successor to Bank One, N.A. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BODELL CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, a 
Utah corporation, 
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v. 
MARK H. ROBBINS; CHEROKEE & 
WALKER INVESTMENT COMPANY, L.L.C., 
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MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
BANK ONE'S JOINDER IN ROBBINS 
MOTION TO EXCLUDE EXPERT 
TESTIMONY OF MERRILL WEIGHT 
AND MOTION TO EXTEND EXPERT 
DEADLINES 
Civil No. 030917018 
Judge John P. Kennedy 
Defendant JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., as successor by merger to Bank One, N.A. 
("Bank One"), has joined the Motion of Mark Robbins to Exclude the Testimony of Merrill 
Weight ("Robbins Motion"). Bank One also moves to change the dates for submitting its 
rebuttal expert reports. 
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Bank One is seeking to exclude the testimony of both expert witnesses designated by 
Bodell Construction. Exclusion will not be resolved prior to the deadline to designate rebuttal 
expert witnesses. If the deadlines are not extended, Bank One may be forced to incur substantial 
unnecessary expense in designating unnecessary rebuttal witnesses. 
Bank One requested Plaintiffs assent to delay the dates for submitting Bank One's 
rebuttal expert reports until after the motions to exclude are decided, but Plaintiff declined. 
A. The Expert Testimony of Merrill Weight Should Be Excluded, and The Time To 
Identify a Rebuttal Expert On The Issue of Damages Postponed Until The Robbins 
Motion Is Decided. 
Plaintiff served the expert report of Merrill Weight on June 11, 2007. On June 28, 2007, 
Defendant Mark Robbins moved to exclude Mr. Weight's testimony on several grounds, 
including Plaintiffs failure to disclose Mr. Weight's damage theories earlier, and because Mr. 
Weight relies on damages theories that are not allowed under Utah law. Bank One has joined in 
the Robbins Motion. 
Bank One further requests that the time for designating any rebuttal expert on the issue of 
damage calculations, currently set in the scheduling order for July 20, 2007, be postponed until 
such time as the Robbins Motion is decided. The Court has broad discretion over scheduling 
orders, which are designed to allow the parties to prepare for trial and save the parties from 
unnecessary expenses. See DeBry v Cascade Enters , 879 P.2d 1353, 1361 (Utah 1994). If the 
Robbins Motion is granted, Bank One will not need to identify a rebuttal witness, and substantial 
expense will be avoided. If the Robbins Motion is denied, Bank One requests that the time to 
identify its rebuttal witness be postponed until after it has an opportunity to depose Mr. Weight 
2 
and learn the basis for his opinions. Such a change to the scheduling order will be modest and 
likely can be done without impacting the trial schedule, currently set for October 22, 2007. 
The need for this modification to the scheduling was caused by Plaintiffs failure to 
disclose its damage theories on a timely basis, as set forth in the Memorandum supporting the 
Robbins Motion. Bank One should not be financially punished for that conduct of Plaintiff. 
B. The Time for Bank One To Identify An Expert to Rebut The Testimony of Gary 
Schwartz Should Be Postponed Until Bank One Has Had The Opportunity To 
Depose Mr. Schwartz and Bring A Motion to Exclude His Testimony. 
Plaintiff served the expert report of Gary Schwartz on June 11, 2007. Bank One sought 
to depose Mr. Schwartz at the earliest possible opportunity in order to bring a motion to exclude 
Mr. Schwartz's testimony. His deposition has been scheduled for July 19, 2007. The basis for 
the motion will primarily be that Mr. Schwartz is not qualified to render opinions as to the 
reasonableness of the reliance Plaintiff placed on an alleged communication from Bank One. 
The deposition is necessary to develop the facts concerning Mr. Schwartz's qualifications. 
Bank One therefore requests that the Court grant a continuance of its deadline to name a 
rebuttal expert witness to Mr. Schwartz, currently set for July 20, 2007, until such time as Bank 
One has the opportunity to depose Mr. Schwartz and have its motion to exclude his testimony 
decided. If the motion to exclude Mr. Schwartz's testimony is granted, Bank One will not need 
to identify any rebuttal expert, and the unnecessary expense of engaging an expert and filing an 
expert report will be avoided. If the motion to exclude is denied, the resulting delay will be 
minor, and should not impact the trial schedule. 
3 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the expert testimony of Merrill Weight should be excluded. 
The time for Defendants to submit the reports of their rebuttal experts should be postponed until 
such time as the motions to exclude the testimony of Messrs. Weight and Schwartz have been 
decided. 
>7 / * 
Dated this U/ day of July, 2007. 
HOLLAND & HART LLP 
Jofin A. Beckstead 
H. Douglas Owens 
Romaine C. Marshall 
Attorneys for Defendant JP Morgan Chase Bank, 
N.A., successor to Bank One, N.A. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BODELL CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, a 
Utah corporation, 
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PLAINTIFF BODELL CONSTRUCTION 
COMPANY'S CONSOLIDATED 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO 
DEFENDANT MARK ROBBINS' 
MOTIONS: 
(1) TO EXCLUDE TESTIMONY OF 
MERRILL WEIGHT; AND 
(2) TO REOPEN FACT DISCOVERY 
AND EXTEND EXPERT 
DEADLINES 
Civil No. 030917018 
Judge John Paul Kennedy 
Plaintiff Bodell Construction Company ("Bodell") responds here to the arguments made 
by Defendant Mark H. Robbins ("Robbins") in his separate motions to: 1) Exclude Expert 
Testimony of Merrill Weight; and 2) Reopen Fact Discovery and Extend Expert Deadlines. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Bodell timely served on June 11, 2007 the expert report of Merrill Weight ("Weight") 
calculating the damages to Bodell flowing from Bodell's reliance on a fraudulent letter written 
by Bank One at Robbins' request. In his motion seeking exclusion of Weight, Robbins asks the 
Court to grant extraordinary relief for an ordinary and routine practice. Claiming unfair surprise, 
Robbins seeks an order excluding Weight as an expert witness at trial. Robbins' claim of 
prejudice is nonsensical. Indeed, Weight's expert report - produced over four months in advance 
of trial - is overwhelmingly based upon known and undisputed facts, most of which are set forth 
in loan agreements in Robbins' possession for several years.1 As is customary, Weight has taken 
those facts, applied established Utah law to them, and calculated BodelPs damages based upon 
that application.2 
To the extent Weight's report provides calculations of damages flowing from those 
largely undisputed facts that expand upon the damages Bodell identified years ago in preliminary 
Interrogatories at the outset of discovery, the expert discovery period is open and Robbins may 
depose Weight in detail concerning the bases of his opinions and the facts supporting those 
opinions - including, of course, any facts relied upon by Weight in forming his opinions that 
Under the stipulated schedule in place, Robbins had twelve weeks from service of Weight's report to conduct 
expert discovery, and another seven weeks after that to prepaie for trial, which is still at the time of this filing over 
three months away 
" With only two limited exceptions, Weight merely provides m his leport mathematical calculations based on the 
established facts. The two exceptions are references to other loans Bodell might have made and interest paid on a 
line credit Bodell had to tap because it was not repaid under the loan m was induced to make Defendants already 
deposed Weight with respect to the former, and he is available for deposition about the latter. 
li 
were not previously developed by Defendants during fact discovery. Tellingly, Robbins has 
never requested Weight's expert deposition. Rather than simply avail himself of the opportunity 
to depose Weight concerning the facts and opinions cited in Weight's report, Robbins elected to 
move the Court for unnecessary and incredibly prejudicial relief that could prevent a proper 
accounting of Bodell's damages for the jury at trial. 
The damages theories identified in Weight's report are premised upon clear and settled 
Utah law, equally available to any of the parties who wished to research what damages are 
available to plaintiffs in fraud actions in Utah. For this reason, there can be no legitimate claim 
of surprise concerning the damages theories available to BodelL Moreover, the damages theories 
cited by Weight are proper. The established method of damage calculation in fraud cases in 
Utah is the "benefit of the bargain," and Robbins' attempt to narrow the application of this rule 
here is unsupportable because it is based on a flawed interpretation of a completely different, 
inapplicable rule applied by a foreign court that has adopted a different (and minority) approach 
to fraud damages. 
Finally, Robbins has shown no good cause for modification of any expert discovery 
deadlines, which likely will disturb the October trial date set many months ago. To the contrary, 
this case has been pending for over four years. Bodell finally has a tnal date, and there simply is 
no reason to jeopardize the trial setting merely because Robbins would like the Court to decide 
months in advance of trial whether or not he should retain an expert to rebut Weight's opinions. 
3
 Weight is the Chief Financial Officer of Bodell He is the person most knowledgeable about Bodell's damages in 
this matter, the accounting of those damages, and other investment opportunities for Bodell In short, he is the 
person most knowledgeable about the facts supporting Bodell's damages calculations 
in 
Robbins should do what all parties do, continue to prepare for trial while these issues are 
considered by the Court. 
For these reasons and those that follow, Robbins's motions to exclude Weight's 
testimony and to extend discovery deadlines should be denied. 
ARGUMENT 
I. ROBBINS' MOTION TO EXCLUDE THE EXPERT TESTIMONY OF 
MERRILL WEIGHT SHOULD BE DENIED 
a. The Court Should Reject Robbins's Timeliness Arguments Because the 
Operative Facts are Known and Undisputed, and He Has Ample Time to 
Conduct Further Discovery Concerning any Facts Not Adequately Developed 
by Defendants in Fact Discovery 
Robbins's principal argument for the exclusion of Weight's expert opinion is that Bodell 
should have identified for Defendants certain damages theories before the close of fact 
discovery. Robbins attempts to vilify Bodell for what is a customary occurrence: damage 
calculations being disclosed by a damages expert during expert discovery based upon facts 
uncovered in fact discovery. Cf. Tyson v. Amerigroup Illinois, Inc., 230 F.R.D. 538, 540-42 & 
n.5 (N.D. 111. 2005) (denying motion to compel interrogatory response regarding damage theories 
before beginning of expert discovery); In re Veeco Instruments, Inc. Securities Litig., No. 
05MD1695, 2007 WL 274800, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. January 29, 2007) (written discovery relating to 
damages properly reserved until close of expert discovery). The operative facts relating to 
Bodell's damages in this case—including the date Bodell made its loans, the amounts of those 
loans, the terms of those loans, and the subsequent defaults on the loans—are well-known by the 
1 
parties and largely undisputed.4 Of course, Utah law governing damages is settled and equally 
available to all of the parties, hi his expert report, Weight merely applied that settled Utah law to 
the facts here and computed BodelPs damages - hardly a surprising or prejudicial event. 
Further, though fact discovery has closed, expert discovery was open at the time of the 
disclosure of the Weight report and still is open for another six weeks. Expert discovery is the 
appropriate time to inquire regarding expert opinions, including damages calculations, and the 
factual bases for those opinions. See id. In this case, nearly all of the relevant facts were the 
subject of fact discovery. Weight himself was previously deposed during fact discovery and 
testified about the facts surrounding the subject loan and Bodell's lending practices. (See, e.g., 
Deposition of Merrill Weight ("Weight Dep.") at 14:3-23:23 (Ex. A).) In his moving papers 
Robbins even cites some of Weight's deposition testimony on damages in an effort to show that 
his report is somehow inconsistent with his previous testimony. 
Of course, Robbins has the right to depose Weight in his capacity as an expert to explore 
Weight's opinions and the factual bases for those opinions. As Bodell's CFO, Weight is the 
person most knowledgeable about the facts underlying Bodell's damages claims. In this regard, 
Robbins is better off with Weight as an expert than some retained third-party expert who may 
lack the foundation to fully and completely answer questions the Defendants may have about the 
facts supporting Bodell's damages. There will be no fact presented at trial by Bodell that 
Robbins will not have had the opportunity to discover. 
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 The one fact allegedly unknown to Robbins before receipt of Weight's expeit report is that Bodell was forced as a 
result of Defendants' fraud to tap a line of credit, resulting in accumulated mteiest, which is recoverable as 
consequential damages in Utah 
As discussed below, this is subject matter for cross-examination, not exclusion of a witness. It does show, 
however, that Defendants had an opportunity (which they used) to depose Weight concerning damages very early in 
the case That testimony covered nearly all the factual subjects m Weight's leport. 
2 
Tellingly, Robbins has never requested Weight's expert deposition and has undertaken no 
effort whatsoever to conduct discovery about any facts allegedly not disclosed prior to the close 
of fact discovery. Nor does Robbins ask in his moving papers for a continuance, or additional 
time to conduct Weight's deposition, retain an expert and provide a report rebutting Weight's 
opinions. Robbins' motion appears designed to accomplish only one thing: to keep from the jury 
at trial an accounting of Bodell's recoverable damages under Utah law. Robbins' motion is 
obviously not designed to remedy any true prejudice or permit discovery of any "surprising" 
facts. Accordingly, he has no basis to seek the "extraordinary sanction" of exclusion of Weight's 
testimony. See Seymour v. Consol Freightways, 187 F.R.D. 541, 542 (S.D. Miss. 1999). 
The cases relied upon by Robbins are equally unpersuasive. For example, in Thibeault v. 
Square D Co., 960 F.2d 239, 241-42 (1st Cir. 1992), the plaintiff served a 37-page document 
disclosing several new theories and seven previously undisclosed experts just four days before 
trial. 960 F.2d at 241-42. In Design Strategies, Inc. v. Davis, 367 F. Supp. 2d 630 (S.D.N.Y. 
2005), the court disallowed the plaintiff from putting forward a damages theory because the 
plaintiff failed to produce adequate facts to support the theory asserted. 367 F. Supp. 2d at 635. 
Neither of these cases supports the proposition that expert testimony should be excluded where a 
party produces its expert report within the timeframe proscribed by the court, and over three 
months before trial, and that expert report merely contains expert calculations based upon the 
application of settled law to largely known and undisputed facts. See id.; Thibeault, 960 F.2d at 
241-42. 
Perhaps most importantly, Robbins cites no case where expert testimony was stricken as 
untimely disclosed where purportedly new damages theories were disclosed before the close of 
3 
expert discovery. And rightfully so; the appropriate time for Robbins to make inquiry 
concerning those theories is during expert discovery. See Tyson, 230 F.R.D. at 540-42 & n.5 
(damages theories to be pared down "when expert discovery begins"); In re Veeco, 2007 WL 
274800 at *2 (same). 
Experts nearly always perform original calculations, analyses, computations or the like in 
preparation of their reports. Those calculations and analyses nearly always rely upon some 
discreet facts that were not previously uncovered in fact discovery. Those facts are then 
disclosed as supporting the expert's opinions, and they become the subject of expert depositions. 
This routine occurrence is exactly what we have here and Robbins can show no prejudice 
flowing therefrom, let alone prejudice sufficient to justify excluding Bodell's only damages 
expert. 
b. Even if Bodell's Damages Calculations Could Have Been Disclosed Earlier, 
Any Attendant Delay is Harmless to Robbins and Does not Warrant the 
Severe Sanction of Exclusion 
Even accepting Robbins' assertion that Bodell should have (and could have) disclosed 
every aspect of its damage calculations and every conceivable factual bases for them before 
expiration of fact discovery, Bodell's alleged failure to do so is plainly harmless. For his part, 
Robbins merely asserts a generalized claim of harm - he cites no specific prejudice that has 
resulted or will result. Nor can he. At its core, Robbins really complains only about two sets of 
facts he claims Bodell failed to disclose: 1) the existence of a line of credit Bodell had to tap 
because it was not repaid the money it was due under the loan agreements; and 2) the basis for 
Bodell's assertion that it could have earned money elsewhere had Bodell not been induced to 
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loan it here.6 Robbins had at the time Weight's report was served twelve weeks to conduct any 
expert discovery he wanted on those topics, and an additional seven weeks after the close of 
expert discovery to prepare to meet at trial any new facts. As noted, expert discovery is still 
open (though the clock is running, without any request to date by Robbins to take Weight's 
deposition). Any prejudice flowing to Robbins at this point is of his own making by failing even 
to try to conduct discovery on the issues he claims are so surprising. Regardless, any prejudice 
to Robbins resulting from this purportedly late disclosure does not warrant the "extraordinary 
sanction" of exclusion of Weight's testimony. See Seymour, 187 F.R.D. at 542. 
c. Weight's Damages Opinions are Proper and Should not be Excluded 
i. The Benefit of the Bargain Rule Applies to All Actions for Fraud in Utah 
As Robbins concedes, Utah has expressly adopted the benefit of the bargain rule for 
fixing damages in fraud cases: 
[T]he rule in this jurisdiction [is] that in an action for fraud and deceit the measure 
of damages is the difference between the actual value of what the party received 
and the value thereof if it had been as represented; this is the benefit of the 
bargain rule. Under this rule the defrauded party is compensated for the loss of his 
bargain and is not confined to his out-of-the-pocket damages. 
Lamb v. Bangart, 525 P.2d 602, 609 (Utah 1974) (citing Dilworth v. Lauritzen, 424 P.2d 136 
(1967)); see also Brown v. Richards, 840 P.2d 143, 150-51 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). Contrary to 
Robbins' suggestion, Utah courts have never limited application of the benefit of the bargain rule 
in fraud cases to only those involving real property - nor would such an arbitrary restriction 
make sense given the rationale for the rule. Cf. id. 
Of course, Robbins cites in his moving papers testimony by Weight in his fact deposition on Bodell's lending 
piactices, the availability of other loans and the rates of returns on those loans. Robbins is simply wiong when he 
contends he did not have discoveiy of facts relating to returns Bodell might have received on other loans had it not 
been induced to lend the money m reliance on the fraudulent Bank One letter. 
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"The purpose underlying the benefit-of-the-bargain rule is to put the defrauded party in 
the same financial position as if the fraudulent representations had in fact been true." Mike 
Finnin Ford, Inc. v. Automatic Data Processing, Inc., 220 F. Supp. 2d 970, 977-78 (N.D. Iowa 
2001); see Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239, 1247 (Utah 1980). For that reason, the benefit of the 
bargain rule is the majority rule. Sigman v. Stevens-Norton, Inc., 425 P.2d 891, 895 (Wash. 
1967) ("In commercial transactions such as this, where damages are sought as a result of fraud 
and deceit, the majority of the courts appear to favor applicability of the 'benefit of the bargain' 
measure of damages."); Stewart v. Potter, 104 P.2d 736, 739 (N.M. 1940) ("The great weight of 
authority sustains the general rule that the defrauded purchaser may recover the difference 
between the real and the represented value of the property, regardless of the fact that the actual 
loss suffered might have been less."). Utah's benefit of the bargain rule is completely 
inconsistent with the small minority of jurisdictions that apply the "out-of-pocket rule," limiting 
damages to out-of-pocket costs resulting from the fraud. Cf. Schwab v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 
449 F. Supp. 2d 992, 1058-59 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (recognizing out-of-pocket rule as minority rule 
and applying benefit of the bargain rule). 
Notwithstanding binding precedent in Utah holding that the measure of damages in a 
fraud case is the "benefit of the bargain," Robbins asks this Court to make new law narrowing 
application of the rule. Robbins attempts to distinguish Lamb and its unqualified application of 
the benefit of the bargain rule in fraud cases by asserting that it applies only in the context of real 
or personal property and should not apply where a party is fraudulently induced to make a loan. 
No Utah decision draws any such distinction. Accordingly, as his only support, Robbins cites 
McLean v. Charles Ellis Realty, Inc., 76 P.3d 661 (Or. Ct. App. 2003). However, McLean does 
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not stand for the proposition for which Robbins cites and likewise does not support his novel 
theory. 
Oregon is among the minority of states that apply the out-of-pocket rule. Galego v. 
Knudsen, 573 P.2d 313, 318 (Or. 1978). It does so with one twist that appears to be unique to 
Oregon; it allows benefit of the bargain damages "if the fraudulent representation also amounted 
to a warranty." Selman v. Shirley, 85 P.2d 384, 394 (Or. 1938). Thus, Oregon law looks to the 
type of representation in deciding which rule to apply; it does not make the distinction that 
Robbins attempts to make here regarding the type of asset that is the subject of fraud. Cf. 
Sorensen v. Gardner, 334 P.2d 471, 476-77 (Or. 1959) (holding that out-of-pocket damages were 
proper in fraud regarding real property); McLean, 76 P.3d at 667 (holding that out-of-pocket 
damages were proper in fraud regarding loan). Even so, Bodell is unable to find any other 
jurisdiction to make such a distinction, and Robbins cites none. Cf. Sigman, 425 P.2d at 895 
(affirming application of the benefit of the bargain rule with respect to fraud in connection with 
mortgage loan); Walston v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 923 P.2d 456, 463 (1996) (benefit of the 
bargain rule applied in the context of insurance policy). In other words, Robbins's only basis for 
exclusion of benefit of the bargain damages here is his own flawed interpretation of a minority 
application of a minority rule in a foreign jurisdiction. 
Benefit of the bargain damages are the unquestionable measure of damages in this case 
based on the clear and unqualified holdings of Utah appellate courts in Lamb, Brown, Dilworth, 
and Dugan, among others. See, e.g., Lamb, 525 P.2d at 609; Brown, 840 P.2d at 150-51. As 
such, the Court should reject Robbins's attempt to exclude Weight's opinions on benefit of the 
bargain damages. 
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ii. Weight's Consequential Damages Calculations are Properly Supported 
Robbins does not dispute that consequential damages are available in fraud cases. Cf. 
Ong Ml (U.S.A.) Inc. v. 11th Ave. Corp., 850 P.2d 447, 457 (Utah 1993). He has, however, 
taken issue with Weight's consequential damages calculation, claiming there is an insufficient 
causal link between the damages and his own conduct in causing Bodell's loss. This causal link, 
however, need not be absolute; Bodell need only offer evidence supporting a "just and 
reasonable inference" of the causal connection. In re Men's Sportswear, Inc., 834 F.2d 1134, 
1139 (2d Cir. 1987); Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 563 
(1931). In this respect, Bodell's logic is simple. From 2002 to 2006, Bodell maintained a line of 
credit with its bank. Had the loan Bodell was fraudulently induced to make been timely repaid, 
Bodell would not have been forced to tap that line of credit and pay interest on the amount 
drawn. To the extent Robbins wants to offer his own impeachment evidence at trial and argue 
to the jury that other factors caused Bodell to tap the line of credit, he is permitted to do so to the 
fullest extent allowable by evidentiary and procedural rules, including effective cross-
examination. However, his arguments do not provide a basis for pretrial exclusion of Weight's 
opinions on consequential damages. Cf. Ong Int 7, 850 P.2d at 457 (holding that "loss of interest 
on loans required to finance the business" is a proper consequential damage in fraud case). 
Robbins also appears to argue that he was unaware of any line of credit that would factor 
into Bodell's damages. However, Weight testified at his deposition that he was responsible for 
"securing lines of credit" for Bodell, and that Bodell had historically borrowed money on those 
credit lines at prime plus one-half percent. (Weight Dep. at 14:1-2; 22:16-23:6.) The fact that 
default of the subject loan resulted in Bodell drawing on such a line of credit could not have 
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come as a surprise to Robbins, and it certainly does not provide a basis to exclude Weight's 
testimony on consequential damages. 
iii. Weight's Comparable Rate of Return is Properly Supported 
Finally, Robbins claims that Weight's comparable rate of return—18%—is not properly 
supported. Specifically, he claims that (1) Bodell would not have had an opportunity to make 
any loan; (2) that Bodell would not have attained an 18% rate; and (3) that Bodell would not 
have been able to collect on any loan it made. These arguments miss the point. It is obvious that 
Robbins disputes Weight's conclusions, but this dispute does not justify exclusion of Weight's 
opinions. Weight testified as a fact witness years ago that Bodell had many opportunities to loan 
money, was able achieve interest rates of up to 50% on loans, and has been able to collect on 
most loans. (Weight Dep. at 15:7-9; 17:11-12; 22:11-15.) This testimony, in addition to the 
expert testimony he will offer at trial, easily provides at least a "just and reasonable inference" 
supporting Bodell's damages. See Story, 282 U.S. at 563. Bodell need not show with absolute 
certainty that it was about to put pen to paper on another loan but chose instead the subject loan 
it was fraudulently induced to make. See id.; Ong Int 7, 850 P.2d at 457 (requiring proof only to 
a reasonable certainty). 
Bodell need only offer evidence to support a just and reasonable inference regarding what 
returns it could have procured had it invested the capital of the subject loan elsewhere. See 
Story?, 282 U.S. at 563. Again, Robbins is free make to the jury the same argument he makes in 
his supporting memorandum, and the jury will then apply the law as instructed by the Court and 
decide what Bodell's damages are. The fact that Robbins disputes Weight's testimony does not 
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render the matter appropriate for resolution by the Court. To the contrary, this is the precise and 
exclusive province of the jury. 
II. ROBBINS'S MOTION TO REOPEN FACT DISCOVERY AND EXTEND 
EXPERT DEADLINES SHOULD BE DENIED 
As stated and supported in detail above, Robbins has had ample time to conduct fact 
discovery. Weight's expert report is supported by few, if any, new facts. The legal bases for 
Bodell's damages calculations are based on well-settled Utah case law equally available to all the 
parties from the inception of this case. Robbins will have had twelve weeks to conduct expert 
discovery after he was served with Weight's report to ascertain the specific bases for Weight's 
opinions regarding damages. To the extent he needs further factual inquiry on damages issues, 
Robbins is free to so inquire at Weight's expert deposition should he choose to take it. Robbins 
also identifies no specific prejudice under these circumstances. Accordingly, there is no basis to 
reopen fact discovery, nor to extend the expert deadlines. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Robbins's motions to exclude Weight's opinions and extend 
discovery deadlines should be denied. 
Respectfully submitted this IO day of July, 2007. 
BURBIDGE, MITCHELL & GROSS, 
By: 
Robert J. Shelby 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I served a true and accurate copy of the foregoing 
PLAINTIFF BODELL CONSTRUCTION COMPANY'S CONSOLIDATED 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT MARK ROBBINS'S 
MOTIONS: 
(1) TO EXCLUDE TESTIMONY OF MERRILL WEIGHT; AND 
(2) TO REOPEN FACT DISCOVERY AND EXTEND EXPERT DEADLINES 
on the' day of July, 2007, to the following in the manner as indicated below: 
VIA E-MAIL AND FIRST CLASS MAIL VIA E-MAIL AND FIRST CLASS MAIL 
John A. Beckstead 
HOLLAND & HART David W. Tufts 
60 E. South Temple, Suite 2000 DURHAM JONES & PINEGAR 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 111 E. Broadway, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
VC/U 
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David W. Tufts (8736) 
Erik A. Olson (8479) 
Jason R.Hull (11202) 
DURHAM JONES & PINEGAR, P.C 
111 East Broadway, Suite 900 
P O. Box 4050 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-4050 
Telephone: (801)415-3000 
Facsimile: (801)415-3500 
Attorneys for Defendant Mark H. Robbins 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BODELL CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, 
a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MARK H. ROBBINS; CHEROKEE & 
WALKER INVESTMENT COMPANY, 
L.L.C., a Utah limited liability company; 
CHEROKEE AND WALKER, L.L.C., a 
Utah limited liability company; BANK 
ONE, UTAH, National Association, a Utah 
corporation; and DOES 1 through 50, 
Defendants. 
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF (1) MOTION TO EXCLUDE 
EXPERT TESTIMONY OF MERRILL 
WEIGHT AND (2) MOTION TO 
REOPEN FACT DISCOVERY AND 
EXTEND EXPERT DEADLINES 
Case No. 030917018 
Judge John Paul Kennedy 
Defendant Mark Robbins (ctRobbms") hereby submits this reply memorandum in support 
of his motion to exclude the expeit testimony of Merrill Weight or in the alternative to reopen 
fact discovery and extend expert deadlines. 
07 JUL 25 PH 3:26 
INTRODUCTION 
Despite having stated on at least five occasions that it was seeking to recover the 
principal amount of $4 million loaned to Mr. Jenson, plus interest at the statutory rate, Bodell 
Construction Company ("Bodell") now seeks damages in excess of $18 million based on new 
damages theories that were never previously disclosed to the defense. Bodell offers no excuse 
for this non disclosure. Mr. Weight's opinions should be excluded because the defense is unable 
to prepare to meet these new theories without fact discovery—which is unavailable now due to 
Bodell's belated disclosure. 
In addition, Mr. Weight's new theory of damages—his so-called "Benefit of the Bargain" 
theory which would measure damages as the contractual amount owed by Mr. Jenson under the 
note—should be excluded because such an approach has never been accepted by any court in 
fraud cases involving a loan transaction. In fact, Mr. Weight's theory has been expressly 
rejected by at least one court as "not being apt" in loan cases because of the difficulty inherent in 
valuing such non-tangible things. McLean v. Charles Ellis Realty, Inc., 76 P.3d 661, 667 (Ore. 
Ct. App. 2003).' Also, Mr. Weight's calculation is not the "Benefit of the Bargain" analysis at 
all because he does not compare the value of the loan as represented against the value of the loan 
as made—he does not calculate a difference. 
Mr. Weight's other damages theories should likewise be excluded because they were 
never previously disclosed, and because there is no causal connection between Mr. Weight's 
opinion and the evidence in this case. 
McLean is an important case because it is the only known case where a party has argued for exactly what Mr. 
Weight proposes heie—using the total amount owed under the note as a measure for fraud damages. McLean 
firmly rejected this as a measure of fraud damages. 76 P.3d at 667. 
SLC 82234 
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ARGUMENT 
I. MR. WEIGHT'S OPINIONS SHOULD BE EXCLUDED BECAUSE THEY ARE 
NEW DAMAGES THEORIES NEVER PREVIOUSLY DISCLOSED. 
Bodell indicated in discoveiy that it would measuie its damages as the amount Bodell 
loaned to Mi Jenson ($4 million, of which Mi Jenson lepaid moie than $3 million) plus mteiest 
at the legal late Now, thiough Mi Weight, Bodell attempts to ambush the defense with thiee 
entnely new, and entuely diffeient, alternative damages theoues Intioduction of these new 
theoues is seveiely piejudicial and unjustified 
A. The Defense is Prejudiced by the Introduction of New Theories. 
"[A] defendant is entitled to know which method [of damages] plaintiff is choosing m 
this case, and to know it in time to piepaie a defense " Piecision Seed Co v Consol Gram & 
BaigeCo, 2006 U S Dist LEXIS 29520, * 17 (S D Ohio May 6, 2006) (striking new damages 
theories not pieviously disclosed) (attached as Exh A) Bodell does not explain why it is 
changing damages theoues now Instead, it aigues that theie is no haim because its new theoues 
aie based on facts that aie "well-known by the paities and laigely undisputed " Bodell Opp at 2 
That is not so 
"Benefit of the Bargain" Theory To determine the value of the loan "as made1' vs "as 
lepiesented" the defense needs to discover fiom thnd-paities Jenson and MSF Pioperties then 
ability to lepay the $4 million loan at the time it was made The defense cannot get this 
infoimatioii fiom Mi Weight, and it is not "well-known" oi "laigely undisputed " 
"Reasonable Rate of Return" Theory To lespond to the leasonable late of letum 
theoiy the defense needs discoveiy of Bodell's loan histoiy, the loan histones of those thnd-
paities fiom whom Mi Weight assumes his late, and discoveiy fiom the thud-paity that Bodell 
claims he could have loaned to None of this has evei been disclosed 
Consequential Damages To lespond to this new theoiy, the defense needs the history 
of Bodell's ciedit line This would include subpoenaing bank lecoids and fact discoveiy of 
Bodell's expenses, investments, and othei confounding causes of Bodell's use of the line 
B. Bodell Otfeis no Valid Excuse for Failing to Disclose these New Theoiies. 
It is not "customaiy," as Bodell suggests, to wait until aftei the close of fact discoveiy to 
disclose a damages calculation See Drug Mait Pharm Coip v Am Home Prods Coip , 472 F 
Supp 2d 385, 421 & n 41 (E D N Y 2007) (disallowing plaintiffs from changing then 
"damages theoiies" dining expert discoveiy), Piecision Seed, 2006 U S Dist LEXIS 29520 at 
" ^ 9-15 (finding no justification foi failuie to disclose damages calculation even when the basis 
foi the damages theoiy was pioduced dmmg discoveiy), UtahR Civ P 26(a)(1)(C) (lequmng 
paities to disclose "computation of damages" m initial disclosuies), hi le Veeco Inst Sec Litig , 
2007 US Dist LEXIS 5969, h 6 ( S D N Y Jan 26, 2007) (compelling lesponses to 
mteiiogatoues "ielating to loss causation and damages" duimg fact discoveiy) (attached Exh B) 
Bodell aigues that his new theoiies aie "available to any paity who wished to leseaich 
what damages aie available to plaintiffs in fiaud actions m Utah " Bodell Opp at m, 3 That 
misses the point The defense is not lequned to feuet out theories that diffei from the one that 
Bodell explicitly said it was going to puisue 
II. MR. WEIGHT'S APPLICATION OF THE "BENEFIT OF THE BARGAIN" 
THEORY HAS NEVER BEEN APPLIED TO A LOAN TRANSACTION. 
In Mi Weight's "Benefit of the Baigam" theoiy he simply calculates the contiactual 
mteiest and othei fees that would be due fiom Mi Tenson undei the ternis of the note This type 
of contiact based measuie has never been applied to a loan tiansaction as damages available foi 
2 
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fraud, and it is in no way an application of the benefit of the bargain theory. 
A. The Benefit of the Bargain Theory Does not Apply to this Loan Transaction. 
No Utah court has ever applied the benefit of the bargain theory outside of the realm of 
tangible property that can be valued. See e^g. Pace v. Parrish, 122 Utah 141, 150 (Utah 1952) 
(real estate); Hecht v. Metzler, 14 Utah 408, 419 (Utah 1897) (real estate); Lamb v. Bangart, 525 
P.2d 602, 609 (Utah 1984) (livestock); Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239, 1247 (Utah 1980) (real 
Estate); Brown v. Richards, 840 P.2d 143, 151 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (real estate and business). 
See also Mike Finnin Ford, Inc. v. Automatic Data Processing, Inc., 220 F.Supp.2d 970, 977-78 
(software); Sigman v. Stevens-Norton, Inc., 425 P.2d 891, 895 (Wash. 1967) (real estate as 
security); Stewart v. Potter, 104 P.2d 736, 739 (N.M. 1940) (automobile); Schwab v. Phillip 
Moms USA, Inc., 449 F.Supp.2d 992, 1058-59 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (cigarettes). 
On the other hand, cases indicate that the benefit of the bargain theory is not applicable to 
loan transactions where there is no real or personal property collateral. McLean v. Charles Ellis 
Realty, Inc., 76 P.3d 661, 667 (Ore. Ct. App. 2003); Home v. Walton, 117 111. 130, 134-135 (111. 
1886) (where there was only a loan, the damage "was the money [the fraud victim] parted with, 
and interest thereon"). The reason for this is simple: the benefit of the bargain measure is not 
"particularly apt where, as here, no property changed hands between plaintiff and defendants and 
a value comparison is not available." McLean, 76 P.3d at 667.2 
B. Mr. Weight has not Performed a Benefit of the Bargain Analysis, but Has 
Merely Calculated the Terms of the Loan to Jenson. 
Even if the Court were to extend the benefit of the bargain rule to a loan transaction, Mr. 
~ McLean is important because it is the only known case where a party has argued for exactly what Mr. Weight 
proposes here—using the total amount owed under the note as a measure for fraud damages. McLean firmly 
rejected this as a measure of fraud damages. 76 P.3d at 667. 
3 
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Weight has not made a benefit of the baigain analysis consistent with the authority Bodell cites 
The benefit of the baigam mle lequnes calculating "the diffei ence between the actual value of 
what [is] leceived and the value theieof as lepiesented " Dilworth v Lauutzen, 424 P 2d 136, 
137-38 (Utah 1967) Sigman v Stevens-Noiton, Inc , 425 P 2d 891, 893 (Wash 1967), cited by 
Bodell, is illustrative In Sigman, the couit explained that the piopei measiue of damages was 
"the difference between the value of the note and the mortgage had the same been as lepiesented, 
and the actual value of such note and mortgage on the date of the loan—'the benefit of the 
baigam' mle " Id at 895 The court explained that to calculate this diffelence one "must look to 
the undei lying secunty, but one must also look to the lepayment ability of the bonowei, the 
natuie of pnoi encumbiances, the position of the lendei m case of default, the income fiom 
lentals, the chaiactei of the bonowei and other factois " Id at 895-96 
Mi Weight does not calculate the actual value of the loan as made by Bodell, or what 
that loan would have been worth if the lepiesentations were true—he does not calculate a 
difference Mi Weight ignoies the fact that the loan as made actually did have value—as 
evidenced by the fact that Jenson made substantial payments on the loan Thus, Mi Weight's 
calculation should be excluded because it is not a benefit of the bargain analysis at all 
III. MR. WEIGHT'S "RATE OF RETURN" AND CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES 
CALCULATIONS ARE NOT BASED IN FACT. 
Bodell cannot beai its buiden of showing that Mr Weight's "Rate of Return" and 
consequential damages calculations aie a diiect and pioximate lesult ol Robbms' actions Dugan 
v Tones, 615 P 2d 1329, 1250 (Utah 1980) As Bodell admits, causation must be shown with 
Reasonable ceitainty " Qng Int'l ( U S A ) Inc v 11th Ave Coip , 850 P 2d 447, 457 (Utah 1993) 
By assuming causation on this point, Mi Weight's calculation becomes too fai afield of the 
4 
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actual facts in the lecoid, theiefoie, Mi Weight's opinions should be excluded 
Theie is nothing that lequnes this Couit to "admit opinion evidence which is connected 
to existing data only by the ipse dixit of the expeit A court may conclude that theie is simply 
too gieat an analytical gap between the data and the opinion pioffeied " Geneial Electnc Co v 
Toinei, 522 U S 136, 147 (1997) Bodell completely ignoies facts that nullify Mr Weight's 
opinions Significantly, Mr Weight's opinion claims mteiest on funds bonowed by Bodell that 
exceed the $4 million loaned to Jenson These amounts cannot be attiibutable to the defendants 
In addition, Mi Weight does not considei any of the other potentially confounding causes of 
Bodell's alleged damages—including othei investments made by Bodell and Mi Bodell's 
divoice obligations Mi Weight's testimony on consequential damages should be excluded 
because it fails foi causation 
Bodell also ignoies evidence that shows that Mr Weight's "Rate of Return" calculation is 
not connected to the evidence m this case Fust, Mi Weight himself admitted that Bodell only 
makes loans if it can "find" them Weight Depo at 14 8-11 Second, Mi Weight does not 
considei Bodell's histoiy of making loans in assuming an 18 peicent figuie of leturn, but looks 
to loans made by thud paities Thud, Mi Weight ignoies the evidence of lecoid of Bodell's 
actual late of Ietuin on these types of tiansactions—Mi Bodell's testimony that the letum is 
between 5 and 15 peicent, not the 18 peicent Mi Weight claims Bodell Depo at 16 7-18 Mi 
Weight's failuie to considei these facts cieates too big of an "analytical gap" between the 
evidence and Mi Weight's opinions, theiefoie, Mi Weight's testimony as to late of ietuin 
should be excluded 
SLC 82234 
5 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Mr. Weight's Benefit of the Bargain theory, Modified Benefit of 
the Bargain Theory, Consequential Damages calculation and Comparable Rate of Return 
calculation should be excluded. In the alternative, if these theories are going to be allowed, 
defendants should be granted additional time to conduct fact discovery relating to the facts that 
Weight bases his calculations on and the deadlines for expert disclosures and the trial date should 
be extended accordingly until such additional discovery can be completed. 
1 
Dated: July 25, 2007 DURHAM JONES & PINEGAR, P.C. 
David W. Tufts 
Erik A. Olson 
Jason R. Hull 
Attorneys for Mark Robbins 
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LEXSEE 2006 U S DIST LEXIS 29520 
PRECISION SEED CO., et al., Plaintills, -vs- CONSOLIDATED GRAIN & 
BARGE COMPANY, Defendant. 
Case No. 3:03-cv-079 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF 
OHIO, WESTERN DIVISION 
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29520 
Ma> 6, 2006, Decided 
SUBSEQUENT HISTORY: Sanctions disallowed by 
Pieciswn Seed Co v Consol Giain & Baige Co , 2006 
US Dist LEXIS 29755 (S D Ohio, May 16, 2006) 
PRIOR HISTORY: Piecmon Seed Co v Consol 
Giain & Baige Co , 2006 US Dist LEXIS 29524 (S D 
Ohio May 5 2006) 
COUNSEL: [x l ] Foi Piecision Seed Co, Mai tin Land 
Co, Plaintiffs Cynthia P McNamee, Michael Patnck 
McNamee, Nikolas P Mann, McNamee & McNamee 
PLL, Beavei Geek, OH, Patnck Jonathan Jams, Fieund 
Fieeze & Arnold - 3, Dayton, OH 
Foi David W Maitin, Plaintiff Cynthia P McNamee, 
Michael Patnck McNamee, Nikolas P Mann, McNamee 
& McNamee PLL, Beavei Geek, OH 
Foi Consolidated Giain & Baige Company, Defendant 
Omn Ehezei Piaiss, Saiah Catheiine Hellmann, Husch & 
Eppenbeigei, LLC, St Louis, MO, Robeit Edwaid Pen-
nine, Gottschlich & Poitune, LLP, Dayton, OH 
JUDGES: Michael R Meiz, Chief United States Magis-
tiate Judge 
OPINION BY: Michael R Meiz 
OPINION 
DECISION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFEN-
DANT'S MOTION IN LIMINE TO EXCLUDE 
EVIDENCE REL4TING TO DAMAGES NOT DIS-
CLOSED IN PLAINTIFFS' INTERROGATORY 
RESPONSE AND IN EXPERT REPORT 
This case is betoie the Couit on Defendant's Motion 
m Limine to Exclude Any Evidence Relating to Dam-
ages Allegedly Suffeied by Plaintiffs that Was Not Dis-
closed in Plaintiffs' Damages Intenogatoiy Response and 
in the Conespondmg Expeit Repoit of Giegoiy H To-
man and Request foi Expedited Ruling (Doc No 132) 
Plaintiffs oppose the Motion (Doc No 134) 
Procedural History 
[*2] This case was lemoved to this Couit on Maich 
12, 2003 ' A Piehmmaiy Pietnal Confeience Oidei was 
enteied by fudge Rose on Septembei 24, 2003, that con-
templated phased discoveiy with liability issues in Phase 
I and damages issues in Phase II and a tnal in June 2005 
(Doc No 36, See also the paities Rule 26(f) Repoit, 
Doc No 31) 
1 On Maich 31, 2006, it was officially lepoited 
to Congiess as having been pending longci than 
the piesumptive thiee-yeai limit set by the Civil 
Justice Refoim Act of 1990 Such cases lequne 
the highest pnonty foi tnal consistent with 
Speedy Tnal settings of cnminal cases 
Undei Fed R Civ P 26(a)(1)(C), each paity m fed-
eial litigation is lequned to disclose without demand 
a computation of any categoiy of dam-
ages claimed by the disclosing paity, 
making available foi inspection and copy-
ing as undei Rule 34 the documents oi 
othei evidentialy matenal, not pnvileged 
oi piotected fiom disclosuie, on which 
such computation [*3] is based, including 
matenal beanng on the natuie and extent 
of injuiies suffeied, 
The paities agieed m then Rule 26(f) Repoit (Doc No 
31) to make the Rule 26(a)(1) disclosuies on oi befoie 
August 6, 2003 On that date, Plaintiffs seived on Defen-
dant the following statement 
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In their complaint, the plaintiffs seek 
compensatory damages, punitive dam-
ages, an accounting, and attorneys' fees. 
Counsel for the parties have agreed to 
postpone any specific computation of any 
of these categories of damages pending 
the conclusion of "Phase I" of the parties' 
discovery. Upon completion of Phase I of 
discovery, the plaintiffs will automati-
cally, and promptly, supplement this dis-
closure to provide the necessary computa-
tion (and supporting documentation) for 
all categories of damages remaining rele-
vant at that time. 
(Exhibit 1 to Doc. No. 132). Plaintiffs have never sup-
plemented this disclosure. 
On September 12, 2003, Defendant served on Plain-
tiffs the following interrogatory: 
20. With respect to each item of damage 
that Plaintiffs claim in the First Amended 
Complaint, state: 
a. the nature of the damages (includ-
ing but not limited to whether the alleged 
[*4] damage relates to the handling fee, 
the storage fee, non-payment of 
weigher/grader, cost of purchase of the 
Facilities, cost of repairs to the Facilities, 
and/or cost of demolition of the Facili-
ties); 
b. the precise amount of each claim 
of damage; 
c. describe in detail all facts on which 
you rely in making each claim of damage; 
d. describe in detail the method by 
which you calculate each item of damage; 
and 
e. identify and produce all documents 
which support, refer or relate in any way 
to your responses to this interrogatory. 
Plaintiffs responded 
ANSWER: 
The Plaintiffs object to this interroga-
tory because it is unrelated to Phase I of 
discovery in this case, The Plaintiffs will 
respond to this interrogatory during Phase 
II of the discovery proceedings. 
(Plaintiffs' Responses to Defendant's Third Set of Inter-
rogatories, Exhibit 2 to Doc. No. 132). 
On April 21, 2005, Judge Rose entered an Amended 
Preliminary Pretrial Conference Order which eliminated 
the phased discovery; set a discovery deadline of No-
vember 3, 2005; and continued the trial to its present 
date, May 22, 2006. After the schedule was amended, 
Defendant sought an answer to its [*5] damages inter-
rogatory. On July 22, 2005, Plaintiffs provided the fol-
lowing answer to Interrogatory No. 20. 
ANSWER: 
See Plaintiffs' Financial Expert Wit-
ness Report, filed July 7, 2005, which 
contains detailed responses to subparts (a) 
- (d) above. 
Plaintiffs' financial expert specifically 
reserved the right to supplement his report 
based upon additional documents or evi-
dence that might become available. 
In addition, CGB maintains docu-
ments that support and will affect Plain-
tiffs' calculation of damages contained in 
the Financial Expert Witness Report. 
These documents, specifically with re-
spect to Topic No. 4, have recently been 
ordered by the Court to be produced. See 
Decision and Order (Doc. # 101). 
Plaintiffs reserve the right to supple-
ment this response based upon any docu-
ments produced as a result of the Court's 
recent Decision and Order (Doc. # 101). 
Defendant then deposed Plaintiffs' damages expert, 
Mr. Toman, just before November 1, 2005, discovery 
cut-off. He testified that he had no other opinions about 
damages beyond those he had disclosed and he has never 
supplemented his testimony or expert report. 
On April 26, 2006, after a dispute in settlement [*6] 
negotiations about how much Plaintiffs could recover at 
trial, Plaintiffs served a supplemental answer to Inter-
rogatory 20 as follows: 
ANSWER: 
Plaintiffs object to this interrogatory 
to the extent that it calls for legal conclu-
sions and seeks information protected by 
the attorney-client privilege and/or the 
work product doctrine. 
^LllP. 
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Plaintiffs fuithei state that, at the time 
this inteuogatoiy was initially answeied, 
and at the time initial disclosuies weie 
made puisuant to Rule 26(a)(1), the pai-
ties had agieed to implement two phases 
of discoveiy - liability and then damages 
Without waiving these objections, and 
subject theieto, Plaintiffs respond as fol-
lows 
a. Damages with respect to remain-
ing claims are as follows: 
Count 1 - bieach of contiact, failuie 
to negotiate stoiage fees foi second and 
thud yeai in good faith, non-payment of 
weighei/giadei 
Count 3 - bieach of fiduciaiy duties 
ansing fiom attempt to foim paitneiship 
legaidmg seed piogiam and seed manual 
Count 4 - fraud legaidmg CGB's in-
tent to woik foi mutual benefit and con-
cealment of fact that it had no intention of 
hononng paitneiship and intended to use 
seed piogiam foi [*7] its own use 
Count 5 
Seciets Act 
violation of Uniform Tiade 
Count 7 - conveision of Mai tin Land 
Company funds 
b. Precise amount of each damage 
claim: 
Count 1 - $ 350,000 foi stoiage fees 
foi both yeais plus $ 47,000 foi 
weighei/giadei foi a total of $ 397,000 
Count 3 - specific dollai amount un-
known and to be deteimined by the juiy 
as no authouty addiesses measuie of 
damages foi bieach of fiduciaiy duty dui-
mg foimation of paitneiship, howevei, at 
the veiy least, R C 1775 20 piovides the 
lemedy of an accounting 
Count 4 - specific dollai amount un-
known and to be detei mined by the juiy, 
howevei, compensatoiy damages include 
puichase puce of Facilities, tiavel time 
and expenses 
Count 5- specific dollai amount to be 
detei mined at tnal, while Plaintiffs' eco-
nomic exeit Gieg Toman's lepoit states 
damages in the amount of $ 152,275, he 
specifically iesei\ed the light to supple-
ment his opinion on the quantity and ex-
piessly based the figuie on assumptions 
and limited documentation, in addition, 
Sixth Cucuit authouty permits David 
Mai tin to testify as to tiade seciet dam-
ages and the amount of damages will be 
calculated based on a minimum of [H 8] 
500,000 bushels 
Count7-$ 5,500 
c The facts suppoitmg each claim aie 
found in Gieg Toman's expeit report, 
deposition testimony from this case and 
all documents pioduced m discoveiy 
d The methods of damages calcula-
tions aie descnbed above and m Gieg 
Toman's expeit lepoit, with lespect to 
damages on the tiade seciets claim, the $ 
4 75 maiket puce pei bushel at relevant 
time less $ 3 85 total cost pei bushel = 90 
cents maigin pei bushel x numbei of 
bushels (500,000 minimum) 
e All documents suppoitmg each 
damage claim have been exchanged m 
discoveiy 
(Exhibit 6 to Doc No 132) 
Analysis 
Defendant seeks to exclude at tiial any damage the-
oiy oi evidence not disclosed by Plaintiffs' damages ex-
peit, Gieg Toman, in his lepoit oi deposition because it 
lead Plaintiffs' July, 2005, answei to Inteuogatoiy 20 as 
saying that Toman would be the sole source of damages 
testimony (Motion Doc No 132) Defendant lehes on 
Fed R Civ P 37(c)(1) which piovides 
A paity that without substantial justifi-
cation fails to disclose infoimation le-
quned by Rule 26(a) oi 26(e)(1), oi to 
amend a pnoi lesponse [h9] to drscovery 
as lequued by Rule 26(e)(2), is not, unless 
such failuie is haimless, peimitted to use 
as evidence at trial, at a healing, oi on a 
motion any witness oi infoimation not so 
disclosed 
Defendant notes that Plaintiffs nevei supplemented 
then Rule 26(a)(1) disclosure and Toman nevei supple-
mented his expeit lepoit, the only supplementation on 
damages has been the amended answei to Inteuogatoiy 
Page 4 
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20 which came less than a month befoie tnal when the 
paities disagieed in settlement negotiations about Plain-
tiffs' potential lecoveiy Defendant digues the amended 
answei is not timely supplementation because it mtio-
duces new theones, new amounts, and at least one new 
damages witness, Plaintiff David Mai tin, and Defendant 
has had no oppoitunity foi chscoveiy on this amended 
answei Theiefoie, Defendant aigues, the late supple-
mentation is not justified and ceitainly not haimless, 
since discoveiy has closed 
Plaintiffs oppose the Motion in Limine because they 
claim "(A) CGB has not demonstiated the Plaintiffs' 
lesponse did not comply with Fed R Civ P 26(a) oi 
alternatively supplementation was justified, (B) CGB 
was not piejudiced [ 4 0 ] by the supplementation, and 
(C) CGB's own actions mandate denial of the Motion m 
Limine " (Memoiandum in Opposition, Doc No 134, at 
2) 
Plaintiffs asseit fust that Defendant mismterpiets 
then Answei to Intenogatoiy No 20 to say they would 
lely solely on Mi Toman to testify on damages (Doc 
No 134 at 6), but the Couit finds that to be a completely 
leasonable interpietation of the ongmal Answei While it 
indicates Mi Toman may supplement his lepoit, he has 
nevei done so While it indicates Plaintiff may disco\ ei 
new documents as a lesult of the Couit's oidei compel-
ling Defendant to pioduce and may supplement based on 
those documents, Plaintiffs nevei supplemented on then 
own initiative as Rule 26(e) lequnes and have sought to 
add fai moie than numbeis denved from late-pioduced 
documents 
1. Duty to Supplement 
Plaintiffs next aigue that, befoie it can justify sanc-
tions undei Fed R Civ P 37(c)(1), Defendant must 
show that "the 'new' damages infoimation fell within the 
ambit of Rule 26(a) and, m fact, cannot do so because 
the Plaintiffs mfoimed CGB of then intention to put on 
evidence legaidmg the costs of [^11] the subject Facili-
ties ovei thiee yeais ago " Id at 9 Plaintiffs claim De-
fendant acknowledges this fact in footnote 4 of the Mo-
tion in Limine In fact that footnote leads 
Plaintiffs' claim foi damages concerning 
the puichase puce of the Facilities is out-
lageous Indeed, on May 31, 2005, CGB 
pieviously moved foi summaiy judgment 
with lespect to this exact damages claim 
See CGB's Second Motion foi Paitial 
Summaiy Judgment, Document 79 1, pp 
17-19 On June 21, 2005, Plaintiffs le-
sponded that such issue was not upe foi 
this Couit's decision See Pltfs' Opposition 
to Second Motion foi Paitial Summaiy 
ludgment, Document 90-1, pp 38-39 
Now, Plaintiffs appeal to be making a 
claim foi such damages 
(Doc No 132 at 5 ) In fact, the footnote is not an ac-
knowledgment that Plaintiffs have evei answeied Intel -
logatoiy No 20 as to damages foi the purchase puce of 
the Facilities Instead, it is an expiession of outiage that, 
despite having made such a claim dunng the pendency of 
the suit, Plaintiffs have not pioduced an answei to Intel-
logatoiy No 20 with respect to such damages Foi ex-
ample, what is the claimed amount of such damages9 
Even the Apnl 26, 2006, answei [h 12] says the amount 
is as yet undetei mined 
With lespect to damages foi misappiopnation of 
tiade seciets, Plaintiffs asseit that 
undei Ohio law the damages to be 
awaided foi the impioper use of a tiade 
seciet aie often determined by a juiy, not 
by a mathematical calculation established 
by an expeit Lay witness testimony is 
unquestionably appiopnate foi this pui-
pose 
(Memoiandum in Opposition, Doc No 134, at 6 ) Plain-
tiffs asseit that tiade seciet damages "simply do not fall 
within the ambit of Rule 26(a) " They purpoit to quote 
the Advisoiy Committee to this effect 
As explained m the Advisoiy Commit-
tee Notes to the 1993 Amendments to 
Rule 26, the supplementation " 
obligation applies only with lespect to 
documents then leasonably available 
Likewise, a paity would not be expected 
to piovide a calculation of damages 
which, as in may [sic] patent infiingement 
actions, depends on infoimation in the 
possession of anothei paity oi peison " 
(Doc No 134 at 9-10) This is a senous misquotation, 
quoted language appeals in the Advisoiy Committee 
Notes to the 1993 Amendments to Fed R Civ P 
26(a)(1)(C) which piescnbes the initial [ t13] disclosuie 
lequnement, not in the Notes to Fed R Civ P 26(e), 
the supplementation requirement. 
In asseitmg they had no duty to supplement, Plain-
tiffs lely on Johnson v H K Webstei Inc , 775 F 2d 1, 3 
Fed R Seiv 3d 20 (1st Cir 1985) Howevei, the Fust 
Cncuit in that case was inteipietmg the pie-1993 veision 
oi Fed R Civ P 26(e) which pi ovided 
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Supplementation ot Responses: A 
paity who has lesponded to a lequest fot 
discoveiy with a lesponse that was com-
plete when made is under no duty to sup-
plement his lesponse to include nifoima-
tion theieaftei acqiuied, except as fol-
lows 
The 1993 Amendments to Rule 26 veiy substantially 
changed the obligation to supplement The Fust Cncuit 
itself lecognized this m Klonoski v Mahlab 156 F3d 
255 (1st Cu 1998) holding e\piessly with lespect to 
Johnson v Webstei that "pie 1993 cases analyzing the 
sanction issue undei the pie amendment iiibnc letain 
only limited authouty in this post amendment eia " Id at 
269 n 5 Klonoski is not cited by Plaintiffs, but was 
leadily levealed when the Couit [x14] shepaidized 
Johnson 
Based on then analysis of Rule 26, Plaintiffs asseit 
they weie not lequued to supplement the pnoi answei to 
Inteilogatoiy 20 at all, but that it was "piovided solely as 
a giatuitous accommodation to CGB, as it is the juiy that 
will make this ultimate deteimination at tnal anyway 
See Aveiy Denmson Coip v Fow PiUais Enteipnse 
Co and PY 45 Fed Appx 479 60 Fed R Evid Seiv 
353 (CA 6 2002) " The fact that a juiy will decide a 
question does not excuse a paity fiom telling its oppo-
nent what testimony it will place befoie the juiy to make 
that deteimination Aveiy Denmson does not purpoit m 
any way to speak to the duties of a paity in discoveiy 
Plaintiffs weie undei a duty imposed by Fed R 
Civ P 26(e) to timely supplement both then Rule 
26(a)(1) disclosures and then answei to Intenogatoiy 20, 
then aigument that they had no such duty in unpeisua 
si\e 
2. Justification lor Late Supplementation: 
Plaintiffs then aigue "Mi Mai tin's testimony about 
the Plaintiffs' damages with legaid to CGB's unauthoi-
lzed use of the Seed Manual is solely based upon piojec 
tions [ 15] and documents piovided by and in the pos-
session of CGB " Id at 10 They note that the 500,000 
bushel piojection which will foim the basis of Mi Mai 
tin's piojected testimony is taken duectly fiom Consoh 
dated's documents pioduced in discoveiy Id 
Plaintiffs claim then late supplementation is justified 
by Defendant's failuie to tequest supplementation until 
the time when it was pioduced (Memoiandum in Oppo-
sition, Doc No 134, at 11) Plaintiffs also aigue that 
then failuie to supplement is justified by Consolidated's 
hawm> moved foi summaiy judgment on Plaintiffs' tiade 
seciet claim Id They aigue "[i]f CGB had piovided the 
Plaintiffs with mfoimation legaidmg Piecision Soya, 
which it was lequued to do, then the Plaintiffs would 
have known eaiher that tiade seciet damages would be 
lelevant foi tnal" Id Howevei, the duty to supplement 
undei Fed R Civ P 26(e) is not tnggeied by an oppos-
ing paity's lequest oi suspended by an opponent's sum 
maiy judgment motion Instead, "[t]he obligation to sup-
plement disclosuies and discoveiy lesponses applies 
whenevei a paity learns that its pnoi disclosuies oi le 
spouses [*16] aie in some mateual lespect incomplete oi 
mcoiiect" Advisoiy Committee Notes to 1993 Amend 
ment to Rule 26(e) 
Assuming Plaintiffs learned veiy late in the discov 
eiy penod about the Piecision Soya-Consolidated 
500,000 bushel piojection, ' they weie without justifica-
tion m waiting six months to amend the answei 
2 The Couit heie meiely uses Plaintiffs' chaiac-
tenzation of this mfoimation, as the Couit has not 
seen this mateual 
3. Late Supplementation is Harmless 
Next Plaintiffs asseit that their late disclosuie is 
haimless because Count 5 foi misappiopuation of tiade 
seciets was pled fiom the veiy beginning of the case and 
"the natuie of damages available foi a violation of Ohio's 
Umfoim Trade Seciets Act call foi a detemnnation by a 
juiy and simply do not lend themselves to the absolute, 
mathematical calculation demanded by CGB " (Memo-
iandum m Opposition, Doc No 134, at 12 ) 
This aigument misses the point entnely The fact 
that a juiy will make the deteimination of damages m no 
way [*17] implies that an opposing paity is not entitled 
to discoveiy the testimony on which the juiy will make 
that deteimination The authouty cited by Plaintiffs does 
indeed hold that "plaintiffs have used a numbei of diffei-
ent methods of calculation to determine damages " Mid-
Miclugan Compute) Systems Inc v Glassman 416 F 3d 
505 510 (6th Cu 2005), quoting Aveiy Denmson Coip 
v Fow Pillais Enteipnse Co, 45 Fed Appx 479 485 
(6th Cu 2002) But this authouty suppoits Defendant's 
position on the instant Motion lathei than Plaintiffs' if 
theie aie a numbei of diffeient methods a plaintiff might 
choose among for pioving damages, a defendant is enti-
tled to know which method this paiticulai plaintiff is 
choosing m this case, and to know it m time to piepaie a 
defense 
Appaiently Plaintiffs now expect to use a "leason 
able loyalty" appioach to damages, which is one of the 
measuies of damages contemplated by Ohio Re\ised 
Code § 1333 63 and Mid Michigan supia They state 
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Mi Mai tin ceitamly has the light to tes-
tify as to his belief about what a reason-
able loyalty should be [but] his testimony 
[*18] is not dispositive In sum then, 
CGB cannot be haimed or prejudiced by 
the Aptil supplementation because it is 
the juiy's calculation of loyalty damages 
that is important, not Mi Mai tin's 
(Memoiandum in Opposition, Doc No 134, at 13 ) But 
even the Apnl 26, 2006, supplementation does not say 
Plaintiffs aie using a leasonable loyalty method, what 
Mi Mai tin believes the leasonable loyalty late is, how 
he leached that conclusion, and why the late he will tes-
tify to is leasonable The fact that the Sixth Cucuit has 
appioved the leasonable loyalty method says nothing 
about Mi Mai tin's competence to testify what a leasona-
bly loyalty late is oi that he can take the stand to state his 
"belief without having disclosed the basis foi it pnoi to 
tnal 
States 1999 US App LEXIS 14943, 
1999 WL 455435, at *3 (1999) (footnote 
omitted), see also Salgado v Genet al Mo-
tois Coip, 150 F3d 735, 742 (7th Cir 
1998) [*20] (noting that "the sanction of 
exclusion is automatic and mandatory 
unless the sanctioned paity can show that 
its violation of Rule 26(a) was eithei justi-
fied oi haimless") We agiee with the cu-
cuits that have put the bin den on the po-
tentially sanctioned paity to piove haim-
lessness See Salgado, 150 F 3d at 741-
42, Wilson v Biadlees of New England 
Inc 250 F3d 10, 21 (1st Cu 2001), 
Heidtman v County of El Paso, 171 F 3d 
1038, 1040 (5th Cu 1999) The decision 
not to impose sanctions is leviewed foi an 
abuse of disci etion See King v Foul Mo-
toi Co , 209 F 3d 886, 900 (6th Cu ) , ceit 
denied, 531 US 960, 148 L Ed 2d 298 
121 S Ct 386(2000) 
4. Competing Disco\ery Misconduct 
In the last section of then Memoiandum m Opposi-
tion, Plaintiffs ask the Couit to weigh any violation of 
Rule 26(e) which they aie found to have committed 
against Consohdated's discoveiy violations They asseit 
"CGB's failuie to forward the Piecision Soya documenta-
tion, standing alone, moie than offsets any haim CGB 
might expenence due to the late supplementation " 
(Id [""19] at 16), leading to the conclusion Plaintiffs 
should not be sanctioned at all In suggesting this would 
be appiopnate, Plaintiffs lely entuely on case authonty 
fiom befoie the 1993 Amendment to Fed R Civ P 
37(c)(1) which piovides in peitinent part as follows 
A party that without substantial justifi-
cation fails to disclose infoimation re-
quired by Rule 26(a) or 26(e)(1), or to 
amend a pnoi response to discoveiy as 
lequned by Rule 26(e)(2), is not, unless 
such failuie is haimless, peimitted to use 
as evidence at tnal, at a heaung, or on a 
motion any witness oi infoimation not so 
disclosed 
In mteipieting this Rule, the Sixth Cucuit has held 
Fedeial Rule of Civil Pioceduie 
37(c)(1) lequnes absolute compliance 
with Rule 26(a), that is, it "mandates that 
a tnal couit punish a paity foi discoveiy 
violations in connection with Rule 26 
unless the violation was haimless oi is 
substantially justified " Vance v United 
Robei ts v Galen of Va , Inc, 325 F 3d 776, 782 (6th Cu 
2003) Plaintiffs have not pioved that then failuie to 
comply at an appiopnate time withFedf R Civ P 26(e) 
was eithei haimless oi substantially justified 
The Couit expiessly lejects Plaintiffs' aigument that 
Defendant's lesistance to discovery justifies then late 
lesponse The piopei method of dealing with discoveiy 
violations is to file [*21] a motion to compel When 
Plaintiffs did so, they leceived this Couit's assistance 
(See Decision and Oidei, Doc No 101) 
Conclusion 
Accoidmgly, Defendant's Motion in Limine to Ex-
clude Any Evidence Relating to Damages Allegedly Suf-
feied by Plaintiffs that Was Not Disclosed in Plaintiffs' 
Damages Intellogatoiy Response and in the Conespond-
mg Expeit Repoit ot Giegoiy H Toman is GRANTED 
Plaintiffs' damages testimony at tnal is limited to that 
disclosed by Giegoiy H Toman in his expeit lepoit and 
deposition If Mi Toman states in his expeit lepoit that 
the amount of damages from imposing a leasonable loy-
alty late is dependent on the numbei of bushels Consoli-
dated would have sold and Plaintiffs can show the num-
bei of bushel piojection they lely on was made by Con-
solidated m documents which Consolidated should ha\ e 
pioduced eaihei but did not pioduce until the end of dis-
coveiy oi which Plaintiffs had to obtain fiom Piecision 
Soya, then Mi Toman may base his testimony on that 
figuie 
May 6, 2006 
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29520, * 
Page 7 
s/ Michael R. Merz Chief United States Magistrate Judge 
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OPINION 
DECISION AND ORDER 
Befoie the Coiut aie discoveiy disputes concerning 
the objections of the Lead Plaintiff to fifteen uiteiiogato-
nes issued by the Defendants m this action The Coiut 
mles as follows 
A Intel wgatones 1-3 
Inteilogatoiy 1 seeks the identity of the peisons 
identified in the complaint heiein as CW1, CW2, and 
CW3 Intenogatoiies 2 and 3 lequests Lead Plaintiff to 
identify othei peisons who piovided Lead Plaintiff with 
infoimation concerning the allegations in the complaint, 
and any documents piovided by those peisons Lead 
Plaintiff asseits that the infoimation sought by Defen-
dants is piotected by the woik-pioduct doc time and De-
fendants have not demolishated a substantial need foi 
compelling disco\eiy 
[ 4] Defendants piovided its Rule 26 disclosuies 
on Apnl 10, 2006 that included a list of peisons whom 
Lead Plaintiff believed had knowledge of the allegations 
in the complaint Lead Plaintiff has confiimed that the 
list included the names of CW1, CW2 and CW3 In le 
Initial Public Offenng Sec Litig, 220 FRD 30 
(SD NY 2003), lends suppoit to Lead Plaintiffs posi-
tion that the identity of the thiee confidential witnesses 
set foith m the complaint filed by the Lead Plaintiff 
should be piotected fiom disclosuie by the attorney 
woik-pioduct doctnne In holding that the names of wit-
nesses who allegedly enteied into tie-in agieement weie 
not piotected by the woik-pioduct pnvilege, that coiut 
noted that" plaintiffs have not piovided a list of poten-
tial witnesses, let alone one that includes eveiyone le-
quned to entei into tie-in agieements " Id at 36 The 
coiut emphasized that defendants weie simply asking foi 
the list of potential witnesses, " not the subset of people 
intei viewed by counsel" Id 
Heie, as stated above, Lead Plaintiffs have long ago 
piovided the list of witnesses who they believed had pei-
sonal knowledge of the allegations [*5] in the com-
plaint Defendants essentially seek the identity of wit-
nesses mteiviewed by counsel foi the Lead Plaintiffs and 
lehed upon m the piepaiation of the complaint Such 
infoimation would demonstiate which witnesses that 
Lead Plaintiff deems impoitaiit and is piotected fiom 
disclosuie by the woik-pioduct pnvilege The Coiut fui-
thei finds that the fifty-five potential witnesses identified 
heie by Lead Plaintiff as foimei officeis, dnectois, and 
employees of Veeco was not an unmanageable numbei, 
paiticulaily given the disclosuie of the names on Apnl 
10, 2006 Moieo\ei, the Couit concludes that Defendants 
have not demo nsti ated a substantial need foi the answeis 
and given the extensive disco veiy in this case will not 
suffei an undue bin den without the infoimation sought 
Accoidingly, Defendants' motion to compel le-
sponses to Intenogatoiy Nos 1-3 is denied 
B Intei i ogatoiy Nos 4-13 
Lead Plaintiff objects to Intenogatoiy Nos 4-13 as 
contention intenogatoiies that aie piematuie Defendants 
asseit that said lequests aie not contention intenogatoiies 
and, in any event, they would not be piematuie as the 
discoveiy deadline is Januaiy 31, 2007 
Local Rule 33 3(c) piovides [x6] that at the conclu-
sion of othei discoveiy, and at least 30 days pnoi to the 
discoveiy cut-off date, intenogatoiies seeking the claims 
and contentions of the opposing paity may be seived 
unless the coiut has oideied otherwise The Couit con-
cludes that said lequests aie not contention intenogato-
iies Accoidingly, Lead Plaintiff is duected to lespond to 
the intenogatoiies 
Intei i ogatoiy Nos 14-15 
Lead Plaintiff asseits that intenogatoiy Nos 14-15 
lelating to loss causation and damages aie contention 
intenogatoiies oi should be leseived foi expeit discov-
eiy Local Rule 33 3(a) piovides m pait that intenogato-
iies duected to "the computation of each categoiy of 
damage alleged" aie allowed at the commencement of 
discoveiy As such, Lead Plaintiff is duected to lespond 
to said intenogatoiies based on the infoimation available 
to it Lead Plaintiff may supplement said Iespouses as 
they deem appiopnate aftei expeit discoveiy 
SO ORDERED 
Dated Januaiy 26, 2007 
White Plains, New Yoik 
GEORGE A YANTHIS, U S M J 
